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From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-audit@redhat.com, io-uring@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>,
	Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>,
	Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 2/8] audit,io_uring,io-wq: add some basic audit support to io_uring
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 2021 09:33:08 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210916133308.GP490529@madcap2.tricolour.ca> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <163172457152.88001.12700049763432531651.stgit@olly>

On 2021-09-15 12:49, Paul Moore wrote:
> This patch adds basic auditing to io_uring operations, regardless of
> their context.  This is accomplished by allocating audit_context
> structures for the io-wq worker and io_uring SQPOLL kernel threads
> as well as explicitly auditing the io_uring operations in
> io_issue_sqe().  Individual io_uring operations can bypass auditing
> through the "audit_skip" field in the struct io_op_def definition for
> the operation; although great care must be taken so that security
> relevant io_uring operations do not bypass auditing; please contact
> the audit mailing list (see the MAINTAINERS file) with any questions.
> 
> The io_uring operations are audited using a new AUDIT_URINGOP record,
> an example is shown below:
> 
>   type=UNKNOWN[1336] msg=audit(1630523381.288:260):
>     uring_op=19 success=yes exit=0 items=0 ppid=853 pid=1204
>     uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0
>     subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
>     key=(null)
>     AUID="root" UID="root" GID="root" EUID="root" SUID="root"
>     FSUID="root" EGID="root" SGID="root" FSGID="root"
> 
> Thanks to Richard Guy Briggs for review and feedback.

I share Steve's concerns about the missing auid and ses.  The userspace
log interpreter conjured up AUID="root" from the absent auid=.

Some of the creds are here including ppid, pid, a herd of *id and subj.
*Something* initiated this action and then delegated it to iouring to
carry out.  That should be in there somewhere.  You had a concern about
shared queues and mis-attribution.  All of these creds including auid
and ses should be kept together to get this right.

> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> 
> ---
> v4:
> - removed some work-in-progress comments
> - removed the auid logging in audit_log_uring()
> v3:
> - removed work-in-progress warning from the description
> v2:
> - added dummy funcs for audit_uring_{entry,exit}()
> - replaced opcode checks in io_issue_sqe() with audit_skip checks
> - moved fastpath checks into audit_uring_{entry,exit}()
> - audit_log_uring() uses GFP_ATOMIC
> - don't record the arch in __audit_uring_entry()
> v1:
> - initial draft
> ---
>  fs/io-wq.c                 |    4 +
>  fs/io_uring.c              |   55 +++++++++++++--
>  include/linux/audit.h      |   26 +++++++
>  include/uapi/linux/audit.h |    1 
>  kernel/audit.h             |    2 +
>  kernel/auditsc.c           |  166 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  6 files changed, 248 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/io-wq.c b/fs/io-wq.c
> index 6c55362c1f99..dac5c5961c9d 100644
> --- a/fs/io-wq.c
> +++ b/fs/io-wq.c
> @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
>  #include <linux/rculist_nulls.h>
>  #include <linux/cpu.h>
>  #include <linux/tracehook.h>
> +#include <linux/audit.h>
>  
>  #include "io-wq.h"
>  
> @@ -562,6 +563,8 @@ static int io_wqe_worker(void *data)
>  	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "iou-wrk-%d", wq->task->pid);
>  	set_task_comm(current, buf);
