From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further restriction of perf_event_open
Date: Wed, 19 Oct 2016 10:56:05 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161019095605.GD9616@leverpostej> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1476825301.4032.7.camel@gmail.com>
On Tue, Oct 18, 2016 at 05:15:01PM -0400, Daniel Micay wrote:
> It's also worth noting that fine-grained control via a scoped
> mechanism would likely only be used to implement *more restrictions*
> on Android, not to make the feature less aggressive. It's desirable
> for perf events to be disabled by default for non-root across the
> board on Android. The part that's imperfect is that when a developer
> uses a profiling tool, unprivileged usage is automatically enabled
> across the board until reboot. Ideally, it would be enabled only for
> the scope where it's needed.
Sure; understood.
> It would be very tricky to implement though, especially without adding
> friction, and it would only have value for protecting devices being
> used for development. It really doesn't seem to be worth the trouble,
> especially since it doesn't persist on reboot. It's only a temporary
> security hole and only for developer devices.
I can see that for Android this isn't much of a win. It is beneficial
elsewhere, and covers a larger set of use-cases.
If perf were a filesystem object, we'd only allow access by a given
'perf' group, and that would be sufficient to avoid most of that
friction (IIUC). I wonder what we can do that's similar.
Thanks,
Mark.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-10-19 9:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-07-27 14:45 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further restriction of perf_event_open Jeff Vander Stoep
2016-07-27 20:43 ` Kees Cook
2016-08-02 9:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-02 13:04 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2016-08-02 13:10 ` Daniel Micay
2016-08-02 13:16 ` Daniel Micay
2016-08-02 19:04 ` Kees Cook
2016-08-02 20:30 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-02 20:51 ` Kees Cook
2016-08-02 21:06 ` Jeffrey Vander Stoep
2016-08-03 8:28 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-08-03 12:28 ` Daniel Micay
2016-08-03 12:53 ` Daniel Micay
2016-08-03 13:36 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-03 14:41 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-03 15:42 ` Schaufler, Casey
2016-08-03 17:25 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-08-03 18:53 ` Kees Cook
2016-08-03 21:44 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-04 2:50 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-08-04 9:11 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-04 15:13 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-08-04 15:37 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-03 19:36 ` Daniel Micay
2016-08-04 10:28 ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-04 13:45 ` Daniel Micay
2016-08-04 14:11 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-04 15:44 ` Daniel Micay
2016-08-04 15:55 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-08-04 16:10 ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-04 16:32 ` Daniel Micay
2016-08-04 17:09 ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-04 17:36 ` Daniel Micay
2016-08-02 21:16 ` Jeffrey Vander Stoep
2016-10-17 13:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2016-10-17 14:54 ` Daniel Micay
2016-10-19 9:41 ` Mark Rutland
2016-10-19 15:16 ` Daniel Micay
2016-10-18 20:48 ` Kees Cook
2016-10-18 21:15 ` Daniel Micay
2016-10-19 9:56 ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2016-10-19 10:01 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-10-19 10:26 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2016-10-19 10:40 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-10-19 15:39 ` Daniel Micay
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