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From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	"Andreas Gruenbacher" <agruenba@redhat.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	"Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	"David Drysdale" <drysdale@google.com>,
	"Eric Paris" <eparis@redhat.com>,
	"James Morris" <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	"Jeff Dike" <jdike@addtoit.com>, "Julien Tinnes" <jln@google.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Michael Kerrisk" <mtk@man7.org>,
	"Paul Moore" <pmoore@redhat.com>,
	"Richard Weinberger" <richard@nod.at>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Stephen Smalley" <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	"Tetsuo Handa" <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
	"Will Drewry" <wad@chromium.org>,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 05/17] security/seccomp: Add LSM and create arrays of syscall metadata
Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2016 02:46:36 +0100
Message-ID: <1458784008-16277-6-git-send-email-mic@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1458784008-16277-1-git-send-email-mic@digikod.net>

To avoid userland to make mistakes by misusing a syscall parameter, the
kernel check the type of the syscall parameters (e.g. char pointer). At
compile time we create a memory section (i.e. __syscall_argdesc) with
syscall metadata. At boot time, this section is used to create an array
(i.e. seccomp_syscalls_argdesc) usable to check the syscall arguments.
The same way, another array can be created and used for compat mode.

Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
---
 include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h | 22 ++++++++++
 include/linux/compat.h            | 10 +++++
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h         |  5 +++
 include/linux/syscalls.h          | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/Kconfig                  |  1 +
 security/Makefile                 |  2 +
 security/seccomp/Kconfig          | 14 +++++++
 security/seccomp/Makefile         |  3 ++
 security/seccomp/lsm.c            | 87 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/seccomp/lsm.h            | 19 +++++++++
 security/security.c               |  1 +
 11 files changed, 232 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 security/seccomp/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 security/seccomp/Makefile
 create mode 100644 security/seccomp/lsm.c
 create mode 100644 security/seccomp/lsm.h

diff --git a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
index c4bd0e2c173c..b8792fc083c2 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
@@ -153,6 +153,26 @@
 #define TRACE_SYSCALLS()
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SECCOMP
+#define ARGDESC_SYSCALLS() . = ALIGN(8);				\
+			 VMLINUX_SYMBOL(__start_syscalls_argdesc) = .;	\
+			 *(__syscalls_argdesc)				\
+			 VMLINUX_SYMBOL(__stop_syscalls_argdesc) = .;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+#define COMPAT_ARGDESC_SYSCALLS() . = ALIGN(8);				\
+		 VMLINUX_SYMBOL(__start_compat_syscalls_argdesc) = .;	\
+		 *(__compat_syscalls_argdesc)				\
+		 VMLINUX_SYMBOL(__stop_compat_syscalls_argdesc) = .;
+#else
+#define COMPAT_ARGDESC_SYSCALLS()
+#endif	/* CONFIG_COMPAT */
+
+#else
+#define ARGDESC_SYSCALLS()
+#define COMPAT_ARGDESC_SYSCALLS()
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SECCOMP */
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SERIAL_EARLYCON
 #define EARLYCON_TABLE() STRUCT_ALIGN();			\
 			 VMLINUX_SYMBOL(__earlycon_table) = .;	\
@@ -511,6 +531,8 @@
 	MEM_DISCARD(init.data)						\
 	KERNEL_CTORS()							\
 	MCOUNT_REC()							\
+	ARGDESC_SYSCALLS()						\
+	COMPAT_ARGDESC_SYSCALLS()					\
 	*(.init.rodata)							\
 	FTRACE_EVENTS()							\
 	TRACE_SYSCALLS()						\
diff --git a/include/linux/compat.h b/include/linux/compat.h
index a76c9172b2eb..b63579a401e8 100644
--- a/include/linux/compat.h
+++ b/include/linux/compat.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/aio_abi.h>	/* for aio_context_t */
 #include <linux/unistd.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>	/* for SYSCALL_FILL_ARGDESC_SECTION */
 
 #include <asm/compat.h>
 #include <asm/siginfo.h>
@@ -28,7 +29,15 @@
 #define __SC_DELOUSE(t,v) ((t)(unsigned long)(v))
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SECCOMP
+#define COMPAT_SYSCALL_FILL_ARGDESC(...)	\
+	SYSCALL_FILL_ARGDESC_SECTION("__compat_syscalls_argdesc", __VA_ARGS__)
+#else
+#define COMPAT_SYSCALL_FILL_ARGDESC(...)
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SECCOMP */
+
 #define COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE0(name) \
+	COMPAT_SYSCALL_FILL_ARGDESC(compat_sys_##name, 0)	\
 	asmlinkage long compat_sys_##name(void)
 
