From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: Simon McVittie <smcv@collabora.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com,
penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v13 23/25] NET: Add SO_PEERCONTEXT for multiple LSMs
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2020 13:43:02 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <dd1687da-5105-33aa-d1b8-300c4738654c@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200106172949.GA80652@horizon>
On 1/6/20 12:29 PM, Simon McVittie wrote:
> On Mon, 06 Jan 2020 at 12:15:57 -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>> On 12/24/19 6:59 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>> The getsockopt SO_PEERSEC provides the LSM based security
>>> information for a single module, but for reasons of backward
>>> compatibility cannot include the information for multiple
>>> modules. A new option SO_PEERCONTEXT is added to report the
>>> security "context" of multiple modules using a "compound" format
>>>
>>> lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0
>>>
>>> This is expected to be used by system services, including dbus-daemon.
>>> The exact format of a compound context has been the subject of
>>> considerable debate. This format was suggested by Simon McVittie,
>>> a dbus maintainer with a significant stake in the format being
>>> usable.
>>
>> Since upstream AA does not currently ever set the peer label info, there is
>> no need for this support for stacking upstream AA today, and there is no way
>> to test this functionality with more than one module present currently in an
>> upstream kernel. Either fix AA to actually implement the functionality so
>> it can be tested properly, or drop it from this series please. I don't
>> understand why AA continues to keep this kind of basic and longstanding
>> downstream functionality out of tree.
>
> Alternatively, a pair of tiny in-tree or out-of-tree stackable LSMs
> that don't make any security decisions, and label every labellable
> process/socket/thing with something predictable, would make it really
> easy for both kernel and user-space developers to test this and the
> user-space code that uses it (D-Bus and others).
>
> For example, they could label process 1234 and all sockets created by
> process 1234 with "contexttest1\0pid1234\0contexttest2\0process1234" or
> something like that.
>
> I'd love to see AppArmor in upstream kernels support SO_PEERSEC and
> SO_PEERCONTEXT, but setting up a development machine to stack AppArmor
> and SELinux (and still be able to boot, without one or the other LSM
> forbidding something important) seems likely to be harder than setting
> it up to load some toy LSMs.
AA+SELinux with these patches boots fine for me with Fedora; it doesn't
load any policy for AA but you still get a compound context from
/proc/pid/attr/context. Should be similar for booting with a distro
that only enables AA by default; you'll get "kernel" for the SELinux
part of the compound label in the absence of any policy loaded.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-01-06 18:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20191224235939.7483-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2019-12-24 23:59 ` [PATCH v13 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-12-24 23:59 ` [PATCH v13 01/25] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2019-12-24 23:59 ` [PATCH v13 02/25] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler
2019-12-25 20:34 ` Mickaël Salaün
2019-12-24 23:59 ` [PATCH v13 03/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2019-12-31 13:13 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-01-02 23:36 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-12-24 23:59 ` [PATCH v13 04/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2019-12-24 23:59 ` [PATCH v13 05/25] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking Casey Schaufler
2019-12-24 23:59 ` [PATCH v13 06/25] Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2020-01-07 17:45 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-24 23:59 ` [PATCH v13 07/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-12-24 23:59 ` [PATCH v13 08/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-12-24 23:59 ` [PATCH v13 09/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-01-07 17:53 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-24 23:59 ` [PATCH v13 10/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-12-24 23:59 ` [PATCH v13 11/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-12-24 23:59 ` [PATCH v13 12/25] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Casey Schaufler
2019-12-24 23:59 ` [PATCH v13 13/25] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
2020-01-07 19:02 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-24 23:59 ` [PATCH v13 14/25] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler
2020-01-07 19:16 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-24 23:59 ` [PATCH v13 15/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2020-01-06 16:15 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-24 23:59 ` [PATCH v13 16/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler
2020-01-07 19:23 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-24 23:59 ` [PATCH v13 17/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-12-24 23:59 ` [PATCH v13 18/25] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
2019-12-24 23:59 ` [PATCH v13 19/25] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2020-01-07 19:25 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-07 21:58 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-01-09 14:34 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-24 23:59 ` [PATCH v13 20/25] LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder Casey Schaufler
2019-12-24 23:59 ` [PATCH v13 21/25] Audit: Add subj_LSM fields when necessary Casey Schaufler
2019-12-24 23:59 ` [PATCH v13 22/25] Audit: Include object data for all security modules Casey Schaufler
2019-12-24 23:59 ` [PATCH v13 23/25] NET: Add SO_PEERCONTEXT for multiple LSMs Casey Schaufler
2020-01-06 17:15 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-06 17:29 ` Simon McVittie
2020-01-06 18:03 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-01-06 18:45 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-06 18:43 ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2019-12-24 23:59 ` [PATCH 24/25] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context Casey Schaufler
2020-01-06 16:22 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-24 23:59 ` [PATCH v13 25/25] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
2020-01-03 18:53 ` [PATCH v13 26/25] Audit: Multiple LSM support in audit rules Casey Schaufler
2020-01-03 18:53 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-01-09 16:33 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-01-10 19:40 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-01-10 19:40 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-01-12 15:37 ` Mimi Zohar
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