On Mon, 2023-11-06 at 03:11 +0000, CK Hu (胡俊光) wrote:
> On Mon, 2023-11-06 at 02:59 +0000, Jason-JH Lin (林睿祥) wrote:
> > On Mon, 2023-11-06 at 01:27 +0000, CK Hu (胡俊光) wrote:
> > > On Sun, 2023-11-05 at 13:04 +0000, Jason-JH Lin (林睿祥) wrote:
> > > > On Tue, 2023-10-31 at 06:01 +0000, CK Hu (胡俊光) wrote:
> > > > > Hi, Jason:
> > > > > 
> > > > > On Mon, 2023-10-23 at 12:45 +0800, Jason-JH.Lin wrote:
> > > > > > To add secure flow support for mediatek-drm, each crtc have
> > > > > > to
> > > > > > create a secure cmdq mailbox channel. Then cmdq packets
> > > > > > with
> > > > > > display HW configuration will be sent to secure cmdq
> > > > > > mailbox
> > > > > > channel
> > > > > > and configured in the secure world.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Each crtc have to use secure cmdq interface to configure
> > > > > > some
> > > > > > secure
> > > > > > settings for display HW before sending cmdq packets to
> > > > > > secure
> > > > > > cmdq
> > > > > > mailbox channel.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > If any of fb get from current drm_atomic_state is secure,
> > > > > > then
> > > > > > crtc
> > > > > > will switch to the secure flow to configure display HW.
> > > > > > If all fbs are not secure in current drm_atomic_state, then
> > > > > > crtc
> > > > > > will
> > > > > > switch to the normal flow.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Signed-off-by: Jason-JH.Lin <jason-jh.lin@mediatek.com>
> > > > > > ---
> > > > > >  drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_crtc.c  | 272
> > > > > > ++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > > > > >  drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_crtc.h  |   1 +
> > > > > >  drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_plane.c |   7 +
> > > > > >  3 files changed, 269 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> > > > > > 
> > > 
> > > [snip]
> > > 
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > +#if IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_MTK_CMDQ)
> > > > > > +static void mtk_crtc_enable_secure_state(struct drm_crtc
> > > > > > *crtc)
> > > > > > +{
> > > > > > +	enum cmdq_sec_scenario sec_scn = CMDQ_MAX_SEC_COUNT;
> > > > > > +	int i;
> > > > > > +	struct mtk_ddp_comp *ddp_first_comp;
> > > > > > +	struct mtk_drm_crtc *mtk_crtc = to_mtk_crtc(crtc);
> > > > > > +	u64 sec_engine = 0; /* for hw engine write output
> > > > > > secure fb */
> > > > > > +	u64 sec_port = 0; /* for larb port read input secure fb
> > > > > > */
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > +	cmdq_pkt_wfe(&mtk_crtc->sec_cmdq_handle, mtk_crtc-
> > > > > > > cmdq_event,
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > false);
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > +	ddp_first_comp = mtk_crtc->ddp_comp[0];
> > > > > > +	for (i = 0; i < mtk_crtc->layer_nr; i++)
> > > > > > +		if (mtk_crtc->planes[i].type ==
> > > > > > DRM_PLANE_TYPE_CURSOR)
> > > > > > +			sec_port |=
> > > > > > mtk_ddp_comp_layer_get_sec_port(ddp_first_comp, i);
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > +	if (drm_crtc_index(crtc) == 0)
> > > > > > +		sec_scn = CMDQ_SEC_PRIMARY_DISP;
> > > > > > +	else if (drm_crtc_index(crtc) == 1)
> > > > > > +		sec_scn = CMDQ_SEC_SUB_DISP;
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > +	cmdq_sec_pkt_set_data(&mtk_crtc->sec_cmdq_handle,
> > > > > > sec_engine,
> > > > > > sec_port, sec_scn);
> > > > > 
> > > > > In cmdq driver, sec_engine means engine which need dapc. You
> > > > > set
> > > > > 0
> > > > > to
> > > > > sec_engine, does it mean that no engine is protected by dapc?
> > > > > If
> > > > > OVL
> > > > > is
> > > > > not protected by dapc, I think we could use cmdq normal
> > > > > thread
> > > > > to
> > > > > write
> > > > > OVL register instead of cmdq secure thread.
> > > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > We enable DPAC protection for the engine that is able to write
