From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Network Development <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>, kernel-team <kernel-team@fb.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 bpf-next 1/4] capability: introduce CAP_BPF and CAP_TRACING
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2019 15:52:27 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrVCimrLCzdZ2Jgb-AFd-Ptjd+MmyD-XW=baSt6uOOTtEg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190906231053.1276792-2-ast@kernel.org>
On Fri, Sep 6, 2019 at 4:10 PM Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> Split BPF and perf/tracing operations that are allowed under
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN into corresponding CAP_BPF and CAP_TRACING.
> For backward compatibility include them in CAP_SYS_ADMIN as well.
>
> The end result provides simple safety model for applications that use BPF:
> - for tracing program types
> BPF_PROG_TYPE_{KPROBE, TRACEPOINT, PERF_EVENT, RAW_TRACEPOINT, etc}
> use CAP_BPF and CAP_TRACING
> - for networking program types
> BPF_PROG_TYPE_{SCHED_CLS, XDP, CGROUP_SKB, SK_SKB, etc}
> use CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN
>
> There are few exceptions from this simple rule:
> - bpf_trace_printk() is allowed in networking programs, but it's using
> ftrace mechanism, hence this helper needs additional CAP_TRACING.
> - cpumap is used by XDP programs. Currently it's kept under CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
> but could be relaxed to CAP_NET_ADMIN in the future.
> - BPF_F_ZERO_SEED flag for hash/lru map is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN only
> to discourage production use.
> - BPF HW offload is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
> - cg_sysctl, cg_device, lirc program types are neither networking nor tracing.
> They can be loaded under CAP_BPF, but attach is allowed under CAP_NET_ADMIN.
> This will be cleaned up in the future.
>
> userid=nobody + (CAP_TRACING | CAP_NET_ADMIN) + CAP_BPF is safer than
> typical setup with userid=root and sudo by existing bpf applications.
> It's not secure, since these capabilities:
> - allow bpf progs access arbitrary memory
> - let tasks access any bpf map
> - let tasks attach/detach any bpf prog
>
> bpftool, bpftrace, bcc tools binaries should not be installed with
> cap_bpf+cap_tracing, since unpriv users will be able to read kernel secrets.
>
> CAP_BPF, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_TRACING are roughly equal in terms of
> damage they can make to the system.
> Example:
> CAP_NET_ADMIN can stop network traffic. CAP_BPF can write into map
> and if that map is used by firewall-like bpf prog the network traffic
> may stop.
> CAP_BPF allows many bpf prog_load commands in parallel. The verifier
> may consume large amount of memory and significantly slow down the system.
> CAP_TRACING allows many kprobes that can slow down the system.
Do we want to split CAP_TRACE_KERNEL and CAP_TRACE_USER? It's not
entirely clear to me that it's useful.
>
> In the future more fine-grained bpf permissions may be added.
>
> Existing unprivileged BPF operations are not affected.
> In particular unprivileged users are allowed to load socket_filter and cg_skb
> program types and to create array, hash, prog_array, map-in-map map types.
>
> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
> ---
> include/linux/capability.h | 18 +++++++++++
> include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 +--
> 3 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
> index ecce0f43c73a..13eb49c75797 100644
> --- a/include/linux/capability.h
> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h
> @@ -247,6 +247,24 @@ static inline bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
> return true;
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */
> +
> +static inline bool capable_bpf(void)
> +{
> + return capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || capable(CAP_BPF);
> +}
> +static inline bool capable_tracing(void)
> +{
> + return capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || capable(CAP_TRACING);
> +}
> +static inline bool capable_bpf_tracing(void)
> +{
> + return capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (capable(CAP_BPF) && capable(CAP_TRACING));
> +}
> +static inline bool capable_bpf_net_admin(void)
> +{
> + return (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || capable(CAP_BPF)) && capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN);
> +}
> +
These helpers are all wrong, unfortunately, since they will produce
inappropriate audit events. capable_bpf() should look more like this:
if (capable_noaudit(CAP_BPF))
return capable(CAP_BPF);
if (capable_noaudit(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
return capable(CAP_BPF);
James, etc: should there instead be new helpers to do this more
generically rather than going through the noaudit contortions? My
code above is horrible.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-09-09 22:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-09-06 23:10 [PATCH v4 bpf-next 0/4] CAP_BPF and CAP_TRACING Alexei Starovoitov
2019-09-06 23:10 ` [PATCH v4 bpf-next 1/4] capability: introduce " Alexei Starovoitov
2019-09-09 22:52 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2019-09-06 23:10 ` [PATCH v4 bpf-next 2/4] bpf: implement CAP_BPF Alexei Starovoitov
2019-09-06 23:10 ` [PATCH v4 bpf-next 3/4] perf: implement CAP_TRACING Alexei Starovoitov
2019-09-06 23:10 ` [PATCH v4 bpf-next 4/4] selftests/bpf: use CAP_BPF and CAP_TRACING in tests Alexei Starovoitov
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