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From: mark gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
To: speck@linutronix.de
Subject: [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 2/3] V5 more sampling fun 2
Date: Mon, 6 Apr 2020 11:52:27 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200406185227.GA6917@mtg-dev.jf.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202004061133.92517B7@keescook>

On Mon, Apr 06, 2020 at 11:34:17AM -0700, speck for Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 16, 2020 at 02:16:07PM -0800, speck for mark gross wrote:
> > From: mark gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
> > Subject: [PATCH 2/3] x86/speculation: Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
> >  (SRBDS) mitigation control.
> > 
> > SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from
> > the RNG across cores and threads. New microcode serializes the processor
> > access during the execution of RDRAND and RDSEED.  This ensures that the
> > shared buffer is overwritten before it is released for reuse.
> > 
> > While it is present on all affected CPU models, the microcode mitigation
> > is not needed on models that enumerate ARCH_CAPABILITIES[MDS_NO] in the
> > cases where TSX is not supported or has been disabled with TSX_CTRL.
> > 
> > The mitigation is activated by default on affected processors and it
> > increases latency for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions.  Among other
> > effects this will reduce throughput from /dev/urandom.
> > 
> > * enable administrator to configure the mitigation off when desired
> >   using either mitigations=off or srbds=off.
> > * export vulnerability status via sysfs
> > * rename file scoped macros to apply for non-whitelist table
> >   initializations.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
> > Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
> > ---
> >  .../ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu      |   1 +
> >  .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         |  20 +++
> >  arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h            |   2 +
> >  arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h              |   4 +
> >  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                    | 123 ++++++++++++++++++
> >  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                  |  61 +++++++--
> >  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h                     |   3 +
> >  drivers/base/cpu.c                            |   8 ++
> >  8 files changed, 210 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
> > index 2e0e3b45d02a..b39531a3c5bc 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
> > +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
> > @@ -492,6 +492,7 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
> >  		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
> >  		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
> >  		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
> > +		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
> >  		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
> >  		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
> >  Date:		January 2018
> > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > index 4d5a4fe22703..017bd682d2b9 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > @@ -4739,6 +4739,26 @@
> >  			the kernel will oops in either "warn" or "fatal"
> >  			mode.
> >  
> > +	srbds=		[X86,INTEL]
> > +			Control mitigation for the Special Register
> > +			Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigation.
> > +
> > +			Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an MDS-like
> > +			exploit which can leak bits from the random
> > +			number generator.
> > +
> > +			By default, this issue is mitigated by
> > +			microcode.  However, the microcode fix can cause
> > +			the RDRAND and RDSEED instructions to become
> > +			much slower.  Among other effects, this will
> > +			result in reduced throughput from /dev/urandom.
> 
> This is this true about /dev/urandom? I thought the RDRAND dependency
> had been removed?

I'm not sure.  I traced the urandom code into a crypto lib named chacha and not
seeing any HWRNG bread crumbs leading to asm code invoking RDRAND or RDSEED.
I'll keep looking.  I'll be happy to remove that last sentence if its true.

