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* [MODERATED] [PATCH 0/4] v5 more sampling fun 0
@ 2020-04-09 18:10 mark gross
  0 siblings, 0 replies; only message in thread
From: mark gross @ 2020-04-09 18:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: speck

From: mark gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 0/4] v6 more sampling fun

This version of the Special Register Buffer Data Sampling has been updated to
address feedback gotten.  Including:
* is based on linus/master from this AM.
* cleanups and changes driven by review feedback from Josh and Thomas.
* addresses the case of intel fusing TSX off on lower end SKU's
* spits out some refactoring from the main patch to better isolate the SRBDS
  specific changes.

Thanks to all who have given me feedback on this.

---

Special Register Buffer Data Sampling is a sampling type of vulnerability that
leaks data across cores sharing the HW-RNG for vulnerable processors.

This leak is fixed by a microcode update and is enabled by default.

This new microcode serializes processor access during execution of RDRAND or
RDSEED. It ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is released
for reuse.

The mitigation impacts the throughput of the RDRAND and RDSEED instructions and
latency of RT processing running on the socket while executing RDRAND or
RDSEED.  The micro benchmarks calling RDRAND many times show a slowdown.

This patch set enables kernel command line control of this mitigation and
exports vulnerability and mitigation status.
This patch set includes 3 patches:
* The first patch adds steppings to x86_cpu_id structure and related macros
* The second patch enables the command line control of the mitigation as well
  as the sysfs export of vulnerability status.
* The third patch has the Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln documentation for
  this issue and the control over the mitigation.


mark gross (4):
  x86/cpu: Add stepping field to x86_cpu_id structure
  x86/cpu: clean up cpu_matches
  x86/speculation: Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS)
    mitigation control.
  x86/speculation: SRBDS vulnerability and mitigation documentation

 .../ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu      |   1 +
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst   |   1 +
 .../special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst | 148 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         |  20 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_device_id.h          |  26 ++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h            |   2 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h              |   4 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                    | 116 ++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                  |  68 ++++++--
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h                     |   2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c                   |   7 +-
 drivers/base/cpu.c                            |   8 +
 include/linux/mod_devicetable.h               |   2 +
 13 files changed, 390 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst

-- 
2.17.1

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