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From: Victor Stewart <v@nametag.social>
To: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>,
	Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-audit@redhat.com, io-uring <io-uring@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/9] audit,io_uring,io-wq: add some basic audit support to io_uring
Date: Wed, 26 May 2021 11:49:16 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAM1kxwjFeawYPudx+ARBMYXgMtU_ypwuSKP7x7U7AQ69LxGQgQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <18823c99-7d65-0e6f-d508-a487f1b4b9e7@samba.org>

> I'm wondering why it's not enough to have the native auditing just to happen.
>
> E.g. all (I have checked RECVMSG,SENDMSG,SEND and CONNECT) socket related io_uring opcodes
> already go via security_socket_{recvmsg,sendmsg,connect}()
>
> IORING_OP_OPENAT* goes via do_filp_open() which is in common with the open[at[2]]() syscalls
> and should also trigger audit_inode() and security_file_open().
>
> So why is there anything special needed for io_uring (now that the native worker threads are used)?
>
> Is there really any io_uring opcode that bypasses the security checks the corresponding native syscall
> would do? If so, I think that should just be fixed...

stefan's points crossed my mind as well.

but assuming iouring buy-in is required, from a design perspective,
rather than inserting these audit conditionals in the hotpath,
wouldn't a layering model work better?
aka enabling auditing changes the function entry point into io_uring
and passes operations through an auditing layer, then back to the main
entry point. then there is no
cost to audit disabled code, and you just force audit to pay whatever
double processing cost that entails.

V

  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-05-26 15:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-05-21 21:49 [RFC PATCH 0/9] Add LSM access controls and auditing to io_uring Paul Moore
2021-05-21 21:49 ` [RFC PATCH 1/9] audit: prepare audit_context for use in calling contexts beyond syscalls Paul Moore
2021-05-21 21:49 ` [RFC PATCH 2/9] audit,io_uring,io-wq: add some basic audit support to io_uring Paul Moore
2021-05-22  0:22   ` Pavel Begunkov
2021-05-22  2:36     ` Paul Moore
2021-05-23 20:26       ` Pavel Begunkov
2021-05-24 19:59         ` Paul Moore
2021-05-25  8:27           ` Pavel Begunkov
2021-05-25 14:53             ` Paul Moore
2021-05-26  1:11           ` Jens Axboe
2021-05-26  2:04             ` Paul Moore
2021-05-26 10:19               ` Pavel Begunkov
2021-05-26 14:38                 ` Paul Moore
2021-05-26 15:11                   ` Steve Grubb
2021-05-26 15:17                   ` Stefan Metzmacher
2021-05-26 15:49                     ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-05-26 17:22                       ` Jens Axboe
2021-05-27 17:27                         ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-05-26 15:49                     ` Victor Stewart [this message]
2021-05-26 16:38                       ` Casey Schaufler
2021-05-26 17:15               ` Jens Axboe
2021-05-26 17:31                 ` Jens Axboe
2021-05-26 17:54                   ` Jens Axboe
2021-05-26 18:01                     ` Jens Axboe
2021-05-26 18:44                       ` Paul Moore
2021-05-26 18:57                         ` Pavel Begunkov
2021-05-26 19:10                           ` Paul Moore
2021-05-26 19:44                         ` Jens Axboe
2021-05-26 20:19                           ` Paul Moore
2021-05-28 16:02                             ` Paul Moore
2021-06-02  8:26                               ` Pavel Begunkov
2021-06-02 15:46                                 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-06-03 10:39                                   ` Pavel Begunkov
2021-06-02 19:46                                 ` Paul Moore
2021-06-03 10:51                                   ` Pavel Begunkov
2021-06-03 15:54                                     ` Casey Schaufler
2021-06-03 15:54                               ` Jens Axboe
2021-06-04  5:04                                 ` Paul Moore
2021-05-26 18:38                     ` Paul Moore
2021-06-02 17:29   ` [RFC PATCH 2/9] audit, io_uring, io-wq: " Richard Guy Briggs
2021-06-02 20:46     ` Paul Moore
2021-08-25  1:21       ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-08-25 19:41         ` Paul Moore
2021-05-21 21:50 ` [RFC PATCH 3/9] audit: dev/test patch to force io_uring auditing Paul Moore
2021-05-21 21:50 ` [RFC PATCH 4/9] audit: add filtering for io_uring records Paul Moore
2021-05-28 22:35   ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-05-30 15:26     ` Paul Moore
2021-05-31 13:44       ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-06-02  1:40         ` Paul Moore
2021-06-02 15:37           ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-06-02 17:20             ` Paul Moore
2021-05-31 13:44       ` [PATCH 1/2] audit: add filtering for io_uring records, addendum Richard Guy Briggs
2021-05-31 16:08         ` kernel test robot
2021-05-31 17:38         ` kernel test robot
2021-06-07 23:15         ` Paul Moore
2021-06-08 12:55           ` Richard Guy Briggs
2021-06-09  2:45             ` Paul Moore
2021-05-31 13:44       ` [PATCH 2/2] audit: block PERM fields being used with io_uring filtering Richard Guy Briggs
2021-05-21 21:50 ` [RFC PATCH 5/9] fs: add anon_inode_getfile_secure() similar to anon_inode_getfd_secure() Paul Moore
2021-05-21 21:50 ` [RFC PATCH 6/9] io_uring: convert io_uring to the secure anon inode interface Paul Moore
2021-05-21 21:50 ` [RFC PATCH 7/9] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks to io_uring Paul Moore
2021-05-26 14:48   ` Stefan Metzmacher
2021-05-26 20:45     ` Paul Moore
2021-05-21 21:50 ` [RFC PATCH 8/9] selinux: add support for the io_uring access controls Paul Moore
2021-05-21 21:50 ` [RFC PATCH 9/9] Smack: Brutalist io_uring support with debug Paul Moore
2021-05-22  0:53 ` [RFC PATCH 0/9] Add LSM access controls and auditing to io_uring Tetsuo Handa
2021-05-22  2:06   ` Paul Moore
2021-05-26 15:00 ` Jeff Moyer
2021-05-26 18:49   ` Paul Moore
2021-05-26 19:07     ` Jeff Moyer
2021-05-26 19:10       ` Paul Moore

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