From: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com> To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>, Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, lhenriques@suse.de, khiremat@redhat.com Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v8 09/24] ceph: add ability to set fscrypt_auth via setattr Date: Wed, 1 Sep 2021 08:53:51 +0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <fca1da91-07aa-61ab-8d43-17a15a72691b@redhat.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <YS5s5mYZtc3r+K/E@sol.localdomain> On 9/1/21 1:54 AM, Eric Biggers wrote: > On Tue, Aug 31, 2021 at 09:50:32AM -0400, Jeff Layton wrote: >>>>>> + /* It should never be re-set once set */ >>>>>> + WARN_ON_ONCE(ci->fscrypt_auth); >>>>>> + >>>>> Maybe this should return -EEXIST if already set ? >>>>> >>>> I don't know. In general, once the context is set on an inode, we >>>> shouldn't ever reset it. That said, I think we might need to allow >>>> admins to override an existing context if it's corrupted. >>>> >>>> So, that's the rationale for the WARN_ON_ONCE. The admins should never >>>> do this under normal circumstances but they do have the ability to >>>> change it if needed (and we'll see a warning in the logs in that case). >>> I may miss some code in the fs/crypto/ layer. >>> >>> I readed that once the directory/file has set the policy context, it >>> will just return 0 if the new one matches the existence, if not match it >>> will return -EEXIST, or will try to call ceph layer to set it. >>> >>> So once this is set, my understanding is that it shouldn't be here ? >>> >> Where did you read that? If we have documented semantics we need to >> follow here, then we should change it to comply with them. >> > That is how FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY behaves, but the check for an existing > policy already happens in fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy(), so ->set_context doesn't > need to worry about it. Yeah, the FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY section in "Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst". > - Eric >
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-09-01 0:54 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2021-08-26 16:19 [RFC PATCH v8 00/24] ceph+fscrypt: context, filename and symlink support Jeff Layton 2021-08-26 16:19 ` [RFC PATCH v8 01/24] vfs: export new_inode_pseudo Jeff Layton 2021-08-26 16:19 ` [RFC PATCH v8 02/24] fscrypt: export fscrypt_base64url_encode and fscrypt_base64url_decode Jeff Layton 2021-08-26 16:19 ` [RFC PATCH v8 03/24] fscrypt: export fscrypt_fname_encrypt and fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size Jeff Layton 2021-08-26 16:19 ` [RFC PATCH v8 04/24] fscrypt: add fscrypt_context_for_new_inode Jeff Layton 2021-08-26 16:19 ` [RFC PATCH v8 05/24] ceph: preallocate inode for ops that may create one Jeff Layton 2021-08-26 16:19 ` [RFC PATCH v8 06/24] ceph: parse new fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file fields in inode traces Jeff Layton 2021-08-26 16:19 ` [RFC PATCH v8 07/24] ceph: add fscrypt_* handling to caps.c Jeff Layton 2021-08-26 16:19 ` [RFC PATCH v8 08/24] ceph: crypto context handling for ceph Jeff Layton 2021-08-26 16:19 ` [RFC PATCH v8 09/24] ceph: add ability to set fscrypt_auth via setattr Jeff Layton 2021-08-31 5:06 ` Xiubo Li 2021-08-31 12:43 ` Jeff Layton 2021-08-31 13:22 ` Xiubo Li 2021-08-31 13:50 ` Jeff Layton 2021-08-31 17:54 ` Eric Biggers 2021-09-01 0:53 ` Xiubo Li [this message] 2021-09-01 1:13 ` Xiubo Li 2021-09-01 12:02 ` Jeff Layton 2021-09-02 1:54 ` Xiubo Li 2021-08-26 16:20 ` [RFC PATCH v8 10/24] ceph: implement -o test_dummy_encryption mount option Jeff Layton 2021-08-26 16:20 ` [RFC PATCH v8 11/24] ceph: add fscrypt ioctls Jeff Layton 2021-08-26 16:20 ` [RFC PATCH v8 12/24] ceph: decode alternate_name in lease info Jeff Layton 2021-08-26 16:20 ` [RFC PATCH v8 13/24] ceph: make ceph_msdc_build_path use ref-walk Jeff Layton 2021-08-26 16:20 ` [RFC PATCH v8 14/24] ceph: add encrypted fname handling to ceph_mdsc_build_path Jeff Layton 2021-08-26 16:20 ` [RFC PATCH v8 15/24] ceph: send altname in MClientRequest Jeff Layton 2021-08-26 16:20 ` [RFC PATCH v8 16/24] ceph: encode encrypted name in dentry release Jeff Layton 2021-08-26 16:20 ` [RFC PATCH v8 17/24] ceph: properly set DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME flag in lookup Jeff Layton 2021-08-26 16:20 ` [RFC PATCH v8 18/24] ceph: make d_revalidate call fscrypt revalidator for encrypted dentries Jeff Layton 2021-08-26 16:20 ` [RFC PATCH v8 19/24] ceph: add helpers for converting names for userland presentation Jeff Layton 2021-08-26 16:20 ` [RFC PATCH v8 20/24] ceph: add fscrypt support to ceph_fill_trace Jeff Layton 2021-08-26 16:20 ` [RFC PATCH v8 21/24] ceph: add support to readdir for encrypted filenames Jeff Layton 2021-08-26 16:20 ` [RFC PATCH v8 22/24] ceph: create symlinks with encrypted and base64-encoded targets Jeff Layton 2021-08-26 16:20 ` [RFC PATCH v8 23/24] ceph: make ceph_get_name decrypt filenames Jeff Layton 2021-08-26 16:20 ` [RFC PATCH v8 24/24] ceph: add a new ceph.fscrypt.auth vxattr Jeff Layton
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