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From: xiubli@redhat.com
To: idryomov@gmail.com, ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: jlayton@kernel.org, lhenriques@suse.de, vshankar@redhat.com,
	mchangir@redhat.com, Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v16 49/68] ceph: add truncate size handling support for fscrypt
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2023 11:27:54 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230227032813.337906-50-xiubli@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230227032813.337906-1-xiubli@redhat.com>

From: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>

This will transfer the encrypted last block contents to the MDS
along with the truncate request only when the new size is smaller
and not aligned to the fscrypt BLOCK size. When the last block is
located in the file hole, the truncate request will only contain
the header.

The MDS could fail to do the truncate if there has another client
or process has already updated the RADOS object which contains
the last block, and will return -EAGAIN, then the kclient needs
to retry it. The RMW will take around 50ms, and will let it retry
20 times for now.

Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
---
 fs/ceph/crypto.h |  21 +++++
 fs/ceph/inode.c  | 198 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 fs/ceph/super.h  |   5 ++
 3 files changed, 217 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.h b/fs/ceph/crypto.h
index 887f191cc423..db6b399645ba 100644
--- a/fs/ceph/crypto.h
+++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.h
@@ -26,6 +26,27 @@ struct ceph_fname {
 	bool		no_copy;
 };
 
+/*
+ * Header for the crypted file when truncating the size, this
+ * will be sent to MDS, and the MDS will update the encrypted
+ * last block and then truncate the size.
+ */
+struct ceph_fscrypt_truncate_size_header {
+	__u8  ver;
+	__u8  compat;
+
+	/*
+	 * It will be sizeof(assert_ver + file_offset + block_size)
+	 * if the last block is empty when it's located in a file
+	 * hole. Or the data_len will plus CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE.
+	 */
+	__le32 data_len;
+
+	__le64 change_attr;
+	__le64 file_offset;
+	__le32 block_size;
+} __packed;
+
 struct ceph_fscrypt_auth {
 	__le32	cfa_version;
 	__le32	cfa_blob_len;
diff --git a/fs/ceph/inode.c b/fs/ceph/inode.c
index ccb3e0e88800..2efd38fffed4 100644
--- a/fs/ceph/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/inode.c
@@ -595,6 +595,7 @@ struct inode *ceph_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb)
 	ci->i_truncate_seq = 0;
 	ci->i_truncate_size = 0;
 	ci->i_truncate_pending = 0;
+	ci->i_truncate_pagecache_size = 0;
 
 	ci->i_max_size = 0;
 	ci->i_reported_size = 0;
@@ -766,6 +767,10 @@ int ceph_fill_file_size(struct inode *inode, int issued,
 		dout("truncate_size %lld -> %llu\n", ci->i_truncate_size,
 		     truncate_size);
 		ci->i_truncate_size = truncate_size;
+		if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode))
+			ci->i_truncate_pagecache_size = size;
+		else
+			ci->i_truncate_pagecache_size = truncate_size;
 	}
 	return queue_trunc;
 }
@@ -2140,7 +2145,7 @@ void __ceph_do_pending_vmtruncate(struct inode *inode)
 	/* there should be no reader or writer */
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(ci->i_rd_ref || ci->i_wr_ref);
 
-	to = ci->i_truncate_size;
+	to = ci->i_truncate_pagecache_size;
 	wrbuffer_refs = ci->i_wrbuffer_ref;
 	dout("__do_pending_vmtruncate %p (%d) to %lld\n", inode,
 	     ci->i_truncate_pending, to);
@@ -2150,7 +2155,7 @@ void __ceph_do_pending_vmtruncate(struct inode *inode)
 	truncate_pagecache(inode, to);
 
 	spin_lock(&ci->i_ceph_lock);
-	if (to == ci->i_truncate_size) {
+	if (to == ci->i_truncate_pagecache_size) {
 		ci->i_truncate_pending = 0;
 		finish = 1;
 	}
@@ -2231,6 +2236,142 @@ static const struct inode_operations ceph_encrypted_symlink_iops = {
 	.listxattr = ceph_listxattr,
 };
 