>  
> +	audit_alloc_kernel(current);
> +
>  	while (!test_bit(IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT, &wq->state)) {
>  		long ret;
>  
> @@ -601,6 +604,7 @@ static int io_wqe_worker(void *data)
>  		io_worker_handle_work(worker);
>  	}
>  
> +	audit_free(current);
>  	io_worker_exit(worker);
>  	return 0;
>  }
> diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c
> index 16fb7436043c..388754b24785 100644
> --- a/fs/io_uring.c
> +++ b/fs/io_uring.c
> @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@
>  #include <linux/pagemap.h>
>  #include <linux/io_uring.h>
>  #include <linux/tracehook.h>
> +#include <linux/audit.h>
>  
>  #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
>  #include <trace/events/io_uring.h>
> @@ -917,6 +918,8 @@ struct io_op_def {
>  	unsigned		needs_async_setup : 1;
>  	/* should block plug */
>  	unsigned		plug : 1;
> +	/* skip auditing */
> +	unsigned		audit_skip : 1;
>  	/* size of async data needed, if any */
>  	unsigned short		async_size;
>  };
> @@ -930,6 +933,7 @@ static const struct io_op_def io_op_defs[] = {
>  		.buffer_select		= 1,
>  		.needs_async_setup	= 1,
>  		.plug			= 1,
> +		.audit_skip		= 1,
>  		.async_size		= sizeof(struct io_async_rw),
>  	},
>  	[IORING_OP_WRITEV] = {
> @@ -939,16 +943,19 @@ static const struct io_op_def io_op_defs[] = {
>  		.pollout		= 1,
>  		.needs_async_setup	= 1,
>  		.plug			= 1,
> +		.audit_skip		= 1,
>  		.async_size		= sizeof(struct io_async_rw),
>  	},
>  	[IORING_OP_FSYNC] = {
>  		.needs_file		= 1,
> +		.audit_skip		= 1,
>  	},
>  	[IORING_OP_READ_FIXED] = {
>  		.needs_file		= 1,
>  		.unbound_nonreg_file	= 1,
>  		.pollin			= 1,
>  		.plug			= 1,
> +		.audit_skip		= 1,
>  		.async_size		= sizeof(struct io_async_rw),
>  	},
>  	[IORING_OP_WRITE_FIXED] = {
> @@ -957,15 +964,20 @@ static const struct io_op_def io_op_defs[] = {
>  		.unbound_nonreg_file	= 1,
>  		.pollout		= 1,
>  		.plug			= 1,
> +		.audit_skip		= 1,
>  		.async_size		= sizeof(struct io_async_rw),
>  	},
>  	[IORING_OP_POLL_ADD] = {
>  		.needs_file		= 1,
>  		.unbound_nonreg_file	= 1,
> +		.audit_skip		= 1,
> +	},
> +	[IORING_OP_POLL_REMOVE] = {
> +		.audit_skip		= 1,
>  	},
> -	[IORING_OP_POLL_REMOVE] = {},
>  	[IORING_OP_SYNC_FILE_RANGE] = {
>  		.needs_file		= 1,
> +		.audit_skip		= 1,
>  	},
>  	[IORING_OP_SENDMSG] = {
>  		.needs_file		= 1,
> @@ -983,18 +995,23 @@ static const struct io_op_def io_op_defs[] = {
>  		.async_size		= sizeof(struct io_async_msghdr),
>  	},
>  	[IORING_OP_TIMEOUT] = {
> +		.audit_skip		= 1,
>  		.async_size		= sizeof(struct io_timeout_data),
>  	},
>  	[IORING_OP_TIMEOUT_REMOVE] = {
>  		/* used by timeout updates' prep() */
> +		.audit_skip		= 1,
>  	},
>  	[IORING_OP_ACCEPT] = {
>  		.needs_file		= 1,
>  		.unbound_nonreg_file	= 1,
>  		.pollin			= 1,
>  	},
> -	[IORING_OP_ASYNC_CANCEL] = {},
> +	[IORING_OP_ASYNC_CANCEL] = {
> +		.audit_skip		= 1,
> +	},
>  	[IORING_OP_LINK_TIMEOUT] = {
> +		.audit_skip		= 1,
>  		.async_size		= sizeof(struct io_timeout_data),
>  	},
>  	[IORING_OP_CONNECT] = {
> @@ -1009,14 +1026,19 @@ static const struct io_op_def io_op_defs[] = {
>  	},
>  	[IORING_OP_OPENAT] = {},
>  	[IORING_OP_CLOSE] = {},
> -	[IORING_OP_FILES_UPDATE] = {},
> -	[IORING_OP_STATX] = {},
> +	[IORING_OP_FILES_UPDATE] = {
> +		.audit_skip		= 1,
> +	},
> +	[IORING_OP_STATX] = {
> +		.audit_skip		= 1,
> +	},
>  	[IORING_OP_READ] = {
>  		.needs_file		= 1,
>  		.unbound_nonreg_file	= 1,
>  		.pollin			= 1,
>  		.buffer_select		= 1,
>  		.plug			= 1,
> +		.audit_skip		= 1,
>  		.async_size		= sizeof(struct io_async_rw),
>  	},
>  	[IORING_OP_WRITE] = {
> @@ -1025,39 +1047,50 @@ static const struct io_op_def io_op_defs[] = {
