Fwd: OpenPGP interoperability issues with gnupg >= 2.4

Fwd: OpenPGP interoperability issues with gnupg >= 2.4

[Sam James]

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> Begin forwarded message:
> 
> From: David Runge <dvzrv@archlinux.org>
> Subject: OpenPGP interoperability issues with gnupg >= 2.4
> Date: 6 February 2023 at 20:24:27 GMT
> To: tmz@pobox.com, ncopa@alpinelinux.org, tbier@posteo.de, sam@gentoo.org, demm@kaosx.us, mail@jann-roeder.net, cho-m@tuta.io, fpletz@fnordicwalking.de, rahul@gopinath.org, tpgxyz@gmail.com, jan.christian@gruenhage.xyz, dkg@fifthhorseman.net, eric@debian.org, xtkoba@gmail.com, dleuenberger@suse.com, adridg@freebsd.org, jjelen@redhat.com, anthraxx@archlinux.org
> 
> Hi all,
> 
> I am one of the package maintainers of gnupg on Arch Linux.
> DISCLAIMER: Since December 2022 I am also a contracted developer for the
> Sequoia project (an alternative implementation of the OpenPGP standard
> in Rust).
> 
> We (Levente Polyak and I) are writing to you because you are the
> maintainers of gnupg on other downstream distributions.
> With gnupg 2.4.0 a change has been merged [1], which has gpg operate
> with certificate material in a way that is incompatible with the
> upcoming IETF approved "crypto-refresh" approach.
> This means, that e.g. messages encrypted using a key generated with
> gnupg >= 2.4.0 will not be compatible with OpenPGP implementations
> following the upcoming IETF standard.
> 
> While this has especially integrators such as Thunderbird [2] and
> keyserver authors worried, it is also a concern for us as a downstream
> distributor of gnupg.
> Some of you have already updated gnupg to >= 2.4.0 in some form, but we
> would like to take the time and open the discussion on this topic, as we
> believe that the change is harmful to the larger OpenPGP ecosystem.
> 
> We are currently still shipping 2.2.x due to (only now resolved) issues
> with our distribution keyring. However, we are wondering how to proceed
> with gnupg in the future, as it will also negatively affect the trust
> model of our own distribution.
> 
> Several scenarios seem likely (depending on adoption):
> 
> * notifying users of upcoming incompatibilities if they create a key
>  with gnupg >= 2.4.0
> * shipping/ using gnupg 2.2.x alongside (or exclusively) for as long as
>  possible
> * undoing the change in gnupg
> 
> We would like to raise awareness and gather some feedback of current
> packagers of gnupg to form a broader response to this issue.
> 
> As mail threads with large To: headers might get very tedious for
> discussing this topic, we would also like to invite you to
> #openpgp-interop on libera.chat [3].
> 
> Best,
> David and Levente
> 
> P.S.: The addressed persons have been gathered via links to downstream
> source data on repology.org [4]. In case we have missed anyone (very
> likely), that should join the discussion, please feel free to forward
> this e-mail to them.
> 
> [1] https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2022-December/035183.html
> [2] https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2023-February/035270.html
> [3] ircs://irc.libera.chat/openpgp-interop
> [4] https://repology.org/project/gnupg/versions
> 
> --
> https://archlinux.org


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Re: Fwd: OpenPGP interoperability issues with gnupg >= 2.4

[Anna (cybertailor) Vyalkova]

> Hi all,
> 
> I am one of the package maintainers of gnupg on Arch Linux.
> DISCLAIMER: Since December 2022 I am also a contracted developer for the
> Sequoia project (an alternative implementation of the OpenPGP standard
> in Rust).
> 
> We (Levente Polyak and I) are writing to you because you are the
> maintainers of gnupg on other downstream distributions.
> With gnupg 2.4.0 a change has been merged [1], which has gpg operate
> with certificate material in a way that is incompatible with the
> upcoming IETF approved "crypto-refresh" approach.
> This means, that e.g. messages encrypted using a key generated with
> gnupg >= 2.4.0 will not be compatible with OpenPGP implementations
> following the upcoming IETF standard.

Please read this message to understand the background:
https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2022-December/035230.html
 
> While this has especially integrators such as Thunderbird [2] and
> keyserver authors worried, it is also a concern for us as a downstream
> distributor of gnupg.
> Some of you have already updated gnupg to >= 2.4.0 in some form, but we
> would like to take the time and open the discussion on this topic, as we
> believe that the change is harmful to the larger OpenPGP ecosystem.
> 
> We are currently still shipping 2.2.x due to (only now resolved) issues
> with our distribution keyring. However, we are wondering how to proceed
> with gnupg in the future, as it will also negatively affect the trust
> model of our own distribution.
> 
> Several scenarios seem likely (depending on adoption):
> 
> * notifying users of upcoming incompatibilities if they create a key
>  with gnupg >= 2.4.0
> * shipping/ using gnupg 2.2.x alongside (or exclusively) for as long as
>  possible
> * undoing the change in gnupg
> 
> We would like to raise awareness and gather some feedback of current
> packagers of gnupg to form a broader response to this issue.
> 
> As mail threads with large To: headers might get very tedious for
> discussing this topic, we would also like to invite you to
> #openpgp-interop on libera.chat [3].

So, is it a real problem or just FUD?

How is it different from u-config people's aggression towards pkgconf?