+/*
+ * Transfer the encrypted last block to the MDS and the MDS
+ * will help update it when truncating a smaller size.
+ *
+ * We don't support a PAGE_SIZE that is smaller than the
+ * CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE.
+ */
+static int fill_fscrypt_truncate(struct inode *inode,
+				 struct ceph_mds_request *req,
+				 struct iattr *attr)
+{
+	struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode);
+	int boff = attr->ia_size % CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	loff_t pos, orig_pos = round_down(attr->ia_size, CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	u64 block = orig_pos >> CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SHIFT;
+	struct ceph_pagelist *pagelist = NULL;
+	struct kvec iov = {0};
+	struct iov_iter iter;
+	struct page *page = NULL;
+	struct ceph_fscrypt_truncate_size_header header;
+	int retry_op = 0;
+	int len = CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	loff_t i_size = i_size_read(inode);
+	int got, ret, issued;
+	u64 objver;
+
+	ret = __ceph_get_caps(inode, NULL, CEPH_CAP_FILE_RD, 0, -1, &got);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	issued = __ceph_caps_issued(ci, NULL);
+
+	dout("%s size %lld -> %lld got cap refs on %s, issued %s\n", __func__,
+	     i_size, attr->ia_size, ceph_cap_string(got),
+	     ceph_cap_string(issued));
+
+	/* Try to writeback the dirty pagecaches */
+	if (issued & (CEPH_CAP_FILE_BUFFER)) {
+		loff_t lend = orig_pos + CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SHIFT - 1;
+		ret = filemap_write_and_wait_range(inode->i_mapping,
+						   orig_pos, lend);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	page = __page_cache_alloc(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (page == NULL) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	pagelist = ceph_pagelist_alloc(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!pagelist) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	iov.iov_base = kmap_local_page(page);
+	iov.iov_len = len;
+	iov_iter_kvec(&iter, READ, &iov, 1, len);
+
+	pos = orig_pos;
+	ret = __ceph_sync_read(inode, &pos, &iter, &retry_op, &objver);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Insert the header first */
+	header.ver = 1;
+	header.compat = 1;
+	header.change_attr = cpu_to_le64(inode_peek_iversion_raw(inode));
+
+	/*
+	 * Always set the block_size to CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	 * because in MDS it may need this to do the truncate.
+	 */
+	header.block_size = cpu_to_le32(CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we hit a hole here, we should just skip filling
+	 * the fscrypt for the request, because once the fscrypt
+	 * is enabled, the file will be split into many blocks
+	 * with the size of CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE, if there
+	 * has a hole, the hole size should be multiple of block
+	 * size.
+	 *
+	 * If the Rados object doesn't exist, it will be set to 0.
+	 */
+	if (!objver) {
+		dout("%s hit hole, ppos %lld < size %lld\n", __func__,
+		     pos, i_size);
+
+		header.data_len = cpu_to_le32(8 + 8 + 4);
+		header.file_offset = 0;
+		ret = 0;
+	} else {
+		header.data_len = cpu_to_le32(8 + 8 + 4 + CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		header.file_offset = cpu_to_le64(orig_pos);
+
+		/* truncate and zero out the extra contents for the last block */
+		memset(iov.iov_base + boff, 0, PAGE_SIZE - boff);
+
+		/* encrypt the last block */
+		ret = ceph_fscrypt_encrypt_block_inplace(inode, page,
+						    CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE,
+						    0, block,
+						    GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Insert the header */
+	ret = ceph_pagelist_append(pagelist, &header, sizeof(header));
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (header.block_size) {
+		/* Append the last block contents to pagelist */
+		ret = ceph_pagelist_append(pagelist, iov.iov_base,
+					   CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	req->r_pagelist = pagelist;
+out:
+	dout("%s %p size dropping cap refs on %s\n", __func__,
+	     inode, ceph_cap_string(got));
+	ceph_put_cap_refs(ci, got);
+	if (iov.iov_base)
+		kunmap_local(iov.iov_base);
+	if (page)
+		__free_pages(page, 0);
+	if (ret && pagelist)
+		ceph_pagelist_release(pagelist);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr, struct ceph_iattr *cia)
 {
 	struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode);
@@ -2238,13 +2379,17 @@ int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr, struct ceph_iattr *c
 	struct ceph_mds_request *req;
 	struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc = ceph_sb_to_client(inode->i_sb)->mdsc;
 	struct ceph_cap_flush *prealloc_cf;
+	loff_t isize = i_size_read(inode);
 	int issued;
 	int release = 0, dirtied = 0;
 	int mask = 0;
 	int err = 0;
 	int inode_dirty_flags = 0;
 	bool lock_snap_rwsem = false;
+	bool fill_fscrypt;
+	int truncate_retry = 20; /* The RMW will take around 50ms */
 
