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From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
To: speck@linutronix.de
Subject: [MODERATED] [PATCH 1/9] TAA v2 1
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2019 10:45:50 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <def4e9b1cd21de2c3bd4fb947e28603eb0e5c509.1572168937.git.bp@suse.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1572168937.git.bp@suse.de>

From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 1/9] x86/msr: Add the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR

Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) may be used on certain
processors as part of a speculative side channel attack.  A microcode
update for existing processors that are vulnerable to this attack will
add a new MSR - IA32_TSX_CTRL to allow the system administrator the
option to disable TSX as one of the possible mitigations.

The CPUs which get this new MSR after a microcode upgrade are the ones
which do not set MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO (bit 5) because those
CPUs have CPUID.MD_CLEAR, i.e., the VERW implementation which clears all
CPU buffers takes care of the TAA case as well.

  [ Note that future processors that are not vulnerable will also
    support the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR. ]

Add defines for the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR and its bits.

TSX has two sub-features:

1. Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM) is an explicitly-used feature
   where new instructions begin and end TSX transactions.
2. Hardware Lock Elision (HLE) is implicitly used when certain kinds of
   "old" style locks are used by software.

Bit 7 of the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES indicates the presence of the
IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR.

There are two control bits in IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR:

  Bit 0: When set, it disables the Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM)
         sub-feature of TSX (will force all transactions to abort on the
	 XBEGIN instruction).

  Bit 1: When set, it disables the enumeration of the RTM and HLE feature
         (i.e. it will make CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4} and
	  CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit11} read as 0).

The other TSX sub-feature, Hardware Lock Elision (HLE), is
unconditionally disabled by the new microcode but still enumerated
as present by CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4}, unless disabled by
IA32_TSX_CTRL_MSR[1] - TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 20ce682a2540..da4caf6da739 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@
 						  * Microarchitectural Data
 						  * Sampling (MDS) vulnerabilities.
 						  */
+#define ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR		BIT(7)	/* MSR for TSX control is available. */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD		0x0000010b
 #define L1D_FLUSH			BIT(0)	/*
@@ -103,6 +104,10 @@
 #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL		0x00000119
 #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3		0x0000011e
 
+#define MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL		0x00000122
+#define TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE		BIT(0)	/* Disable RTM feature */
+#define TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR		BIT(1)	/* Disable TSX enumeration */
+
 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS		0x00000174
 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP		0x00000175
 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP		0x00000176
-- 
2.21.0

  reply	other threads:[~2019-10-27  9:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-10-27  9:35 [MODERATED] [PATCH 0/9] TAA v2 0 Borislav Petkov
2019-10-23  8:45 ` Pawan Gupta [this message]
2019-10-23  8:52 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 2/9] TAA v2 2 Pawan Gupta
2019-10-28  7:36   ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-10-23  9:01 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 3/9] TAA v2 3 Pawan Gupta
2019-10-23  9:30 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 4/9] TAA v2 4 Pawan Gupta
2019-10-23 10:19 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 5/9] TAA v2 5 Pawan Gupta
2019-10-23 10:23 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 6/9] TAA v2 6 Pawan Gupta
2019-10-23 10:28 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 7/9] TAA v2 7 Pawan Gupta
2019-10-23 10:32 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 8/9] TAA v2 8 Pawan Gupta
2019-10-23 10:35 ` [MODERATED] [PATCH 9/9] TAA v2 9 Michal Hocko

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