From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>, "Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>, "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>, "Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>, "Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>, "Daniel Mack" <daniel@zonque.org>, "David Drysdale" <drysdale@google.com>, "David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>, "Elena Reshetova" <elena.reshetova@intel.com>, "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>, "James Morris" <james.l.morris@oracle.com>, "Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>, "Paul Moore" <pmoore@redhat.com>, "Sargun Dhillon" <sargun@sargun.me>, "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, "Tejun Heo" <tj@kernel.org>, "Will Drewry" <wad@chromium.org>, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, cgroups@vger.kernel.org Subject: [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 05/22] bpf,landlock: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 09:23:58 +0200 Message-ID: <20160914072415.26021-6-mic@digikod.net> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20160914072415.26021-1-mic@digikod.net> The program subtype goal is to be able to have different static fine-grained verifications for a unique program type. The struct bpf_verifier_ops gets a new optional function: is_valid_subtype(). This new verifier is called at the begening of the eBPF program verification to check if the (optional) program subtype is valid. For now, only Landlock eBPF programs are using a program subtype but this could be used by other program types in the future. Cf. the next commit to see how the subtype is used by Landlock LSM. Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160827205559.GA43880@ast-mbp.thefacebook.com Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> --- include/linux/bpf.h | 8 ++++++-- include/linux/filter.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 9 +++++++++ kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 5 +++-- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 9 +++++++-- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 12 ++++++++---- net/core/filter.c | 21 +++++++++++++-------- 7 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h index eae4ce4542c1..9aa01d9d3d80 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h @@ -149,17 +149,21 @@ struct bpf_prog; struct bpf_verifier_ops { /* return eBPF function prototype for verification */ - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); + const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id, + union bpf_prog_subtype *prog_subtype); /* return true if 'size' wide access at offset 'off' within bpf_context * with 'type' (read or write) is allowed */ bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type, - enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type); + enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type, + union bpf_prog_subtype *prog_subtype); u32 (*convert_ctx_access)(enum bpf_access_type type, int dst_reg, int src_reg, int ctx_off, struct bpf_insn *insn, struct bpf_prog *prog); + + bool (*is_valid_subtype)(union bpf_prog_subtype *prog_subtype); }; struct bpf_prog_type_list { diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h index 1f09c521adfe..88470cdd3ee1 100644 --- a/include/linux/filter.h +++ b/include/linux/filter.h @@ -406,6 +406,7 @@ struct bpf_prog { kmemcheck_bitfield_end(meta); u32 len; /* Number of filter blocks */ enum bpf_prog_type type; /* Type of BPF program */ + union bpf_prog_subtype subtype; /* For fine-grained verifications */ struct bpf_prog_aux *aux; /* Auxiliary fields */ struct sock_fprog_kern *orig_prog; /* Original BPF program */ unsigned int (*bpf_func)(const struct sk_buff *skb, diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h index b68de57f7ab8..667b6ef3ff1e 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h @@ -127,6 +127,14 @@ enum bpf_attach_type { #define BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC (1U << 0) +union bpf_prog_subtype { + struct { + __u32 id; /* enum landlock_hook_id */ + __u16 origin; /* LANDLOCK_FLAG_ORIGIN_* */ + __aligned_u64 access; /* LANDLOCK_FLAG_ACCESS_* */ + } landlock_hook; +} __attribute__((aligned(8))); + union bpf_attr { struct { /* anonymous struct used by BPF_MAP_CREATE command */ __u32 map_type; /* one of enum bpf_map_type */ @@ -155,6 +163,7 @@ union bpf_attr { __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied buffer */ __u32 kern_version; /* checked when prog_type=kprobe */ + union bpf_prog_subtype prog_subtype; /* checked when prog_type=landlock */ }; struct { /* anonymous struct used by BPF_OBJ_* commands */ diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c index 776c752604b0..8b3f4d2b4802 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c @@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ static void fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_prog *prog) continue; } - fn = prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm); + fn = prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm, &prog->subtype); /* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions */ @@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_get_type(u32 ufd, enum bpf_prog_type type) EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_prog_get_type); /* last field in 'union bpf_attr' used by this command */ -#define BPF_PROG_LOAD_LAST_FIELD kern_version +#define BPF_PROG_LOAD_LAST_FIELD prog_subtype static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr) { @@ -768,6 +768,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr) err = find_prog_type(type, prog); if (err < 0) goto free_prog; + prog->subtype = attr->prog_subtype; /* run eBPF verifier */ err = bpf_check(&prog, attr); diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 608cbffb0e86..c434817e6ef4 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -684,7 +684,8 @@ static int check_ctx_access(struct verifier_env *env, int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type t, enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type) { if (env->prog->aux->ops->is_valid_access && - env->prog->aux->ops->is_valid_access(off, size, t, reg_type)) { + env->prog->aux->ops->is_valid_access(off, size, t, reg_type, + &env->prog->subtype)) { /* remember the offset of last byte accessed in ctx */ if (env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset < off + size) env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset = off + size; @@ -1173,7 +1174,7 @@ static int check_call(struct verifier_env *env, int func_id) } if (env->prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto) - fn = env->prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(func_id); + fn = env->prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(func_id, &env->prog->subtype); if (!fn) { verbose("unknown func %d\n", func_id); @@ -2768,6 +2769,10 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr) if ((*prog)->len <= 0 || (*prog)->len > BPF_MAXINSNS) return -E2BIG; + if ((*prog)->aux->ops->is_valid_subtype && + !(*prog)->aux->ops->is_valid_subtype(&(*prog)->subtype)) + return -EINVAL; + /* 'struct verifier_env' can be global, but since it's not small, * allocate/free it every time bpf_check() is called */ diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c index 5dcb99281259..51cf0f254bf2 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c @@ -435,7 +435,8 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto *tracing_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id) } } -static const struct bpf_func_proto *kprobe_prog_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id) +static const struct bpf_func_proto *kprobe_prog_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, + union bpf_prog_subtype *prog_subtype) { switch (func_id) { case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output: @@ -449,7 +450,8 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto *kprobe_prog_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func /* bpf+kprobe programs can access fields of 'struct pt_regs' */ static bool kprobe_prog_is_valid_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type, - enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type) + enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type, + union bpf_prog_subtype *prog_subtype) { if (off < 0 || off >= sizeof(struct pt_regs)) return false; @@ -517,7 +519,8 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_stackid_proto_tp = { .arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING, }; -static const struct bpf_func_proto *tp_prog_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id) +static const struct bpf_func_proto *tp_prog_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, + union bpf_prog_subtype *prog_subtype) { switch (func_id) { case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output: @@ -530,7 +533,8 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto *tp_prog_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id) } static bool tp_prog_is_valid_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type, - enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type) + enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type, + union bpf_prog_subtype *prog_subtype) { if (off < sizeof(void *) || off >= PERF_MAX_TRACE_SIZE) return false; diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index 9e9d99e52814..e61f02d0dd64 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -2411,7 +2411,8 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_xdp_event_output_proto = { }; static const struct bpf_func_proto * -sk_filter_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id) +sk_filter_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, + union bpf_prog_subtype *prog_subtype) { switch (func_id) { case BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem: @@ -2437,7 +2438,8 @@ sk_filter_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id) } static const struct bpf_func_proto * -tc_cls_act_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id) +tc_cls_act_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, + union bpf_prog_subtype *prog_subtype) { switch (func_id) { case BPF_FUNC_skb_store_bytes: @@ -2485,18 +2487,18 @@ tc_cls_act_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id) case BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup: return &bpf_skb_under_cgroup_proto; default: - return sk_filter_func_proto(func_id); + return sk_filter_func_proto(func_id, prog_subtype); } } static const struct bpf_func_proto * -xdp_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id) +xdp_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, union bpf_prog_subtype *prog_subtype) { switch (func_id) { case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output: return &bpf_xdp_event_output_proto; default: - return sk_filter_func_proto(func_id); + return sk_filter_func_proto(func_id, prog_subtype); } } @@ -2515,7 +2517,8 @@ static bool __is_valid_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type) static bool sk_filter_is_valid_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type, - enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type) + enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type, + union bpf_prog_subtype *prog_subtype) { switch (off) { case offsetof(struct __sk_buff, tc_classid): @@ -2539,7 +2542,8 @@ static bool sk_filter_is_valid_access(int off, int size, static bool tc_cls_act_is_valid_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type, - enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type) + enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type, + union bpf_prog_subtype *prog_subtype) { if (type == BPF_WRITE) { switch (off) { @@ -2582,7 +2586,8 @@ static bool __is_valid_xdp_access(int off, int size, static bool xdp_is_valid_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type, - enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type) + enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type, + union bpf_prog_subtype *prog_subtype) { if (type == BPF_WRITE) return false; -- 2.9.3