+retry:
 	prealloc_cf = ceph_alloc_cap_flush();
 	if (!prealloc_cf)
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -2256,6 +2401,7 @@ int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr, struct ceph_iattr *c
 		return PTR_ERR(req);
 	}
 
+	fill_fscrypt = false;
 	spin_lock(&ci->i_ceph_lock);
 	issued = __ceph_caps_issued(ci, NULL);
 
@@ -2377,10 +2523,27 @@ int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr, struct ceph_iattr *c
 		}
 	}
 	if (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
-		loff_t isize = i_size_read(inode);
-
 		dout("setattr %p size %lld -> %lld\n", inode, isize, attr->ia_size);
-		if ((issued & CEPH_CAP_FILE_EXCL) && attr->ia_size >= isize) {
+		/*
+		 * Only when the new size is smaller and not aligned to
+		 * CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE will the RMW is needed.
+		 */
+		if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) && attr->ia_size < isize &&
+		    (attr->ia_size % CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
+			mask |= CEPH_SETATTR_SIZE;
+			release |= CEPH_CAP_FILE_SHARED | CEPH_CAP_FILE_EXCL |
+				   CEPH_CAP_FILE_RD | CEPH_CAP_FILE_WR;
+			set_bit(CEPH_MDS_R_FSCRYPT_FILE, &req->r_req_flags);
+			mask |= CEPH_SETATTR_FSCRYPT_FILE;
+			req->r_args.setattr.size =
+				cpu_to_le64(round_up(attr->ia_size,
+						     CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE));
+			req->r_args.setattr.old_size =
+				cpu_to_le64(round_up(isize,
+						     CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE));
+			req->r_fscrypt_file = attr->ia_size;
+			fill_fscrypt = true;
+		} else if ((issued & CEPH_CAP_FILE_EXCL) && attr->ia_size >= isize) {
 			if (attr->ia_size > isize) {
 				i_size_write(inode, attr->ia_size);
 				inode->i_blocks = calc_inode_blocks(attr->ia_size);
@@ -2403,7 +2566,6 @@ int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr, struct ceph_iattr *c
 					cpu_to_le64(round_up(isize,
 							     CEPH_FSCRYPT_BLOCK_SIZE));
 				req->r_fscrypt_file = attr->ia_size;
-				/* FIXME: client must zero out any partial blocks! */
 			} else {
 				req->r_args.setattr.size = cpu_to_le64(attr->ia_size);
 				req->r_args.setattr.old_size = cpu_to_le64(isize);
@@ -2470,8 +2632,10 @@ int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr, struct ceph_iattr *c
 
 	release &= issued;
 	spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock);
-	if (lock_snap_rwsem)
+	if (lock_snap_rwsem) {
 		up_read(&mdsc->snap_rwsem);
+		lock_snap_rwsem = false;
+	}
 
