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From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Cc: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>,
	Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>, Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] libs/guest: Don't hide the indirection on xc_cpu_policy_t
Date: Wed, 5 May 2021 13:48:26 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <deb19b01-aa07-6faf-42c8-67fe372ede64@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YJJiWLqGoHLSnj01@Air-de-Roger>

On 05/05/2021 10:16, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
> On Tue, May 04, 2021 at 07:53:22PM +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> It is bad form in C, perhaps best demonstrated by trying to read
>> xc_cpu_policy_destroy(), and causes const qualification to have
>> less-than-obvious behaviour (the hidden pointer becomes const, not the thing
>> it points at).
> Would this also affect cpuid_leaf_buffer_t and msr_entry_buffer_t
> which hide an array behind a typedef?

They're a total pain because in userspace, they're plain arrays, and in
Xen, they're GUEST_HANDLE's.

Hiding arrays in a typedef like that (unlike hiding pointers) doesn't
change the interaction with const.

So the code there is correct AFAICT, even if it doesn't appear so.

>> xc_cpu_policy_set_domain() needs to drop its (now normal) const qualification,
>> as the policy object is modified by the serialisation operation.
>>
>> This also shows up a problem with the x86_cpu_policies_are_compatible(), where
>> the intermediate pointers are non-const.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
> Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>

Thanks.

>> ---
>> CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
>> CC: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
>> CC: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
>>
>> Discovered while trying to start the integration into XenServer.  This wants
>> fixing ASAP, before futher uses get added.
>>
>> Unsure what to do about x86_cpu_policies_are_compatible().  It would be nice
>> to have xc_cpu_policy_is_compatible() sensibly const'd, but maybe that means
>> we need a struct const_cpu_policy and that smells like it is spiralling out of
>> control.
> Not sure TBH, I cannot think of any alternative right now, but
> introducing a const_cpu_policy feels kind of code duplication.

At least this is all internals.  We've got time and flexibility to
experiment.

~Andrew



      reply	other threads:[~2021-05-05 12:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-05-04 18:53 [PATCH] libs/guest: Don't hide the indirection on xc_cpu_policy_t Andrew Cooper
2021-05-05  6:27 ` Jan Beulich
2021-05-05  9:16 ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-05-05 12:48   ` Andrew Cooper [this message]

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