>  		.unbound_nonreg_file	= 1,
>  		.pollout		= 1,
>  		.plug			= 1,
> +		.audit_skip		= 1,
>  		.async_size		= sizeof(struct io_async_rw),
>  	},
>  	[IORING_OP_FADVISE] = {
>  		.needs_file		= 1,
> +		.audit_skip		= 1,
>  	},
>  	[IORING_OP_MADVISE] = {},
>  	[IORING_OP_SEND] = {
>  		.needs_file		= 1,
>  		.unbound_nonreg_file	= 1,
>  		.pollout		= 1,
> +		.audit_skip		= 1,
>  	},
>  	[IORING_OP_RECV] = {
>  		.needs_file		= 1,
>  		.unbound_nonreg_file	= 1,
>  		.pollin			= 1,
>  		.buffer_select		= 1,
> +		.audit_skip		= 1,
>  	},
>  	[IORING_OP_OPENAT2] = {
>  	},
>  	[IORING_OP_EPOLL_CTL] = {
>  		.unbound_nonreg_file	= 1,
> +		.audit_skip		= 1,
>  	},
>  	[IORING_OP_SPLICE] = {
>  		.needs_file		= 1,
>  		.hash_reg_file		= 1,
>  		.unbound_nonreg_file	= 1,
> +		.audit_skip		= 1,
> +	},
> +	[IORING_OP_PROVIDE_BUFFERS] = {
> +		.audit_skip		= 1,
> +	},
> +	[IORING_OP_REMOVE_BUFFERS] = {
> +		.audit_skip		= 1,
>  	},
> -	[IORING_OP_PROVIDE_BUFFERS] = {},
> -	[IORING_OP_REMOVE_BUFFERS] = {},
>  	[IORING_OP_TEE] = {
>  		.needs_file		= 1,
>  		.hash_reg_file		= 1,
>  		.unbound_nonreg_file	= 1,
> +		.audit_skip		= 1,
>  	},
>  	[IORING_OP_SHUTDOWN] = {
>  		.needs_file		= 1,
> @@ -6591,6 +6624,9 @@ static int io_issue_sqe(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags)
>  	if ((req->flags & REQ_F_CREDS) && req->creds != current_cred())
>  		creds = override_creds(req->creds);
>  
> +	if (!io_op_defs[req->opcode].audit_skip)
> +		audit_uring_entry(req->opcode);
> +
>  	switch (req->opcode) {
>  	case IORING_OP_NOP:
>  		ret = io_nop(req, issue_flags);
> @@ -6706,6 +6742,9 @@ static int io_issue_sqe(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags)
>  		break;
>  	}
>  
> +	if (!io_op_defs[req->opcode].audit_skip)
> +		audit_uring_exit(!ret, ret);
> +
>  	if (creds)
>  		revert_creds(creds);
>  	if (ret)
> @@ -7360,6 +7399,8 @@ static int io_sq_thread(void *data)
>  		set_cpus_allowed_ptr(current, cpu_online_mask);
>  	current->flags |= PF_NO_SETAFFINITY;
>  
> +	audit_alloc_kernel(current);
> +
>  	mutex_lock(&sqd->lock);
>  	while (1) {
>  		bool cap_entries, sqt_spin = false;
> @@ -7425,6 +7466,8 @@ static int io_sq_thread(void *data)
>  	io_run_task_work();
>  	mutex_unlock(&sqd->lock);
>  
> +	audit_free(current);
> +
>  	complete(&sqd->exited);
>  	do_exit(0);
>  }
> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> index 82b7c1116a85..d656a06dd909 100644
> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> @@ -286,7 +286,10 @@ static inline int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
>  /* These are defined in auditsc.c */
>  				/* Public API */
>  extern int  audit_alloc(struct task_struct *task);
> +extern int  audit_alloc_kernel(struct task_struct *task);
>  extern void __audit_free(struct task_struct *task);
> +extern void __audit_uring_entry(u8 op);
> +extern void __audit_uring_exit(int success, long code);
>  extern void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a0, unsigned long a1,
>  				  unsigned long a2, unsigned long a3);
>  extern void __audit_syscall_exit(int ret_success, long ret_value);
> @@ -323,6 +326,21 @@ static inline void audit_free(struct task_struct *task)
>  	if (unlikely(task->audit_context))
>  		__audit_free(task);
>  }
> +static inline void audit_uring_entry(u8 op)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 * We intentionally check audit_context() before audit_enabled as most
> +	 * Linux systems (as of ~2021) rely on systemd which forces audit to
> +	 * be enabled regardless of the user's audit configuration.
> +	 */
> +	if (unlikely(audit_context() && audit_enabled))
> +		__audit_uring_entry(op);
> +}
> +static inline void audit_uring_exit(int success, long code)