 	if (inode_dirty_flags)
 		__mark_inode_dirty(inode, inode_dirty_flags);
@@ -2483,7 +2647,27 @@ int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr, struct ceph_iattr *c
 		req->r_args.setattr.mask = cpu_to_le32(mask);
 		req->r_num_caps = 1;
 		req->r_stamp = attr->ia_ctime;
+		if (fill_fscrypt) {
+			err = fill_fscrypt_truncate(inode, req, attr);
+			if (err)
+				goto out;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * The truncate request will return -EAGAIN when the
+		 * last block has been updated just before the MDS
+		 * successfully gets the xlock for the FILE lock. To
+		 * avoid corrupting the file contents we need to retry
+		 * it.
+		 */
 		err = ceph_mdsc_do_request(mdsc, NULL, req);
+		if (err == -EAGAIN && truncate_retry--) {
+			dout("setattr %p result=%d (%s locally, %d remote), retry it!\n",
+			     inode, err, ceph_cap_string(dirtied), mask);
+			ceph_mdsc_put_request(req);
+			ceph_free_cap_flush(prealloc_cf);
+			goto retry;
+		}
 	}
 out:
 	dout("setattr %p result=%d (%s locally, %d remote)\n", inode, err,
diff --git a/fs/ceph/super.h b/fs/ceph/super.h
index 300e93bd3972..3df88811c7df 100644
--- a/fs/ceph/super.h
+++ b/fs/ceph/super.h
@@ -427,6 +427,11 @@ struct ceph_inode_info {
 	u32 i_truncate_seq;        /* last truncate to smaller size */
 	u64 i_truncate_size;       /*  and the size we last truncated down to */
 	int i_truncate_pending;    /*  still need to call vmtruncate */
+	/*
+	 * For none fscrypt case it equals to i_truncate_size or it will
+	 * equals to fscrypt_file_size
+	 */
+	u64 i_truncate_pagecache_size;
 
