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From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	linux_dti@icloud.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	will.deacon@arm.com, ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org,
	kristen@linux.intel.com, deneen.t.dock@intel.com,
	Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>,
	Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 09/17] x86/kprobes: Instruction pages initialization enhancements
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 16:32:51 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190117003259.23141-10-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190117003259.23141-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>

From: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>

This patch is a preparatory patch for a following patch that makes
module allocated pages non-executable. The patch sets the page as
executable after allocation.

In the future, we may get better protection of executables. For example,
by using hypercalls to request the hypervisor to protect VM executable
pages from modifications using nested page-tables. This would allow
us to ensure the executable has not changed between allocation and
its write-protection.

While at it, do some small cleanup of what appears to be unnecessary
masking.

Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
index 4ba75afba527..fac692e36833 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
@@ -431,8 +431,20 @@ void *alloc_insn_page(void)
 	void *page;
 
 	page = module_alloc(PAGE_SIZE);
-	if (page)
-		set_memory_ro((unsigned long)page & PAGE_MASK, 1);
+	if (page == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * First make the page read-only, and then only then make it executable
+	 * to prevent it from being W+X in between.
+	 */
+	set_memory_ro((unsigned long)page, 1);
+
+	/*
+	 * TODO: Once additional kernel code protection mechanisms are set, ensure
+	 * that the page was not maliciously altered and it is still zeroed.
+	 */
+	set_memory_x((unsigned long)page, 1);
 
 	return page;
 }
@@ -440,8 +452,12 @@ void *alloc_insn_page(void)
 /* Recover page to RW mode before releasing it */
 void free_insn_page(void *page)
 {
-	set_memory_nx((unsigned long)page & PAGE_MASK, 1);
-	set_memory_rw((unsigned long)page & PAGE_MASK, 1);
+	/*
+	 * First make the page non-executable, and then only then make it
+	 * writable to prevent it from being W+X in between.
+	 */
+	set_memory_nx((unsigned long)page, 1);
+	set_memory_rw((unsigned long)page, 1);
 	module_memfree(page);
 }
 
-- 
2.17.1

  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-01-17  0:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-01-17  0:32 [PATCH 00/17] Merge text_poke fixes and executable lockdowns Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17  0:32 ` [PATCH 01/17] Fix "x86/alternatives: Lockdep-enforce text_mutex in text_poke*()" Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17  6:47   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-01-17 21:15     ` hpa
2019-01-17 22:39       ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-17 22:59         ` hpa
2019-01-17 23:14           ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-25  9:30   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-01-25 18:28     ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-17  0:32 ` [PATCH 02/17] x86/jump_label: Use text_poke_early() during early init Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17  0:32 ` [PATCH 03/17] x86/mm: temporary mm struct Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17  0:32 ` [PATCH 04/17] fork: provide a function for copying init_mm Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17  0:32 ` [PATCH 05/17] x86/alternative: initializing temporary mm for patching Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17  0:32 ` [PATCH 06/17] x86/alternative: use temporary mm for text poking Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17 20:27   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-01-17 20:47     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-01-17 21:43       ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-17 22:29         ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-17 22:31         ` hpa
2019-01-17  0:32 ` [PATCH 07/17] x86/kgdb: avoid redundant comparison of patched code Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17  0:32 ` [PATCH 08/17] x86/ftrace: set trampoline pages as executable Rick Edgecombe
2019-02-06 16:22   ` Steven Rostedt
2019-02-06 17:33     ` Nadav Amit
2019-02-06 17:41       ` Steven Rostedt
2019-01-17  0:32 ` Rick Edgecombe [this message]
2019-01-17  6:51   ` [PATCH 09/17] x86/kprobes: Instruction pages initialization enhancements Masami Hiramatsu
2019-01-17  0:32 ` [PATCH 10/17] x86: avoid W^X being broken during modules loading Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17  0:32 ` [PATCH 11/17] x86/jump-label: remove support for custom poker Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17  0:32 ` [PATCH 12/17] x86/alternative: Remove the return value of text_poke_*() Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17  0:32 ` [PATCH 13/17] Add set_alias_ function and x86 implementation Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17  0:32 ` [PATCH 14/17] mm: Make hibernate handle unmapped pages Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17  9:39   ` Pavel Machek
2019-01-17 22:16     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2019-01-17 23:41       ` Pavel Machek
2019-01-17 23:48         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2019-01-18  8:16           ` Pavel Machek
2019-01-17  0:32 ` [PATCH 15/17] vmalloc: New flags for safe vfree on special perms Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17  0:32 ` [PATCH 16/17] Plug in new special vfree flag Rick Edgecombe
2019-02-06 16:23   ` Steven Rostedt
2019-02-07 17:33     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2019-02-07 17:49       ` Steven Rostedt
2019-02-07 18:20         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2019-01-17  0:32 ` [PATCH 17/17] module: Prevent module removal racing with text_poke() Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17  7:54   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-01-17 18:07     ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-17 23:44       ` H. Peter Anvin
2019-01-18  8:23       ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-01-17 23:58     ` H. Peter Anvin
2019-01-18  1:15       ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-18 13:32         ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-01-17 13:21 ` [PATCH 00/17] Merge text_poke fixes and executable lockdowns Peter Zijlstra

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