> +{
> +	if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
> +		__audit_uring_exit(success, code);
> +}
>  static inline void audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a0,
>  				       unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
>  				       unsigned long a3)
> @@ -554,8 +572,16 @@ static inline int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
>  {
>  	return 0;
>  }
> +static inline int audit_alloc_kernel(struct task_struct *task)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
>  static inline void audit_free(struct task_struct *task)
>  { }
> +static inline void audit_uring_entry(u8 op)
> +{ }
> +static inline void audit_uring_exit(int success, long code)
> +{ }
>  static inline void audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a0,
>  				       unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
>  				       unsigned long a3)
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> index daa481729e9b..a1997697c8b1 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> @@ -118,6 +118,7 @@
>  #define AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL	1333	/* NTP value adjustment */
>  #define AUDIT_BPF		1334	/* BPF subsystem */
>  #define AUDIT_EVENT_LISTENER	1335	/* Task joined multicast read socket */
> +#define AUDIT_URINGOP		1336	/* io_uring operation */
>  
>  #define AUDIT_AVC		1400	/* SE Linux avc denial or grant */
>  #define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR	1401	/* Internal SE Linux Errors */
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
> index 13abc48de0bd..d1161e3b83e2 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.h
> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
> @@ -103,10 +103,12 @@ struct audit_context {
>  	enum {
>  		AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED,	/* audit_context is currently unused */
>  		AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL,	/* in use by syscall */
> +		AUDIT_CTX_URING,	/* in use by io_uring */
>  	} context;
>  	enum audit_state    state, current_state;
>  	unsigned int	    serial;     /* serial number for record */
>  	int		    major;      /* syscall number */
> +	int		    uring_op;   /* uring operation */
>  	struct timespec64   ctime;      /* time of syscall entry */
>  	unsigned long	    argv[4];    /* syscall arguments */
>  	long		    return_code;/* syscall return code */
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index f3d309b05c2d..6dda448fb826 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -959,6 +959,7 @@ static void audit_reset_context(struct audit_context *ctx)
>  	ctx->current_state = ctx->state;
>  	ctx->serial = 0;
>  	ctx->major = 0;
> +	ctx->uring_op = 0;
>  	ctx->ctime = (struct timespec64){ .tv_sec = 0, .tv_nsec = 0 };
>  	memset(ctx->argv, 0, sizeof(ctx->argv));
>  	ctx->return_code = 0;
> @@ -1044,6 +1045,31 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +/**
> + * audit_alloc_kernel - allocate an audit_context for a kernel task
> + * @tsk: the kernel task
> + *
> + * Similar to the audit_alloc() function, but intended for kernel private
> + * threads.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
> + */
> +int audit_alloc_kernel(struct task_struct *tsk)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 * At the moment we are just going to call into audit_alloc() to
> +	 * simplify the code, but there two things to keep in mind with this
> +	 * approach:
> +	 *
> +	 * 1. Filtering internal kernel tasks is a bit laughable in almost all
> +	 * cases, but there is at least one case where there is a benefit:
> +	 * the '-a task,never' case allows the admin to effectively disable
> +	 * task auditing at runtime.