> > > > data
> > > > to
> > > > the DRAM address set on their register, such as WDMA and WROT,
> > > > to
> > > > avoid
> > > > their register being set to the normal DRAM address.
> > > > 
> > > > We enable larb port protection for the engine that is able to
> > > > read
> > > > data
> > > > from the DRAM address, such as OVL, RDMA and MDP_RDMA, to avoid
> > > > secure
> > > > DRAM being read by the non-secure larb port. So we don't need
> > > > toenable
> > > > DAPC for these engines.
> > > > 
> > > > No mater DAPC protection or larb port protection, they both
> > > > need
> > > > to
> > > > use
> > > > sec_engine to tell TEE which engines need to be protected.
> > > > 
> > > > But OVL is a special HW engine, it can only set its
> > > > DISP_REG_OVL_SECURE
> > > > register in [PATCH v2 07/11] to enable its larb port
> > > > protection,
> > > > so
> > > > OVL
> > > > no need to set the sec_engine. But we'll move that part to the
> > > > TEE
> > > > secure world, so that means OVL sec_engine will be set here in
> > > > the
> > > > next
> > > > version.
> > > > 
> > > > > It's weird that normal world could decide which engine is
> > > > > protected
> > > > > by
> > > > > dapc. If hacker set 0 for output engine, then outout engine
> > > > > would
> > > > > not
> > > > > be protected?
> > > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > If hacker set 0 for output engine, TEE world will check that
> > > > output
> > > > engine didn't set sec_engine from normal world by verifying
> > > > instruction
> > > > where the output engine instruction set the secure handle.
> > > > 
> > > > We still need to set sec_engine to check that all the
> > > > sec_engine
> > > > fags
> > > > are matched to the scenario and instruction verification in the
> > > > secure
> > > > world.
> > > 
> > > So after secure scenario is set, TEE already have a sec_engine
> > > list.
> > > Let's call it TEE sec_engine list. And normal world has another
> > > sec_engine list, let's call it normal sec_engine list. Normal
> > > world
> > > pass normal sec_engine list to TEE by cmdq_sec_pkt_set_data() and
> > > TEE
> > > would check normal sec_engine list is identical to TEE sec_engine
> > > list
> > > or not. If TEE already have a TEE sec_engine list, I think it's
> > > not
> > > necessary that normal world have another normal sec_engine list.
> > > So
> > > drop this normal sec_engine list parameter.
> > > 
> > 
> > The TEE sec_engine list is align to the sec_engine list in normal
> > world. I think the sec_engine for DAPC can be dropped and it can be
> > enabled/disabled by the TEE sec_engine, but the sec_engine for larb
> > port won't do that verification in the secure world. If sec_engine
> > for
> > larb port is not set in normal world, it'll cause iova translation
> > fault. So we still need this sec_engine for larb port.
> 
> In TEE, there is already a TEE sec_engine list, so checking larb port
> could use TEE sec_engine list because TEE sec_engine list would be
> identical to normal sec_engine list. Why not use TEE sec_engine list
> to
> check larb port? What is the detail of checking larb port? Describe
> it
> if necessary.
> 
After checking the CMDQ PTA larb port enable/disable flow, I think it's
possible to implement the same verification like DAPC for larb port.
So I'll drop the sec_engine flags in normal world to simplify and de-
risk for the secure configuration parameters.

This also need to add a TODO on commit message:
verify instruction for enabling/disabling larb port in secure world and
drop the sec_engine flags in normal world.

Regards,
Jason-JH.Lin

> Regards,
> CK
> 
> > 
> > Regards,
> > Jason-JH.Lin
> > 
> > > Regards,
> > > CK
> > > 
> > > > 
> > > > Regards,
> > > > Jason-JH.Lin
> > > > 
> > > > > Regards,
> > > > > CK
> > > > > 
> > > > > > +
> > > > > > +	pr_debug("crtc-%d enable secure plane!\n",
> > > > > > drm_crtc_index(crtc));
> > > > > > +}
> > > > > > +#endif
> > > > > >