kernel-hardening.lists.openwall.com archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	NitinGote <nitin.r.gote@intel.com>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] selinux: check sidtab limit before adding a new entry
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2019 09:50:26 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <201907220949.AFB5B68@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190722132111.25743-1-omosnace@redhat.com>

On Mon, Jul 22, 2019 at 03:21:11PM +0200, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote:
> We need to error out when trying to add an entry above SIDTAB_MAX in
> sidtab_reverse_lookup() to avoid overflow on the odd chance that this
> happens.
> 
> Fixes: ee1a84fdfeed ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance")
> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>

Is this reachable from unprivileged userspace?

> ---
>  security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c | 5 +++++
>  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
> index e63a90ff2728..54c1ba1e79ab 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
> @@ -286,6 +286,11 @@ static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
>  		++count;
>  	}
>  
> +	/* bail out if we already reached max entries */
> +	rc = -ENOMEM;
> +	if (count == SIDTAB_MAX)

Do you want to use >= here instead?

-Kees

> +		goto out_unlock;
> +
>  	/* insert context into new entry */
>  	rc = -ENOMEM;
>  	dst = sidtab_do_lookup(s, count, 1);
> -- 
> 2.21.0
> 

-- 
Kees Cook

  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-07-22 16:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-07-22 13:21 [PATCH] selinux: check sidtab limit before adding a new entry Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-07-22 14:17 ` William Roberts
2019-07-23  6:48   ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-07-22 16:50 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2019-07-23  0:36   ` Paul Moore
2019-07-23  6:48   ` Ondrej Mosnacek

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=201907220949.AFB5B68@keescook \
    --to=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=nitin.r.gote@intel.com \
    --cc=omosnace@redhat.com \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).