 	u64 i_max_size;            /* max file size authorized by mds */
 	u64 i_reported_size; /* (max_)size reported to or requested of mds */
-- 
2.31.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-02-27  3:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 84+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-02-27  3:27 [PATCH v16 00/68] ceph+fscrypt: full support xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 01/68] libceph: add spinlock around osd->o_requests xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 02/68] libceph: define struct ceph_sparse_extent and add some helpers xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 03/68] libceph: add sparse read support to msgr2 crc state machine xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 04/68] libceph: add sparse read support to OSD client xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 05/68] libceph: support sparse reads on msgr2 secure codepath xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 06/68] libceph: add sparse read support to msgr1 xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 07/68] ceph: add new mount option to enable sparse reads xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 08/68] ceph: preallocate inode for ops that may create one xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 09/68] ceph: make ceph_msdc_build_path use ref-walk xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 10/68] libceph: add new iov_iter-based ceph_msg_data_type and ceph_osd_data_type xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 11/68] ceph: use osd_req_op_extent_osd_iter for netfs reads xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 12/68] ceph: fscrypt_auth handling for ceph xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 13/68] ceph: ensure that we accept a new context from MDS for new inodes xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 14/68] ceph: add support for fscrypt_auth/fscrypt_file to cap messages xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 15/68] ceph: implement -o test_dummy_encryption mount option xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 16/68] ceph: decode alternate_name in lease info xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 17/68] ceph: add fscrypt ioctls xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 18/68] ceph: make the ioctl cmd more readable in debug log xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 19/68] ceph: add base64 endcoding routines for encrypted names xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 20/68] ceph: add encrypted fname handling to ceph_mdsc_build_path xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 21/68] ceph: send altname in MClientRequest xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 22/68] ceph: encode encrypted name in dentry release xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 23/68] ceph: properly set DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME flag in lookup xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 24/68] ceph: set DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME in atomic open xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 25/68] ceph: make d_revalidate call fscrypt revalidator for encrypted dentries xiubli
2023-03-07 18:53   ` Luís Henriques
2023-03-08  1:50     ` Xiubo Li
2023-03-08  9:29       ` Luís Henriques
2023-03-08 10:42         ` Xiubo Li
2023-03-08 17:14           ` Luís Henriques
2023-03-08 17:54             ` Jeff Layton
2023-03-08 18:30               ` Luís Henriques
2023-03-08 19:32                 ` Jeff Layton
2023-03-09  9:52                   ` Luís Henriques
2023-03-09  7:06             ` Xiubo Li
2023-03-09  9:55               ` Luís Henriques
2023-03-09 11:41                 ` Xiubo Li
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 26/68] ceph: add helpers for converting names for userland presentation xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 27/68] ceph: fix base64 encoded name's length check in ceph_fname_to_usr() xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 28/68] ceph: add fscrypt support to ceph_fill_trace xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 29/68] ceph: pass the request to parse_reply_info_readdir() xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 30/68] ceph: add ceph_encode_encrypted_dname() helper xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 31/68] ceph: add support to readdir for encrypted filenames xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 32/68] ceph: create symlinks with encrypted and base64-encoded targets xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 33/68] ceph: make ceph_get_name decrypt filenames xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 34/68] ceph: add a new ceph.fscrypt.auth vxattr xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 35/68] ceph: add some fscrypt guardrails xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 36/68] ceph: allow encrypting a directory while not having Ax caps xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 37/68] ceph: mark directory as non-complete after loading key xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 38/68] ceph: don't allow changing layout on encrypted files/directories xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 39/68] libceph: add CEPH_OSD_OP_ASSERT_VER support xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 40/68] ceph: size handling for encrypted inodes in cap updates xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 41/68] ceph: fscrypt_file field handling in MClientRequest messages xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 42/68] ceph: get file size from fscrypt_file when present in inode traces xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 43/68] ceph: handle fscrypt fields in cap messages from MDS xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 44/68] ceph: update WARN_ON message to pr_warn xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 45/68] ceph: add __ceph_get_caps helper support xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 46/68] ceph: add __ceph_sync_read " xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 47/68] ceph: add object version support for sync read xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 48/68] ceph: add infrastructure for file encryption and decryption xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` xiubli [this message]
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 50/68] libceph: allow ceph_osdc_new_request to accept a multi-op read xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 51/68] ceph: disable fallocate for encrypted inodes xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 52/68] ceph: disable copy offload on " xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 53/68] ceph: don't use special DIO path for " xiubli
2023-02-27  3:27 ` [PATCH v16 54/68] ceph: align data in pages in ceph_sync_write xiubli
2023-02-27  3:28 ` [PATCH v16 55/68] ceph: add read/modify/write to ceph_sync_write xiubli
2023-02-27  3:28 ` [PATCH v16 56/68] ceph: plumb in decryption during sync reads xiubli
2023-02-27  3:28 ` [PATCH v16 57/68] ceph: add fscrypt decryption support to ceph_netfs_issue_op xiubli
2023-02-27  3:28 ` [PATCH v16 58/68] ceph: set i_blkbits to crypto block size for encrypted inodes xiubli
2023-02-27  3:28 ` [PATCH v16 59/68] ceph: add encryption support to writepage xiubli
2023-02-27  3:28 ` [PATCH v16 60/68] ceph: fscrypt support for writepages xiubli
2023-02-27  3:28 ` [PATCH v16 61/68] ceph: invalidate pages when doing direct/sync writes xiubli
2023-02-27  3:28 ` [PATCH v16 62/68] ceph: add support for encrypted snapshot names xiubli
2023-02-27  3:28 ` [PATCH v16 63/68] ceph: add support for handling " xiubli
2023-02-27  3:28 ` [PATCH v16 64/68] ceph: update documentation regarding snapshot naming limitations xiubli
2023-02-27  3:28 ` [PATCH v16 65/68] ceph: prevent snapshots to be created in encrypted locked directories xiubli
2023-02-27  3:28 ` [PATCH v16 66/68] ceph: report STATX_ATTR_ENCRYPTED on encrypted inodes xiubli
2023-02-27  3:28 ` [PATCH v16 67/68] libceph: defer removing the req from osdc just after req->r_callback xiubli
2023-02-27  3:28 ` [PATCH v16 68/68] ceph: drop the messages from MDS when unmounting xiubli
2023-02-27  9:27 ` [PATCH v16 00/68] ceph+fscrypt: full support Luís Henriques
2023-02-27  9:58   ` Xiubo Li
2023-02-27 10:30     ` Luís Henriques

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