From: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
To: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>,
io-uring <io-uring@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/3] io_uring: add restrictions to support untrusted applications and guests
Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2020 17:20:44 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGxU2F55zzMzc043P88TWJNr2poUTVwrRmu86qyh0uM-8gimng@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200813153254.93731-1-sgarzare@redhat.com>
Hi Jens,
this is a gentle ping.
I'll respin, using memdup_user() for restriction registration.
I'd like to get some feedback to see if I should change anything else.
Do you think it's in good shape?
Thanks,
Stefano
On Thu, Aug 13, 2020 at 5:34 PM Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> v4:
> - rebased on top of io_uring-5.9
> - fixed io_uring_enter() exit path when ring is disabled
>
> v3: https://lore.kernel.org/io-uring/20200728160101.48554-1-sgarzare@redhat.c=
> om/
> RFC v2: https://lore.kernel.org/io-uring/20200716124833.93667-1-sgarzare@redh=
> at.com
> RFC v1: https://lore.kernel.org/io-uring/20200710141945.129329-1-sgarzare@red=
> hat.com
>
> Following the proposal that I send about restrictions [1], I wrote this series
> to add restrictions in io_uring.
>
> I also wrote helpers in liburing and a test case (test/register-restrictions.=
> c)
> available in this repository:
> https://github.com/stefano-garzarella/liburing (branch: io_uring_restrictions)
>
> Just to recap the proposal, the idea is to add some restrictions to the
> operations (sqe opcode and flags, register opcode) to safely allow untrusted
> applications or guests to use io_uring queues.
>
> The first patch changes io_uring_register(2) opcodes into an enumeration to
> keep track of the last opcode available.
>
> The second patch adds IOURING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS opcode and the code to
> handle restrictions.
>
> The third patch adds IORING_SETUP_R_DISABLED flag to start the rings disabled,
> allowing the user to register restrictions, buffers, files, before to start
> processing SQEs.
>
> Comments and suggestions are very welcome.
>
> Thank you in advance,
> Stefano
>
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/io-uring/20200609142406.upuwpfmgqjeji4lc@steredha=
> t/
>
> Stefano Garzarella (3):
> io_uring: use an enumeration for io_uring_register(2) opcodes
> io_uring: add IOURING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS opcode
> io_uring: allow disabling rings during the creation
>
> fs/io_uring.c | 160 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> include/uapi/linux/io_uring.h | 60 ++++++++++---
> 2 files changed, 203 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
>
> --=20
> 2.26.2
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-08-25 15:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-08-13 15:32 [PATCH v4 0/3] io_uring: add restrictions to support untrusted applications and guests Stefano Garzarella
2020-08-13 15:32 ` [PATCH v4 1/3] io_uring: use an enumeration for io_uring_register(2) opcodes Stefano Garzarella
2020-08-26 19:40 ` Kees Cook
2020-08-26 19:43 ` Kees Cook
2020-08-26 19:52 ` Andreas Dilger
2020-08-27 7:11 ` Stefano Garzarella
2020-08-13 15:32 ` [PATCH v4 2/3] io_uring: add IOURING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS opcode Stefano Garzarella
2020-08-26 19:46 ` Kees Cook
2020-08-27 7:12 ` Stefano Garzarella
2020-08-13 15:32 ` [PATCH v4 3/3] io_uring: allow disabling rings during the creation Stefano Garzarella
2020-08-26 19:50 ` Kees Cook
2020-08-27 7:18 ` Stefano Garzarella
2020-08-27 15:04 ` Kees Cook
2020-08-25 15:20 ` Stefano Garzarella [this message]
2020-08-26 16:47 ` [PATCH v4 0/3] io_uring: add restrictions to support untrusted applications and guests Jens Axboe
2020-08-26 19:40 ` Kees Cook
2020-08-27 7:24 ` Stefano Garzarella
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=CAGxU2F55zzMzc043P88TWJNr2poUTVwrRmu86qyh0uM-8gimng@mail.gmail.com \
--to=sgarzare@redhat.com \
--cc=asarai@suse.de \
--cc=axboe@kernel.dk \
--cc=christian.brauner@ubuntu.com \
--cc=io-uring@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=jannh@google.com \
--cc=jmoyer@redhat.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=sargun@sargun.me \
--cc=stefanha@redhat.com \
--cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).