--mark

> 
> -Kees
> 
> > +
> > +			The microcode mitigation can be disabled with
> > +			the following option:
> > +
> > +			off:    Disable mitigation and remove
> > +				performance impact to RDRAND and RDSEED
> > +
> >  	srcutree.counter_wrap_check [KNL]
> >  			Specifies how frequently to check for
> >  			grace-period sequence counter wrap for the
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> > index db189945e9b0..02dabc9e77b0 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> > @@ -362,6 +362,7 @@
> >  #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS	(18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
> >  #define X86_FEATURE_FSRM		(18*32+ 4) /* Fast Short Rep Mov */
> >  #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VP2INTERSECT (18*32+ 8) /* AVX-512 Intersect for D/Q */
> > +#define X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL		(18*32+ 9) /* "" SRBDS mitigation MSR available */
> >  #define X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR		(18*32+10) /* VERW clears CPU buffers */
> >  #define X86_FEATURE_TSX_FORCE_ABORT	(18*32+13) /* "" TSX_FORCE_ABORT */
> >  #define X86_FEATURE_PCONFIG		(18*32+18) /* Intel PCONFIG */
> > @@ -407,5 +408,6 @@
> >  #define X86_BUG_SWAPGS			X86_BUG(21) /* CPU is affected by speculation through SWAPGS */
> >  #define X86_BUG_TAA			X86_BUG(22) /* CPU is affected by TSX Async Abort(TAA) */
> >  #define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT		X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
> > +#define X86_BUG_SRBDS			X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
> >  
> >  #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> > index 12c9684d59ba..3efde600a674 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> > @@ -128,6 +128,10 @@
> >  #define TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE		BIT(0)	/* Disable RTM feature */
> >  #define TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR		BIT(1)	/* Disable TSX enumeration */
> >  
> > +/* SRBDS support */
> > +#define MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL		0x00000123
> > +#define RNGDS_MITG_DIS			BIT(0)
> > +
> >  #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS		0x00000174
> >  #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP		0x00000175
> >  #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP		0x00000176
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> > index ed54b3b21c39..51cc38d95a8f 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> > @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
> >  static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
> >  static void __init mds_print_mitigation(void);
> >  static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
> > +static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
> >  
> >  /* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
> >  u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
> > @@ -108,6 +109,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
> >  	l1tf_select_mitigation();
> >  	mds_select_mitigation();
> >  	taa_select_mitigation();
> > +	srbds_select_mitigation();
> >  
> >  	/*
> >  	 * As MDS and TAA mitigations are inter-related, print MDS
> > @@ -397,6 +399,114 @@ static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str)
> >  }
> >  early_param("tsx_async_abort", tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline);
> >  
> > +#undef pr_fmt
> > +#define pr_fmt(fmt)	"SRBDS: " fmt
> > +
> > +enum srbds_mitigations {
> > +	SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
> > +	SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
> > +	SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
> > +	SRBDS_NOT_AFFECTED_TSX_OFF,
> > +	SRBDS_HYPERVISOR,
> > +};
> > +
> > +enum srbds_mitigations srbds_mitigation __ro_after_init = SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
> > +static const char * const srbds_strings[] = {
> > +	[SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF]		= "Vulnerable",
> > +	[SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED]	= "Vulnerable: no microcode",
> > +	[SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL]		= "Mitigated",
> > +	[SRBDS_NOT_AFFECTED_TSX_OFF]	= "Not affected (TSX disabled)",
> > +	[SRBDS_HYPERVISOR]		= "Unknown",
> > +};
> > +
> > +static bool srbds_off;
> > +
> > +void update_srbds_msr(void)
> > +{
> > +	u64 mcu_ctrl;
> > +
> > +	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
> > +		return;
> > +
> > +	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
> > +		return;
> > +
> > +	if (srbds_mitigation == SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED)
> > +		return;
> > +
> > +	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
> > +
> > +	switch (srbds_mitigation) {
> > +	case SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF:
> > +	case SRBDS_NOT_AFFECTED_TSX_OFF:
> > +		mcu_ctrl |= RNGDS_MITG_DIS;
> > +		break;
> > +	case SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
> > +		mcu_ctrl &= ~RNGDS_MITG_DIS;
> > +		break;
> > +	default:
> > +		break;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void)
> > +{
> > +	u64 ia32_cap;
> > +
> > +	/*
> > +	 * This test relies on the CPUID values of vendor, family, model,
> > +	 * stepping which might not reflect the real hardware when we are
> > +	 * running as a guest. But VMM vendors have asked that we do this
> > +	 * before the X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR test since this provides better
> > +	 * guidance to users in most real situations.
> > +	 */
> > +
> > +	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
> > +		return;
> > +	/*
> > +	 * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting
> > +	 * TSX that are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled.