next prev parent reply index Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2016-09-14 7:23 [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 00/22] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 01/22] landlock: Add Kconfig Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 02/22] bpf: Move u64_to_ptr() to BPF headers and inline it Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 03/22] bpf,landlock: Add a new arraymap type to deal with (Landlock) handles Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 18:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-14 23:22 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 23:28 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-15 21:51 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-10-03 23:53 ` Kees Cook 2016-10-05 22:02 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 04/22] bpf: Set register type according to is_valid_access() Mickaël Salaün 2016-10-19 14:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Graf 2016-10-19 15:10 ` Daniel Borkmann 2016-09-14 7:23 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message] 2016-10-19 15:01 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v3 05/22] bpf,landlock: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier Thomas Graf 2016-09-14 7:23 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 06/22] landlock: Add LSM hooks Mickaël Salaün 2016-10-19 15:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Graf 2016-10-19 22:42 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 07/22] landlock: Handle file comparisons Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 19:07 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn 2016-09-14 22:39 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 21:06 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-14 23:02 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 23:24 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-15 21:25 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-20 0:12 ` [kernel-hardening] lsm naming dilemma. " Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-20 1:10 ` [kernel-hardening] " Sargun Dhillon 2016-09-20 16:58 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-10-03 23:30 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 08/22] seccomp: Fix documentation for struct seccomp_filter Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 09/22] seccomp: Move struct seccomp_filter in seccomp.h Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 10/22] seccomp: Split put_seccomp_filter() with put_seccomp() Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 11/22] seccomp,landlock: Handle Landlock hooks per process hierarchy Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 18:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-09-14 22:34 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-10-03 23:52 ` Kees Cook 2016-10-05 21:05 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 12/22] bpf: Cosmetic change for bpf_prog_attach() Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 13/22] bpf/cgroup: Replace struct bpf_prog with union bpf_object Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 14/22] bpf/cgroup: Make cgroup_bpf_update() return an error code Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 21:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 15/22] bpf/cgroup: Move capability check Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 16/22] bpf/cgroup,landlock: Handle Landlock hooks per cgroup Mickaël Salaün 2016-10-03 23:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2016-10-05 20:58 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-10-05 21:25 ` Kees Cook 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 17/22] cgroup: Add access check for cgroup_get_from_fd() Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 22:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 18/22] cgroup,landlock: Add CGRP_NO_NEW_PRIVS to handle unprivileged hooks Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 18:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-09-14 22:11 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-15 1:25 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-09-15 2:19 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-15 2:27 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-09-15 4:00 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-15 4:08 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-09-15 4:31 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-15 4:38 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-09-15 4:48 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-15 19:41 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-20 4:37 ` Sargun Dhillon 2016-09-20 17:02 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-15 19:35 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 19/22] landlock: Add interrupted origin Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 18:29 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2016-09-14 22:14 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-15 1:19 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-10-03 23:46 ` Kees Cook 2016-10-05 21:01 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 20/22] landlock: Add update and debug access flags Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 21/22] bpf,landlock: Add optional skb pointer in the Landlock context Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 21:20 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-14 22:46 ` Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 7:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 22/22] samples/landlock: Add sandbox example Mickaël Salaün 2016-09-14 21:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov 2016-09-14 14:36 ` [kernel-hardening] RE: [RFC v3 00/22] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing David Laight
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