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From: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
To: Emily Shaffer <emilyshaffer@google.com>
Cc: "Taylor Blau" <me@ttaylorr.com>,
	"Glen Choo" <chooglen@google.com>,
	"Git List" <git@vger.kernel.org>,
	justin@justinsteven.com,
	"Johannes Schindelin" <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>,
	"Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason" <avarab@gmail.com>,
	"Derrick Stolee" <derrickstolee@github.com>,
	"brian m. carlson" <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>,
	"Randall S. Becker" <rsbecker@nexbridge.com>
Subject: Re: Bare repositories in the working tree are a security risk
Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2022 11:47:34 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <xmqq4k2mi88p.fsf@gitster.g> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAJoAoZkf6VuAOwX9j8Zc0x4HqJRJ5zQgqfmu+8Zs1kVx88dGpg@mail.gmail.com> (Emily Shaffer's message of "Thu, 21 Apr 2022 11:29:15 -0700")

Emily Shaffer <emilyshaffer@google.com> writes:

>> Nice - a more strict spin on proposal 3 from above, if I understand it
>> right. Rather than allowing any and all bare repos, avoid someone
>> sneaking in a malicious one next to legitimate ones by using an
>> allowlist. Seems reasonable to me.
>
> Ah, another thing I forgot to mention. There has been a little
> discussion in the past about isolating "safe" parts of config (and
> gitdir) from "unsafe" parts, e.g. "which configs and embedded scripts
> are executables", to help better protect from zipfile-type attacks,
> which are very similar to this kind of attack. I wonder if it makes
> sense to consider that sort of thing as a needswork for this bugfix?
> e.g. "/* NEEDSWORK: Only ignore unsafe configs and hooks instead of
> ignoring the entire embedded config and hooks in the future */"?

There have been such discussions in the past and they all went
nowhere because such safe-listing fundamentally does not work.  What
you consider "safe" today may turn out to be "unsafe" and in a later
version of Git will stop honoring it, and for those who depended on
it being listed as "safe", such a security fix will be a regression.

Disabling the whole thing if the file can be tainted is the only
sensible way forward without promising users that they will be hurt
by such changes/regressions in the future, I would think.

So, no, I do not think such a NEEDSWORK comment is welcome.

Thanks.



  reply	other threads:[~2022-04-21 18:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-04-06 22:43 Glen Choo
2022-04-06 23:22 ` [PATCH] fsck: detect bare repos in trees and warn Glen Choo
2022-04-07 12:42   ` Johannes Schindelin
2022-04-07 13:21     ` Derrick Stolee
2022-04-07 14:14       ` Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason
2022-04-14 20:02         ` Glen Choo
2022-04-15 12:46           ` Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason
2022-04-07 15:11       ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-13 22:24       ` Glen Choo
2022-04-07 13:12   ` Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason
2022-04-07 15:20   ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-07 18:38 ` Bare repositories in the working tree are a security risk John Cai
2022-04-07 21:24 ` brian m. carlson
2022-04-07 21:53   ` Justin Steven
2022-04-07 22:10     ` brian m. carlson
2022-04-07 22:40       ` rsbecker
2022-04-08  5:54       ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-14  0:03         ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-14  0:04         ` Glen Choo
2022-04-13 23:44       ` Glen Choo
2022-04-13 20:37 ` Glen Choo
2022-04-13 23:36   ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-14 16:41     ` Glen Choo
2022-04-14 17:35       ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-14 18:19         ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-15 21:33         ` Glen Choo
2022-04-15 22:17           ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-16  0:52             ` Taylor Blau
2022-04-15 22:43           ` Glen Choo
2022-04-15 20:13       ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-15 23:45         ` Glen Choo
2022-04-15 23:59           ` Glen Choo
2022-04-16  1:00           ` Taylor Blau
2022-04-16  1:18             ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-16  1:30               ` Taylor Blau
2022-04-16  0:34 ` Glen Choo
2022-04-16  0:41 ` Glen Choo
2022-04-16  1:28   ` Taylor Blau
2022-04-21 18:25     ` Emily Shaffer
2022-04-21 18:29       ` Emily Shaffer
2022-04-21 18:47         ` Junio C Hamano [this message]
2022-04-21 18:54           ` Taylor Blau
2022-04-21 19:09       ` Taylor Blau
2022-04-21 21:01         ` Emily Shaffer
2022-04-21 21:22           ` Taylor Blau
2022-04-29 23:57     ` Glen Choo
2022-04-30  1:14       ` Taylor Blau
2022-05-02 19:39         ` Glen Choo
2022-05-02 14:05       ` Philip Oakley
2022-05-02 18:50         ` Junio C Hamano

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