 #define COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(name, ...) \
@@ -45,6 +54,7 @@
 	COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINEx(6, _##name, __VA_ARGS__)
 
 #define COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, name, ...)				\
+	COMPAT_SYSCALL_FILL_ARGDESC(compat_sys##name, x, __VA_ARGS__)	\
 	asmlinkage long compat_sys##name(__MAP(x,__SC_DECL,__VA_ARGS__))\
 		__attribute__((alias(__stringify(compat_SyS##name))));  \
 	static inline long C_SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_DECL,__VA_ARGS__));\
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 71969de4058c..12df41669308 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1892,5 +1892,10 @@ extern void __init yama_add_hooks(void);
 #else
 static inline void __init yama_add_hooks(void) { }
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SECCOMP
+extern void __init seccomp_init(void);
+#else
+static inline void __init seccomp_init(void) { }
+#endif
 
 #endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
index 185815c96433..0f846c408bba 100644
--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
@@ -79,6 +79,8 @@ union bpf_attr;
 #include <linux/quota.h>
 #include <linux/key.h>
 #include <trace/syscall.h>
+#include <uapi/asm/unistd.h>
+#include <linux/seccomp.h>
 
 /*
  * __MAP - apply a macro to syscall arguments
@@ -98,6 +100,24 @@ union bpf_attr;
 #define __MAP6(m,t,a,...) m(t,a), __MAP5(m,__VA_ARGS__)
 #define __MAP(n,...) __MAP##n(__VA_ARGS__)
 
+#define __COMPARGS6
+#define __COMPARGS5 , 0
+#define __COMPARGS4 , 0, 0
+#define __COMPARGS3 , 0, 0, 0
+#define __COMPARGS2 , 0, 0, 0, 0
+#define __COMPARGS1 , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+#define __COMPARGS0 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+#define __COMPARGS(n) __COMPARGS##n
+
+#define __COMPDECL6
+#define __COMPDECL5
+#define __COMPDECL4
+#define __COMPDECL3
+#define __COMPDECL2
+#define __COMPDECL1
+#define __COMPDECL0 void
+#define __COMPDECL(n) __COMPDECL##n
+
 #define __SC_DECL(t, a)	t a
 #define __TYPE_IS_L(t)	(__same_type((t)0, 0L))
 #define __TYPE_IS_UL(t)	(__same_type((t)0, 0UL))
@@ -175,8 +195,55 @@ extern struct trace_event_functions exit_syscall_print_funcs;
 #define SYSCALL_METADATA(sname, nb, ...)
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SECCOMP
+/*
+ * Do not store the symbole name but the syscall symbole address.
+ * FIXME: Handle aliased symboles (i.e. different name but same address)?
+ *
+ * @addr: syscall address
+ * @args: syscall arguments C type (i.e. __SACT__* values)
+ */
+struct syscall_argdesc {
+	const void *addr;
+	u8 args[6];
+};
+
+/* Syscall Argument C Type (none means no argument) */
+#define __SACT__NONE			0
+#define __SACT__OTHER			1
+#define __SACT__CONST_CHAR_PTR		2
+#define __SACT__CHAR_PTR		3
+
+#define __SC_ARGDESC_TYPE(t, a)						\
+	__builtin_types_compatible_p(typeof(t), const char *) ?		\
+	__SACT__CONST_CHAR_PTR :					\
+	__builtin_types_compatible_p(typeof(t), char *) ?		\
+	__SACT__CHAR_PTR :						\
+	__SACT__OTHER
+
+#define SYSCALL_FILL_ARGDESC_SECTION(_section, sname, nb, ...)		\
+	asmlinkage long sname(__MAP(nb, __SC_DECL, __VA_ARGS__)		\
+			__COMPDECL(nb));				\
+	static struct syscall_argdesc __used				\
+		__attribute__((section(_section)))			\
+		syscall_argdesc_##sname = {				\
+			.addr = sname,					\
+			.args = {					\
+				__MAP(nb, __SC_ARGDESC_TYPE, __VA_ARGS__)\
+				__COMPARGS(nb)				\
+			},						\
+		};
+
+#define SYSCALL_FILL_ARGDESC(...)	\
+	SYSCALL_FILL_ARGDESC_SECTION("__syscalls_argdesc", __VA_ARGS__)
+
+#else
+#define SYSCALL_FILL_ARGDESC(...)
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SECCOMP */
+
 #define SYSCALL_DEFINE0(sname)					\
 	SYSCALL_METADATA(_##sname, 0);				\
+	SYSCALL_FILL_ARGDESC(sys_##sname, 0)			\
 	asmlinkage long sys_##sname(void)
 
