From: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>, "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>, "Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>, "Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>, "David Drysdale" <drysdale@google.com>, "Florent Revest" <revest@chromium.org>, "James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>, "Jann Horn" <jann@thejh.net>, "John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>, "Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>, "Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>, "KP Singh" <kpsingh@chromium.org>, "Michael Kerrisk" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>, "Mickaël Salaün" <mickael.salaun@ssi.gouv.fr>, "Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>, "Sargun Dhillon" <sargun@sargun.me>, "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, "Shuah Khan" <shuah@kernel.org>, "Stephen Smalley" <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>, "Tejun Heo" <tj@kernel.org>, "Tetsuo Handa" <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>, "Tycho Andersen" <tycho@tycho.ws>, "Will Drewry" <wad@chromium.org>, bpf@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v13 4/7] landlock: Add ptrace LSM hooks Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2019 09:18:26 -0800 Message-ID: <20191105171824.dfve44gjiftpnvy7@ast-mbp.dhcp.thefacebook.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20191104172146.30797-5-mic@digikod.net> On Mon, Nov 04, 2019 at 06:21:43PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > Add a first Landlock hook that can be used to enforce a security policy > or to audit some process activities. For a sandboxing use-case, it is > needed to inform the kernel if a task can legitimately debug another. > ptrace(2) can also be used by an attacker to impersonate another task > and remain undetected while performing malicious activities. > > Using ptrace(2) and related features on a target process can lead to a > privilege escalation. A sandboxed task must then be able to tell the > kernel if another task is more privileged, via ptrace_may_access(). > > Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> ... > +static int check_ptrace(struct landlock_domain *domain, > + struct task_struct *tracer, struct task_struct *tracee) > +{ > + struct landlock_hook_ctx_ptrace ctx_ptrace = { > + .prog_ctx = { > + .tracer = (uintptr_t)tracer, > + .tracee = (uintptr_t)tracee, > + }, > + }; So you're passing two kernel pointers obfuscated as u64 into bpf program yet claiming that the end goal is to make landlock unprivileged?! The most basic security hole in the tool that is aiming to provide security. I think the only way bpf-based LSM can land is both landlock and KRSI developers work together on a design that solves all use cases. BPF is capable to be a superset of all existing LSMs whereas landlock and KRSI propsals today are custom solutions to specific security concerns. BPF subsystem was extended with custom things in the past. In networking we have lwt, skb, tc, xdp, sk program types with a lot of overlapping functionality. We couldn't figure out how to generalize them into single 'networking' program. Now we can and we should. Accepting two partially overlapping bpf-based LSMs would be repeating the same mistake again.
next prev parent reply index Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-11-04 17:21 [PATCH bpf-next v13 0/7] Landlock LSM Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-04 17:21 ` [PATCH bpf-next v13 1/7] bpf,landlock: Define an eBPF program type for Landlock hooks Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-04 17:21 ` [PATCH bpf-next v13 2/7] landlock: Add the management of domains Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-04 17:21 ` [PATCH bpf-next v13 3/7] landlock,seccomp: Apply Landlock programs to process hierarchy Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-04 17:21 ` [PATCH bpf-next v13 4/7] landlock: Add ptrace LSM hooks Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-05 17:18 ` Alexei Starovoitov [this message] 2019-11-05 17:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2019-11-05 19:31 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2019-11-05 19:55 ` Casey Schaufler 2019-11-05 21:54 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2019-11-05 22:32 ` Casey Schaufler 2019-11-05 18:01 ` Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-05 19:34 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2019-11-05 22:18 ` Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-06 10:06 ` KP Singh 2019-11-06 16:55 ` Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-06 21:45 ` KP Singh 2019-11-08 14:08 ` Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-08 14:34 ` Daniel Borkmann 2019-11-08 15:39 ` Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-08 15:27 ` KP Singh 2019-11-06 10:15 ` KP Singh 2019-11-06 16:58 ` Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-04 17:21 ` [PATCH bpf-next v13 5/7] bpf,landlock: Add task_landlock_ptrace_ancestor() helper Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-04 17:21 ` [PATCH bpf-next v13 6/7] bpf,landlock: Add tests for the Landlock ptrace program type Mickaël Salaün 2019-11-04 17:21 ` [PATCH bpf-next v13 7/7] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation for Landlock Mickaël Salaün
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