> > +	 */
> > +	ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
> > +	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) {
> > +		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM))
> > +			srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_NOT_AFFECTED_TSX_OFF;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
> > +		if (srbds_mitigation != SRBDS_NOT_AFFECTED_TSX_OFF)
> > +			srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_HYPERVISOR;
> > +		return;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL)) {
> > +		srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
> > +		return;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	if (cpu_mitigations_off() || srbds_off) {
> > +		if (srbds_mitigation != SRBDS_NOT_AFFECTED_TSX_OFF)
> > +			srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	update_srbds_msr();
> > +	pr_info("%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int __init srbds_parse_cmdline(char *str)
> > +{
> > +	if (!str)
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > +	if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
> > +		srbds_off = true;
> > +
> > +	return 0;
> > +}
> > +early_param("srbds", srbds_parse_cmdline);
> > +
> >  #undef pr_fmt
> >  #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V1 : " fmt
> >  
> > @@ -1528,6 +1638,11 @@ static char *ibpb_state(void)
> >  	return "";
> >  }
> >  
> > +static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf)
> > +{
> > +	return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
> > +}
> > +
> >  static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
> >  			       char *buf, unsigned int bug)
> >  {
> > @@ -1572,6 +1687,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
> >  	case X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT:
> >  		return itlb_multihit_show_state(buf);
> >  
> > +	case X86_BUG_SRBDS:
> > +		return srbds_show_state(buf);
> > +
> >  	default:
> >  		break;
> >  	}
> > @@ -1618,4 +1736,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
> >  {
> >  	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
> >  }
> > +
> > +ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
> > +{
> > +	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SRBDS);
> > +}
> >  #endif
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> > index bed0cb83fe24..db9b9fbf9c0f 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> > @@ -1075,9 +1075,34 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
> >  	{}
> >  };
> >  
> > -static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which)
> > +#define VULNHW_INTEL_STEPPING(model, steppings, issues)			   \
> > +	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPING_FEATURE(INTEL, 6,		   \
> > +					    INTEL_FAM6_##model, steppings, \
> > +					    X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues)
> > +
> > +#define VULNHW_INTEL(model, issues) X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(model, issues)
> > +#define SRBDS			BIT(1)
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * List affected CPU's for issues that cannot be enumerated.
> > + */
> > +static const struct x86_cpu_id affected_cpus[] __initconst = {
> > +	VULNHW_INTEL(IVYBRIDGE,		SRBDS),
> > +	VULNHW_INTEL(HASWELL,		SRBDS),
> > +	VULNHW_INTEL(HASWELL_L,		SRBDS),
> > +	VULNHW_INTEL(HASWELL_G,		SRBDS),
> > +	VULNHW_INTEL(BROADWELL_G,	SRBDS),
> > +	VULNHW_INTEL(BROADWELL,		SRBDS),
> > +	VULNHW_INTEL(SKYLAKE_L,		SRBDS),
> > +	VULNHW_INTEL(SKYLAKE,		SRBDS),
> > +	VULNHW_INTEL_STEPPING(KABYLAKE_L, GENMASK(0xC, 0), SRBDS), /*06_8E steppings <=C*/
> > +	VULNHW_INTEL_STEPPING(KABYLAKE, GENMASK(0xD, 0),   SRBDS), /*06_9E steppings <=D*/
> > +	{}
> > +};
> > +
> > +static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which, const struct x86_cpu_id *table)
> >  {
> > -	const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(cpu_vuln_whitelist);
> > +	const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table);
> >  
> >  	return m && !!(m->driver_data & which);
> >  }
> > @@ -1097,33 +1122,44 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> >  	u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
> >  
> >  	/* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */
> > -	if (!cpu_matches(NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
> > +	if (!cpu_matches(NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT, cpu_vuln_whitelist) &&
> > +	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
> >  		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
> >  
> > -	if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION))
> > +	if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION, cpu_vuln_whitelist))
> >  		return;
> >  
> >  	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
> >  
> > -	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SPECTRE_V2))
> > +	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SPECTRE_V2, cpu_vuln_whitelist))
> >  		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
> >  
> > -	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
> > -	   !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
> > +	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB, cpu_vuln_whitelist) &&
> > +	    (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
> > +	    !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
> >  		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
> >  
> >  	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
> >  		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
> >  
> > -	if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
> > +	if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS, cpu_vuln_whitelist) &&
> > +	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
> >  		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS);
> > -		if (cpu_matches(MSBDS_ONLY))
> > +		if (cpu_matches(MSBDS_ONLY, cpu_vuln_whitelist))
> >  			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
> >  	}
> >  
> > -	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS))
> > +	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS, cpu_vuln_whitelist))
> >  		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS);
> >  
> > +	/*
> > +	 * Some low-end SKUs on the affected list do not support
> > +	 * RDRAND or RDSEED. Make sure they show as "Not affected".