 #define SYSCALL_DEFINE1(name, ...) SYSCALL_DEFINEx(1, _##name, __VA_ARGS__)
@@ -188,6 +255,7 @@ extern struct trace_event_functions exit_syscall_print_funcs;
 
 #define SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, sname, ...)				\
 	SYSCALL_METADATA(sname, x, __VA_ARGS__)			\
+	SYSCALL_FILL_ARGDESC(sys##sname, x, __VA_ARGS__)	\
 	__SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, sname, __VA_ARGS__)
 
 #define __PROTECT(...) asmlinkage_protect(__VA_ARGS__)
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index e45237897b43..c98fe1a924cd 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ source security/smack/Kconfig
 source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
 source security/apparmor/Kconfig
 source security/yama/Kconfig
+source security/seccomp/Kconfig
 
 source security/integrity/Kconfig
 
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index c9bfbc84ff50..0e4cdefc4777 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)        += tomoyo
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR)	+= apparmor
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA)		+= yama
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER)		+= seccomp
 
 # always enable default capabilities
 obj-y					+= commoncap.o
@@ -22,6 +23,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT)			+= lsm_audit.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)		+= tomoyo/
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR)		+= apparmor/
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA)		+= yama/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER)	+= seccomp/
 obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE)		+= device_cgroup.o
 
 # Object integrity file lists
diff --git a/security/seccomp/Kconfig b/security/seccomp/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7b0fe649ed89
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/seccomp/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+config SECURITY_SECCOMP
+	bool "Seccomp LSM support"
+	depends on AUDIT
+	depends on SECCOMP
+	depends on SECURITY
+	default y
+	help
+	  This selects an extension to the Seccomp BPF to be able to filter
+	  syscall arguments as kernel objects (e.g. file path).
+	  This stacked LSM is needed to detect and block race-condition attacks
+	  against argument evaluation (i.e. TOCTOU). Further information can be
+	  found in Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt .
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer Y.
diff --git a/security/seccomp/Makefile b/security/seccomp/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f2e848d81138
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/seccomp/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SECCOMP) := seccomp.o
+
+seccomp-y := lsm.o
diff --git a/security/seccomp/lsm.c b/security/seccomp/lsm.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..93c881724341
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/seccomp/lsm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+/*
+ * Seccomp Linux Security Module
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016  Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#include <asm/syscall.h>	/* sys_call_table */
+#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>	/* kcalloc() */
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>	/* syscall_argdesc */
+
+#include "lsm.h"
+
+/* TODO: Remove the need for CONFIG_SYSFS dependency */
+
+struct syscall_argdesc (*seccomp_syscalls_argdesc)[] = NULL;
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+struct syscall_argdesc (*compat_seccomp_syscalls_argdesc)[] = NULL;
+#endif	/* CONFIG_COMPAT */
+
+static const struct syscall_argdesc *__init
+find_syscall_argdesc(const struct syscall_argdesc *start,
+		const struct syscall_argdesc *stop, const void *addr)
+{
+	if (unlikely(!addr || !start || !stop)) {
+		WARN_ON(1);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	for (; start < stop; start++) {
+		if (start->addr == addr)
+			return start;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static inline void __init init_argdesc(void)
+{
+	const struct syscall_argdesc *argdesc;
+	const void *addr;
+	int i;
+
+	seccomp_syscalls_argdesc = kcalloc(NR_syscalls,
+			sizeof((*seccomp_syscalls_argdesc)[0]), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (unlikely(!seccomp_syscalls_argdesc)) {
+		WARN_ON(1);
+		return;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < NR_syscalls; i++) {
+		addr = sys_call_table[i];
+		argdesc = find_syscall_argdesc(__start_syscalls_argdesc,
+				__stop_syscalls_argdesc, addr);
+		if (!argdesc)
+			continue;
+
+		(*seccomp_syscalls_argdesc)[i] = *argdesc;
+	}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+	compat_seccomp_syscalls_argdesc = kcalloc(IA32_NR_syscalls,
+			sizeof((*compat_seccomp_syscalls_argdesc)[0]),
+			GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (unlikely(!compat_seccomp_syscalls_argdesc)) {
+		WARN_ON(1);
+		return;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < IA32_NR_syscalls; i++) {
+		addr = ia32_sys_call_table[i];
+		argdesc = find_syscall_argdesc(__start_compat_syscalls_argdesc,
+				__stop_compat_syscalls_argdesc, addr);
+		if (!argdesc)
+			continue;
+
+		(*compat_seccomp_syscalls_argdesc)[i] = *argdesc;
+	}
+#endif	/* CONFIG_COMPAT */
+}
+
+void __init seccomp_init(void)
+{
+	pr_info("seccomp: Becoming ready for sandboxing\n");
+	init_argdesc();
+}
diff --git a/security/seccomp/lsm.h b/security/seccomp/lsm.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ededbd27c225
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/seccomp/lsm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/*
+ * Seccomp Linux Security Module
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016  Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>	/* syscall_argdesc */
+
+extern const struct syscall_argdesc __start_syscalls_argdesc[];
+extern const struct syscall_argdesc __stop_syscalls_argdesc[];
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+extern const struct syscall_argdesc __start_compat_syscalls_argdesc[];
+extern const struct syscall_argdesc __stop_compat_syscalls_argdesc[];
+#endif	/* CONFIG_COMPAT */
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index e8ffd92ae2eb..76e50345cd82 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ int __init security_init(void)
 	 */
 	capability_add_hooks();
 	yama_add_hooks();
+	seccomp_init();
 
