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From: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>,
	"Dmitry V . Levin" <ldv@altlinux.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
	Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v8 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it
Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2018 15:33:49 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <dc76a745-3fa7-4023-dcc1-3df18c9461a6@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jJ+dWjtjJ88ziOoyTJnSxbjdvEJd5LGY9nxWxHpVR6pug@mail.gmail.com>

On 02/20/2018 03:17 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 2:29 AM, Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> wrote:
>> On 16.02.2018 21:10, Alexander Popov wrote:
>>> This is the 8th version of the patch series introducing STACKLEAK to the
>>> mainline kernel. I've made some minor improvements while waiting for the
>>> next review by x86 maintainers.
> 
> If we can borrow some of luto or tglx's time, I think that'd be best:
> they've been looking at the entry code a lot lately. :) Regardless, I
> think the addition to the entry code is clean (especially now that the
> fast path is gone *sob*). :P
> 
>>> STACKLEAK is a security feature developed by Grsecurity/PaX (kudos to them),
>>> which:
>>>   - reduces the information that can be revealed through kernel stack leak bugs;
>>>   - blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks (e.g. CVE-2010-2963);
>>>   - introduces some runtime checks for kernel stack overflow detection.
> 
> I've added this series to my kernel.org trees, which means 0-day will
> start grinding on it too now:
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git
> kspp/gcc-plugin/stackleak
> 
> The LKDTM tests look great and check out for me. I think the code is
> clear, so I'd like to get it into -next, but I want to be sure I'm not
> stepping on x86 toes first.
> 
> Laura, how does arm64 look for this? Would it be possible to add it to
> this series (at least on kernel.org for build/run testing)?
> 

I fell behind on rebasing/testing so I need to bring it up to date.
Assuming the arm folks are okay with the approach, we can bring it
in for kernel.org testing once I'm finished.

Thanks,
Laura

  reply	other threads:[~2018-02-20 23:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-02-16 18:10 [PATCH RFC v8 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it Alexander Popov
2018-02-16 18:10 ` [PATCH RFC v8 1/6] x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls Alexander Popov
2018-02-21 13:24   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-02-21 21:49     ` Alexander Popov
2018-02-22 19:14       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-02-22 20:24         ` Alexander Popov
2018-02-16 18:10 ` [PATCH RFC v8 2/6] gcc-plugins: Add STACKLEAK plugin for tracking the kernel stack Alexander Popov
2018-02-16 18:10 ` [PATCH RFC v8 3/6] x86/entry: Erase kernel stack in syscall_trace_enter() Alexander Popov
2018-02-16 18:10 ` [PATCH RFC v8 4/6] lkdtm: Add a test for STACKLEAK Alexander Popov
2018-02-16 18:10 ` [PATCH RFC v8 5/6] fs/proc: Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system Alexander Popov
2018-02-16 18:10 ` [PATCH RFC v8 6/6] doc: self-protection: Add information about STACKLEAK feature Alexander Popov
2018-02-20 10:29 ` [PATCH RFC v8 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it Alexander Popov
2018-02-20 23:17   ` Kees Cook
2018-02-20 23:33     ` Laura Abbott [this message]
2018-02-21  1:13       ` [PATCH 0/2] Stackleak for arm64 Laura Abbott
2018-02-21  1:13         ` Laura Abbott
2018-02-21  1:13         ` [PATCH 1/2] stackleak: Update " Laura Abbott
2018-02-21  1:13           ` Laura Abbott
2018-02-22 16:58           ` Will Deacon
2018-02-22 16:58             ` Will Deacon
2018-02-22 19:22             ` Alexander Popov
2018-02-22 19:22               ` Alexander Popov
2018-02-27 10:21               ` Richard Sandiford
2018-02-27 10:21                 ` Richard Sandiford
2018-02-27 10:21                 ` Richard Sandiford
2018-02-28 15:09                 ` Alexander Popov
2018-02-28 15:09                   ` Alexander Popov
2018-03-01 10:33                   ` Richard Sandiford
2018-03-01 10:33                     ` Richard Sandiford
2018-03-01 10:33                     ` Richard Sandiford
2018-03-02 11:14                     ` Alexander Popov
2018-03-02 11:14                       ` Alexander Popov
2018-02-22 19:38             ` Laura Abbott
2018-02-22 19:38               ` Laura Abbott
2018-02-21  1:13         ` [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack Laura Abbott
2018-02-21  1:13           ` Laura Abbott
2018-02-21 15:38           ` Mark Rutland
2018-02-21 15:38             ` Mark Rutland
2018-02-21 23:53             ` Laura Abbott
2018-02-21 23:53               ` Laura Abbott
2018-02-22  1:35               ` Laura Abbott
2018-02-22  1:35                 ` Laura Abbott
2018-02-21 14:48         ` [PATCH 0/2] Stackleak for arm64 Alexander Popov
2018-02-21 14:48           ` Alexander Popov
2018-02-21 10:05     ` [PATCH RFC v8 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it Borislav Petkov
2018-02-21 15:09       ` Alexander Popov
2018-02-21 14:43     ` Alexander Popov
2018-02-22  1:43 ` Laura Abbott
2018-02-22 23:14   ` [PATCH 0/2] Update stackleak for gcc-8 Laura Abbott
2018-02-22 23:14     ` [PATCH 1/2] gcc-plugins: Update cgraph_create_edge " Laura Abbott
2018-02-22 23:40       ` Kees Cook
2018-02-23 17:30         ` Laura Abbott
2018-02-24 12:36           ` Alexander Popov
2018-02-22 23:14     ` [PATCH 2/2] gcc-plugins: stackleak: Update " Laura Abbott
2018-02-24 14:04       ` Alexander Popov
2018-02-26 21:51         ` Laura Abbott
2018-02-27 10:30           ` Richard Sandiford
2018-02-28 10:27             ` Alexander Popov
2018-02-22 23:43     ` [PATCH 0/2] Update stackleak " Kees Cook

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