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From: mark gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
To: speck@linutronix.de
Subject: [MODERATED] [PATCH 2/4] V7 more sampling fun 2
Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2020 17:56:27 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <=?utf-8?q?=3C3d3011fa9591bb93ac90d230bb49498e55614a6c=2E158680?= =?utf-8?q?1416=2Egit=2Emgross=40linux=2Eintel=2Ecom=3E?=> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1586801416.git.mgross@linux.intel.com>

From: mark gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] x86/cpu: clean up cpu_matches

To make cpu_matches reusable for alternitive matching tables, make cpu_matches
take a x86_cpu_id table as a parameter.

Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 25 ++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index bed0cb83fe24..2bea1cc8dcb4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1075,9 +1075,9 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 	{}
 };
 
-static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which)
+static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which, const struct x86_cpu_id *table)
 {
-	const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(cpu_vuln_whitelist);
+	const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table);
 
 	return m && !!(m->driver_data & which);
 }
@@ -1097,31 +1097,34 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
 
 	/* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
+	if (!cpu_matches(NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT, cpu_vuln_whitelist) &&
+	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
 
-	if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION))
+	if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION, cpu_vuln_whitelist))
 		return;
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
 
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SPECTRE_V2))
+	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SPECTRE_V2, cpu_vuln_whitelist))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
 
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
+	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB, cpu_vuln_whitelist) &&
+	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
 	   !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
 
 	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
 
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
+	if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS, cpu_vuln_whitelist) &&
+	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS);
-		if (cpu_matches(MSBDS_ONLY))
+		if (cpu_matches(MSBDS_ONLY, cpu_vuln_whitelist))
 			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
 	}
 
-	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS))
+	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS, cpu_vuln_whitelist))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS);
 
 	/*
@@ -1139,7 +1142,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	     (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
 
-	if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
+	if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN, cpu_vuln_whitelist))
 		return;
 
 	/* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
@@ -1148,7 +1151,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
 
-	if (cpu_matches(NO_L1TF))
+	if (cpu_matches(NO_L1TF, cpu_vuln_whitelist))
 		return;
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);
-- 
2.17.1

  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-04-13 18:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-04-13 18:10 [MODERATED] [PATCH 0/4] V7 more sampling fun 0 mark gross
2020-01-16 22:16 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 3/4] V7 more sampling fun 3 mark gross
2020-01-30 19:12 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 4/4] V7 more sampling fun 4 mark gross
2020-03-17  0:56 ` mark gross [this message]
2020-03-17  0:56 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 1/4] V7 more sampling fun 1 mark gross
2020-04-14  3:48 ` [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 3/4] V7 more sampling fun 3 mark gross
2020-04-14 16:23   ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-14 20:03     ` [MODERATED] " mark gross
2020-04-14 10:58 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-14 16:43   ` [MODERATED] " mark gross
2020-04-14 20:02 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-04-14 21:03   ` mark gross
2020-04-14 21:23     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-04-14 21:53       ` mark gross
2020-04-14 20:05 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-04-14 21:59   ` mark gross
2020-04-14 22:46     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2020-04-15 20:59       ` mark gross
2020-04-15 12:58     ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-04-15 22:21       ` [MODERATED] " mark gross
2020-04-15 17:51 ` [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 1/4] V7 more sampling fun 1 Borislav Petkov
2020-04-15 23:58   ` mark gross

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