 	/*
 	 * Load all the remaining security modules.
-- 
2.8.0.rc3

  parent reply index

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-03-24  1:46 [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 00/17] seccomp-object: From attack surface reduction to sandboxing Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 01/17] um: Export the sys_call_table Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 02/17] seccomp: Fix typo Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 03/17] selftest/seccomp: Fix the flag name SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  4:35   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-03-29 15:35     ` Shuah Khan
2016-03-29 18:46       ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-29 19:06         ` [kernel-hardening] " Shuah Khan
2016-03-24  1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 04/17] selftest/seccomp: Fix the seccomp(2) signature Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  4:36   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-03-29 15:38     ` Shuah Khan
2016-03-29 18:51       ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] " Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-29 19:07         ` [kernel-hardening] " Shuah Khan
2016-03-24  1:46 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2016-03-24 15:47   ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v1 05/17] security/seccomp: Add LSM and create arrays of syscall metadata Casey Schaufler
2016-03-24 16:01   ` Casey Schaufler
2016-03-24 21:31     ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 06/17] seccomp: Add the SECCOMP_ADD_CHECKER_GROUP command Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 07/17] seccomp: Add seccomp object checker evaluation Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  1:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 08/17] selftest/seccomp: Remove unknown_ret_is_kill_above_allow test Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  2:53 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 09/17] selftest/seccomp: Extend seccomp_data until matches[6] Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  2:53   ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 10/17] selftest/seccomp: Add field_is_valid_syscall test Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  2:53   ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 11/17] selftest/seccomp: Add argeval_open_whitelist test Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  2:53   ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 12/17] audit,seccomp: Extend audit with seccomp state Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  2:53   ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 13/17] selftest/seccomp: Rename TRACE_poke to TRACE_poke_sys_read Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  2:53   ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 14/17] selftest/seccomp: Make tracer_poke() more generic Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  2:54   ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 15/17] selftest/seccomp: Add argeval_toctou_argument test Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  2:54   ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 16/17] security/seccomp: Protect against filesystem TOCTOU Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24  2:54   ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 17/17] selftest/seccomp: Add argeval_toctou_filesystem test Mickaël Salaün
2016-03-24 16:24 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v1 00/17] seccomp-object: From attack surface reduction to sandboxing Kees Cook
2016-03-27  5:03   ` Loganaden Velvindron
2016-04-20 18:21 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-04-26 22:46   ` Kees Cook
2016-04-28  2:36 ` Kees Cook
2016-04-28 23:45   ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-05-21 12:58     ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-05-02 22:19   ` James Morris
2016-05-21 15:19   ` Daniel Borkmann
2016-05-22 21:30     ` Mickaël Salaün

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