> > +	 */
> > +	if (cpu_matches(SRBDS, affected_cpus) &&
> > +	    (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED)))
> > +		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS);
> > +
> >  	/*
> >  	 * When the CPU is not mitigated for TAA (TAA_NO=0) set TAA bug when:
> >  	 *	- TSX is supported or
> > @@ -1139,7 +1175,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> >  	     (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
> >  		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
> >  
> > -	if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
> > +	if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN, cpu_vuln_whitelist))
> >  		return;
> >  
> >  	/* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
> > @@ -1148,7 +1184,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> >  
> >  	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
> >  
> > -	if (cpu_matches(NO_L1TF))
> > +	if (cpu_matches(NO_L1TF, cpu_vuln_whitelist))
> >  		return;
> >  
> >  	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);
> > @@ -1591,6 +1627,7 @@ void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> >  	mtrr_ap_init();
> >  	validate_apic_and_package_id(c);
> >  	x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap();
> > +	update_srbds_msr();
> >  }
> >  
> >  static __init int setup_noclflush(char *arg)
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
> > index 37fdefd14f28..9188ad5be4ed 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
> > @@ -44,7 +44,10 @@ struct _tlb_table {
> >  extern const struct cpu_dev *const __x86_cpu_dev_start[],
> >  			    *const __x86_cpu_dev_end[];
> >  
> > +void update_srbds_msr(void);
> > +
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL
> > +
> >  enum tsx_ctrl_states {
> >  	TSX_CTRL_ENABLE,
> >  	TSX_CTRL_DISABLE,
> > diff --git a/drivers/base/cpu.c b/drivers/base/cpu.c
> > index 9a1c00fbbaef..d2136ab9b14a 100644
> > --- a/drivers/base/cpu.c
> > +++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c
> > @@ -562,6 +562,12 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev,
> >  	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
> >  }
> >  
> > +ssize_t __weak cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev,
> > +			      struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
> > +{
> > +	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
> > +}
> > +
> >  static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
> >  static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
> >  static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
> > @@ -570,6 +576,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(l1tf, 0444, cpu_show_l1tf, NULL);
> >  static DEVICE_ATTR(mds, 0444, cpu_show_mds, NULL);
> >  static DEVICE_ATTR(tsx_async_abort, 0444, cpu_show_tsx_async_abort, NULL);
> >  static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, cpu_show_itlb_multihit, NULL);
> > +static DEVICE_ATTR(srbds, 0444, cpu_show_srbds, NULL);
> >  
> >  static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
> >  	&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
> > @@ -580,6 +587,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
> >  	&dev_attr_mds.attr,
> >  	&dev_attr_tsx_async_abort.attr,
> >  	&dev_attr_itlb_multihit.attr,
> > +	&dev_attr_srbds.attr,
> >  	NULL
> >  };
> >  
> > -- 
> > 2.17.1
> 
> -- 
> Kees Cook

  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-04-06 18:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-04-06 17:52 [MODERATED] [PATCH 0/3] V5 more sampling fun 0 mark gross
2020-01-16 22:16 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 2/3] V5 more sampling fun 2 mark gross
2020-01-30 19:12 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 3/3] V5 more sampling fun 3 mark gross
2020-03-17  0:56 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 1/3] V5 more sampling fun 1 mark gross
     [not found] ` <5e8b7166.1c69fb81.4c99a.3619SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2020-04-06 18:31   ` [MODERATED] " Kees Cook
     [not found] ` <5e8b71d8.1c69fb81.64075.43abSMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2020-04-06 18:34   ` [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 2/3] V5 more sampling fun 2 Kees Cook
2020-04-06 18:37     ` Greg KH
2020-04-06 20:56       ` mark gross
2020-04-06 22:14       ` Luck, Tony
2020-04-07  7:51         ` Greg KH
2020-04-06 18:52     ` mark gross [this message]
     [not found] ` <5e8b71af.1c69fb81.d8b8.ac6bSMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2020-04-06 18:34   ` [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 3/3] V5 more sampling fun 3 Kees Cook
2020-04-06 22:07 ` [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 2/3] V5 more sampling fun 2 Josh Poimboeuf
2020-04-07  0:34   ` mark gross
2020-04-07 12:39     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-04-08 20:26       ` mark gross
2020-04-08 22:14   ` mark gross
2020-04-08 22:58     ` mark gross
2020-04-07 15:17 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-08 20:33   ` [MODERATED] " mark gross
2020-04-08 23:21     ` Thomas Gleixner

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