> +	 *
> +	 * 2. The {set,clear}_task_syscall_work() ops likely have zero effect
> +	 * on these internal kernel tasks, but they probably don't hurt either.
> +	 */
> +	return audit_alloc(tsk);
> +}
> +
>  static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
>  {
>  	/* resetting is extra work, but it is likely just noise */
> @@ -1546,6 +1572,44 @@ static void audit_log_proctitle(void)
>  	audit_log_end(ab);
>  }
>  
> +/**
> + * audit_log_uring - generate a AUDIT_URINGOP record
> + * @ctx: the audit context
> + */
> +static void audit_log_uring(struct audit_context *ctx)
> +{
> +	struct audit_buffer *ab;
> +	const struct cred *cred;
> +
> +	ab = audit_log_start(ctx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_URINGOP);
> +	if (!ab)
> +		return;
> +	cred = current_cred();
> +	audit_log_format(ab, "uring_op=%d", ctx->uring_op);
> +	if (ctx->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID)
> +		audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
> +				 (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS ?
> +				  "yes" : "no"),
> +				 ctx->return_code);
> +	audit_log_format(ab,
> +			 " items=%d"
> +			 " ppid=%d pid=%d uid=%u gid=%u euid=%u suid=%u"
> +			 " fsuid=%u egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u",
> +			 ctx->name_count,
> +			 task_ppid_nr(current), task_tgid_nr(current),
> +			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->uid),
> +			 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->gid),
> +			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->euid),
> +			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->suid),
> +			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid),
> +			 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->egid),
> +			 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->sgid),
> +			 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid));
> +	audit_log_task_context(ab);
> +	audit_log_key(ab, ctx->filterkey);
> +	audit_log_end(ab);
> +}
> +
>  static void audit_log_exit(void)
>  {
>  	int i, call_panic = 0;
> @@ -1581,6 +1645,9 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
>  		audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
>  		audit_log_end(ab);
>  		break;
> +	case AUDIT_CTX_URING:
> +		audit_log_uring(context);
> +		break;
>  	default:
>  		BUG();
>  		break;
> @@ -1751,6 +1818,105 @@ static void audit_return_fixup(struct audit_context *ctx,
>  	ctx->return_valid = (success ? AUDITSC_SUCCESS : AUDITSC_FAILURE);
>  }
>  
> +/**
> + * __audit_uring_entry - prepare the kernel task's audit context for io_uring
> + * @op: the io_uring opcode
> + *
> + * This is similar to audit_syscall_entry() but is intended for use by io_uring
> + * operations.  This function should only ever be called from
> + * audit_uring_entry() as we rely on the audit context checking present in that
> + * function.
> + */
> +void __audit_uring_entry(u8 op)
> +{
> +	struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
> +
> +	if (ctx->state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED)
> +		return;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * NOTE: It's possible that we can be called from the process' context
> +	 *       before it returns to userspace, and before audit_syscall_exit()
> +	 *       is called.  In this case there is not much to do, just record
> +	 *       the io_uring details and return.
