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From: Matt Parnell <mparnell@gmail.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
	Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" 
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	"dhowells@redhat.com" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"matthew.garrett@nebula.com" <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Kernel Lockdown: Add an option to allow raw MSR access even, in confidentiality mode.
Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2019 17:31:03 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <f1cda5e6-5d10-fa96-d2f8-00c1f3a7683c@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACdnJutjZk4r_7oCZTnQdmKGZKay1KvvDA+7goj9fwkMVcfHmQ@mail.gmail.com>

I suppose that turning off the early lockdown functionality, and then
having apparmor or selinux grant intel-undervolt permission to the MSRs
is probably another method of going about this, only slightly less "tight."

On 12/2/19 5:29 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 2, 2019 at 2:55 PM Jordan Glover
> <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch> wrote:
>
>> Could you clarify if blocking msr breaks internal power management of intel
>> cpu or it only prevents manual tinkering with it by user? If the latter then
>> I think it's ok to keep it as is.
> The latter.

  reply	other threads:[~2019-12-02 23:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-11-30  6:49 [PATCH] Kernel Lockdown: Add an option to allow raw MSR access even, in confidentiality mode Matt Parnell
2019-11-30 18:36 ` Kees Cook
2019-11-30 19:09   ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-01 20:53     ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-02 18:29       ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-02 22:55         ` Jordan Glover
2019-12-02 23:13           ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-02 23:29           ` Matthew Garrett
2019-12-02 23:31             ` Matt Parnell [this message]
2019-12-03  2:13   ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-03  2:16     ` Matthew Garrett
2019-12-03  2:24       ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-03  2:50         ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-03  3:57           ` Matt Parnell
2019-12-02 19:43 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-12-02 20:39   ` Matt Parnell

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