[PATCH 16/16] dnsproxy: fix compiler warnings (differing signedness, empty format string)

[Matthias Gerstner <matthias.gerstner@suse.de>]

There are some invocations of functions with implicit casts from
signed/unsigned char or vice versa. This has been inconsisent in the
beginning and future refactoring should choose a harmonized data type
for message buffers, maybe something like `uint8_t*`.
---
 src/dnsproxy.c | 15 ++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/dnsproxy.c b/src/dnsproxy.c
index 9ab4a6742..5d6e69cf6 100644
--- a/src/dnsproxy.c
+++ b/src/dnsproxy.c
@@ -1362,10 +1362,10 @@ static void cache_refresh(void)
 	g_hash_table_foreach(cache, cache_refresh_iterator, NULL);
 }
 
-static int reply_query_type(const unsigned char *msg, int len)
+static int reply_query_type(const char *msg, size_t len)
 {
 	/* skip the header */
-	const unsigned char *c = msg + DNS_HEADER_SIZE;
+	const unsigned char *c = (const unsigned char*)msg + DNS_HEADER_SIZE;
 	len -= DNS_HEADER_SIZE;
 
 	if (len < 0)
@@ -1416,7 +1416,8 @@ static int cache_update(struct server_data *srv, const char *msg, size_t msg_len
 	question[sizeof(question) - 1] = '\0';
 	int ttl = 0;
 	uint16_t answers = 0, type = 0, class = 0;
-	const int err = parse_response(msg + offset, msg_len - offset,
+	const int err = parse_response(
+				(unsigned char*)(msg + offset), msg_len - offset,
 				question, sizeof(question) - 1,
 				&type, &class, &ttl,
 				response, &rsplen, &answers);
@@ -2293,7 +2294,7 @@ static void destroy_server(struct server_data *server)
 static gboolean udp_server_event(GIOChannel *channel, GIOCondition condition,
 							gpointer user_data)
 {
-	unsigned char buf[4096];
+	char buf[4096];
 	struct server_data *data = user_data;
 
 	if (condition & (G_IO_NVAL | G_IO_ERR | G_IO_HUP)) {
@@ -2508,14 +2509,14 @@ hangup:
 		}
 
 		struct request_data *req = lookup_request(
-				reply->buf, reply->received, IPPROTO_TCP);
+				(const char*)reply->buf, reply->received, IPPROTO_TCP);
 
 		if (!req)
 			/* invalid / corrupt request */
 			return TRUE;
 
 		const int res = forward_dns_reply(
-			reply->buf, reply->received, IPPROTO_TCP, server, req);
+			(char*)reply->buf, reply->received, IPPROTO_TCP, server, req);
 
 		g_free(reply);
 		server->incoming_reply = NULL;
@@ -2542,7 +2543,7 @@ static gboolean tcp_idle_timeout(gpointer user_data)
 {
 	struct server_data *server = user_data;
 
-	debug("");
+	debug("\n");
 
 	if (!server)
 		return FALSE;
-- 
2.37.3