> +	 */
> +	ctx->uring_op = op;
> +	if (ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL)
> +		return;
> +
> +	ctx->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
> +	if (!ctx->dummy && ctx->state == AUDIT_STATE_BUILD)
> +		ctx->prio = 0;
> +
> +	ctx->context = AUDIT_CTX_URING;
> +	ctx->current_state = ctx->state;
> +	ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&ctx->ctime);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * __audit_uring_exit - wrap up the kernel task's audit context after io_uring
> + * @success: true/false value to indicate if the operation succeeded or not
> + * @code: operation return code
> + *
> + * This is similar to audit_syscall_exit() but is intended for use by io_uring
> + * operations.  This function should only ever be called from
> + * audit_uring_exit() as we rely on the audit context checking present in that
> + * function.
> + */
> +void __audit_uring_exit(int success, long code)
> +{
> +	struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * TODO: At some point we will likely want to filter on io_uring ops
> +	 *       and other things similar to what we do for syscalls, but that
> +	 *       is something for another day; just record what we can here.
> +	 */
> +
> +	if (ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL) {
> +		/*
> +		 * NOTE: See the note in __audit_uring_entry() about the case
> +		 *       where we may be called from process context before we
> +		 *       return to userspace via audit_syscall_exit().  In this
> +		 *       case we simply emit a URINGOP record and bail, the
> +		 *       normal syscall exit handling will take care of
> +		 *       everything else.
> +		 *       It is also worth mentioning that when we are called,
> +		 *       the current process creds may differ from the creds
> +		 *       used during the normal syscall processing; keep that
> +		 *       in mind if/when we move the record generation code.
> +		 */
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * We need to filter on the syscall info here to decide if we
> +		 * should emit a URINGOP record.  I know it seems odd but this
> +		 * solves the problem where users have a filter to block *all*
> +		 * syscall records in the "exit" filter; we want to preserve
> +		 * the behavior here.
> +		 */
> +		audit_filter_syscall(current, ctx);
> +		audit_filter_inodes(current, ctx);
> +		if (ctx->current_state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
> +			return;
> +
> +		audit_log_uring(ctx);
> +		return;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* this may generate CONFIG_CHANGE records */
> +	if (!list_empty(&ctx->killed_trees))
> +		audit_kill_trees(ctx);
> +
> +	audit_filter_inodes(current, ctx);
> +	if (ctx->current_state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
> +		goto out;
> +	audit_return_fixup(ctx, success, code);
> +	audit_log_exit();
> +
> +out:
> +	audit_reset_context(ctx);
> +}
> +
>  /**
>   * __audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
>   * @major: major syscall type (function)
> 

- RGB

--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635


  reply	other threads:[~2021-09-16 13:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-09-15 16:49 [PATCH v4 0/8] Add LSM access controls and auditing to io_uring Paul Moore
2021-09-15 16:49 ` [PATCH v4 1/8] audit: prepare audit_context for use in calling contexts beyond syscalls Paul Moore
2021-09-15 16:49 ` [PATCH v4 2/8] audit,io_uring,io-wq: add some basic audit support to io_uring Paul Moore
2021-09-16 13:33   ` Richard Guy Briggs [this message]
2021-09-16 14:02     ` Paul Moore
2021-09-16 14:19       ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-09-16 14:47         ` Paul Moore
2021-09-15 16:49 ` [PATCH v4 3/8] audit: add filtering for io_uring records Paul Moore
2021-09-15 21:48   ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-09-15 16:49 ` [PATCH v4 4/8] fs: add anon_inode_getfile_secure() similar to anon_inode_getfd_secure() Paul Moore
2021-09-15 16:49 ` [PATCH v4 5/8] io_uring: convert io_uring to the secure anon inode interface Paul Moore
2021-09-15 16:49 ` [PATCH v4 6/8] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks to io_uring Paul Moore
2021-09-15 16:50 ` [PATCH v4 7/8] selinux: add support for the io_uring access controls Paul Moore
2021-09-15 16:50 ` [PATCH v4 8/8] Smack: Brutalist io_uring support Paul Moore
2021-09-20  2:44 ` [PATCH v4 0/8] Add LSM access controls and auditing to io_uring Paul Moore

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