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From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>,
	Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>,
	Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>,
	Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>,
	Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>,
	Peter Rosin <peda@axentia.se>, Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>,
	dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org, linux-fbdev@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org,
	security@kernel.org, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] fbdev: potential information leak in do_fb_ioctl()
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2019 14:26:21 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87r22ujaqq.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191030074321.GD2656@xps-13> (Andrea Righi's message of "Wed, 30 Oct 2019 08:43:21 +0100")

Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com> writes:

> On Tue, Oct 29, 2019 at 02:02:11PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> writes:
>> 
>> > The "fix" struct has a 2 byte hole after ->ywrapstep and the
>> > "fix = info->fix;" assignment doesn't necessarily clear it.  It depends
>> > on the compiler.
>> >
>> > Fixes: 1f5e31d7e55a ("fbmem: don't call copy_from/to_user() with mutex held")
>> > Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
>> > ---
>> > I have 13 more similar places to patch...  I'm not totally sure I
>> > understand all the issues involved.
>> 
>> What I have done in a similar situation with struct siginfo, is that
>> where the structure first appears I have initialized it with memset,
>> and then field by field.
>> 
>> Then when the structure is copied I copy the structure with memcpy.
>> 
>> That ensures all of the bytes in the original structure are initialized
>> and that all of the bytes are copied.
>> 
>> The goal is to avoid memory that has values of the previous users of
>> that memory region from leaking to userspace.  Which depending on who
>> the previous user of that memory region is could tell userspace
>> information about what the kernel is doing that it should not be allowed
>> to find out.
>> 
>> I tried to trace through where "info" and thus presumably "info->fix" is
>> coming from and only made it as far as  register_framebuffer.  Given
>> that I suspect a local memset, and then a field by field copy right
>> before copy_to_user might be a sound solution.  But ick.  That is a lot
>> of fields to copy.
>
> I know it might sound quite inefficient, but what about making struct
> fb_fix_screeninfo __packed?
>
> This doesn't solve other potential similar issues, but for this
> particular case it could be a reasonable and simple fix.

It is part of the user space ABI.  As such you can't move the fields.

Eric

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Cc: linux-fbdev@vger.kernel.org, security@kernel.org,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>,
	kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org,
	Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org,
	Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr>,
	Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>,
	Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>, Peter Rosin <peda@axentia.se>,
	Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] fbdev: potential information leak in do_fb_ioctl()
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2019 14:26:21 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87r22ujaqq.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> (raw)
Message-ID: <20191030192621.GaBJp-D0AiMgs120sxikZkqxN8yp3L1xSkaewBNbGSY@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191030074321.GD2656@xps-13> (Andrea Righi's message of "Wed, 30 Oct 2019 08:43:21 +0100")

Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com> writes:

> On Tue, Oct 29, 2019 at 02:02:11PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> writes:
>> 
>> > The "fix" struct has a 2 byte hole after ->ywrapstep and the
>> > "fix = info->fix;" assignment doesn't necessarily clear it.  It depends
>> > on the compiler.
>> >
>> > Fixes: 1f5e31d7e55a ("fbmem: don't call copy_from/to_user() with mutex held")
>> > Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
>> > ---
>> > I have 13 more similar places to patch...  I'm not totally sure I
>> > understand all the issues involved.
>> 
>> What I have done in a similar situation with struct siginfo, is that
>> where the structure first appears I have initialized it with memset,
>> and then field by field.
>> 
>> Then when the structure is copied I copy the structure with memcpy.
>> 
>> That ensures all of the bytes in the original structure are initialized
>> and that all of the bytes are copied.
>> 
>> The goal is to avoid memory that has values of the previous users of
>> that memory region from leaking to userspace.  Which depending on who
>> the previous user of that memory region is could tell userspace
>> information about what the kernel is doing that it should not be allowed
>> to find out.
>> 
>> I tried to trace through where "info" and thus presumably "info->fix" is
>> coming from and only made it as far as  register_framebuffer.  Given
>> that I suspect a local memset, and then a field by field copy right
>> before copy_to_user might be a sound solution.  But ick.  That is a lot
>> of fields to copy.
>
> I know it might sound quite inefficient, but what about making struct
> fb_fix_screeninfo __packed?
>
> This doesn't solve other potential similar issues, but for this
> particular case it could be a reasonable and simple fix.

It is part of the user space ABI.  As such you can't move the fields.

Eric
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  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-10-30 19:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-10-29 18:23 [PATCH] fbdev: potential information leak in do_fb_ioctl() Dan Carpenter
2019-10-29 18:35 ` Joe Perches
2019-10-29 18:35   ` Joe Perches
2019-10-29 19:02 ` Eric W. Biederman
2019-10-29 19:02   ` Eric W. Biederman
2019-10-30  7:43   ` Andrea Righi
2019-10-30  7:43     ` Andrea Righi
2019-10-30 19:26     ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2019-10-30 19:26       ` Eric W. Biederman
2019-10-30 20:12       ` Andrea Righi
2019-10-30 20:12         ` Andrea Righi
2019-10-31 18:16         ` Joe Perches
2019-10-31 18:16           ` Joe Perches
2019-10-31 22:12           ` Eric W. Biederman
2019-10-31 22:12             ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-01-03 13:07   ` Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz
2020-01-13 11:08     ` [PATCH v2] " Dan Carpenter
2020-01-15 14:31       ` Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz
2020-01-13 12:49     ` [PATCH] " Arnd Bergmann
2020-01-15 13:09       ` Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz
2020-01-15 13:16         ` Arnd Bergmann

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