From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.1 required=3.0 tests=DATE_IN_PAST_06_12, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 09C5FC5DF60 for ; Tue, 5 Nov 2019 20:50:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with SMTP id 3539B214B2 for ; Tue, 5 Nov 2019 20:50:15 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 3539B214B2 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=arm.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=kernel-hardening-return-17294-kernel-hardening=archiver.kernel.org@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 21628 invoked by uid 550); 5 Nov 2019 20:50:09 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Received: (qmail 21606 invoked from network); 5 Nov 2019 20:50:08 -0000 Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2019 09:04:26 +0000 From: Mark Rutland To: Sami Tolvanen Cc: Will Deacon , Catalin Marinas , Steven Rostedt , Masami Hiramatsu , Ard Biesheuvel , Dave Martin , Kees Cook , Laura Abbott , Marc Zyngier , Nick Desaulniers , Jann Horn , Miguel Ojeda , Masahiro Yamada , clang-built-linux , Kernel Hardening , linux-arm-kernel , LKML Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 10/17] arm64: disable kretprobes with SCS Message-ID: <20191105090426.GA4743@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com> References: <20191018161033.261971-1-samitolvanen@google.com> <20191101221150.116536-1-samitolvanen@google.com> <20191101221150.116536-11-samitolvanen@google.com> <20191104170454.GA2024@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.11.1+11 (2f07cb52) (2018-12-01) On Mon, Nov 04, 2019 at 03:42:09PM -0800, Sami Tolvanen wrote: > On Mon, Nov 4, 2019 at 9:05 AM Mark Rutland wrote: > > I'm a bit confused as to why that's the case -- could you please > > elaborate on how this is incompatible? > > > > IIUC kretrobes works by patching the function entry point with a BRK, so > > that it can modify the LR _before_ it is saved to the stack. I don't see > > how SCS affects that. > > You're correct. While this may not be optimal for reducing attack > surface, I just tested this to confirm that there's no functional > conflict. I'll drop this and related patches from v5. Great; thanks for confirming! Mark.