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* [PATCH v5 0/6] ubsan: Split out bounds checker
@ 2020-02-27 19:35 Kees Cook
  2020-02-27 19:35 ` [PATCH v5 1/6] ubsan: Add trap instrumentation option Kees Cook
                   ` (5 more replies)
  0 siblings, 6 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-02-27 19:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andrew Morton
  Cc: Kees Cook, Andrey Ryabinin, Elena Petrova, Andrey Konovalov,
	Alexander Potapenko, Dan Carpenter, Gustavo A. R. Silva,
	Arnd Bergmann, Ard Biesheuvel, kasan-dev, linux-mm, linux-kernel,
	kernel-hardening, syzkaller

Argh, v4 missed uncommitted changes. v5 brown paper bag release! :)

This splits out the bounds checker so it can be individually used. This
is enabled in Android and hopefully for syzbot. Includes LKDTM tests for
behavioral corner-cases (beyond just the bounds checker), and adjusts
ubsan and kasan slightly for correct panic handling.

-Kees

v5:
 - _actually_ use hyphenated bug class names (andreyknvl)
v4: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200227184921.30215-1-keescook@chromium.org
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200116012321.26254-1-keescook@chromium.org
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191121181519.28637-1-keescook@chromium.org
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191120010636.27368-1-keescook@chromium.org


Kees Cook (6):
  ubsan: Add trap instrumentation option
  ubsan: Split "bounds" checker from other options
  lkdtm/bugs: Add arithmetic overflow and array bounds checks
  ubsan: Check panic_on_warn
  kasan: Unset panic_on_warn before calling panic()
  ubsan: Include bug type in report header

 drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c  | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c  |  3 ++
 drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h |  3 ++
 lib/Kconfig.ubsan          | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++----
 lib/Makefile               |  2 +
 lib/ubsan.c                | 47 +++++++++++++-----------
 mm/kasan/report.c          | 10 ++++-
 scripts/Makefile.ubsan     | 16 ++++++--
 8 files changed, 172 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)

-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 1/6] ubsan: Add trap instrumentation option
  2020-02-27 19:35 [PATCH v5 0/6] ubsan: Split out bounds checker Kees Cook
@ 2020-02-27 19:35 ` Kees Cook
  2020-02-27 19:35 ` [PATCH v5 2/6] ubsan: Split "bounds" checker from other options Kees Cook
                   ` (4 subsequent siblings)
  5 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-02-27 19:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andrew Morton
  Cc: Kees Cook, Elena Petrova, Dmitry Vyukov, Andrey Ryabinin,
	Andrey Konovalov, Alexander Potapenko, Dan Carpenter,
	Gustavo A. R. Silva, Arnd Bergmann, Ard Biesheuvel, kasan-dev,
	linux-mm, linux-kernel, kernel-hardening, syzkaller

The Undefined Behavior Sanitizer can operate in two modes: warning
reporting mode via lib/ubsan.c handler calls, or trap mode, which uses
__builtin_trap() as the handler. Using lib/ubsan.c means the kernel
image is about 5% larger (due to all the debugging text and reporting
structures to capture details about the warning conditions). Using the
trap mode, the image size changes are much smaller, though at the loss
of the "warning only" mode.

In order to give greater flexibility to system builders that want
minimal changes to image size and are prepared to deal with kernel code
being aborted and potentially destabilizing the system, this introduces
CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP. The resulting image sizes comparison:

   text    data     bss       dec       hex     filename
19533663   6183037  18554956  44271656  2a38828 vmlinux.stock
19991849   7618513  18874448  46484810  2c54d4a vmlinux.ubsan
19712181   6284181  18366540  44362902  2a4ec96 vmlinux.ubsan-trap

CONFIG_UBSAN=y:      image +4.8% (text +2.3%, data +18.9%)
CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP=y: image +0.2% (text +0.9%, data +1.6%)

Additionally adjusts the CONFIG_UBSAN Kconfig help for clarity and
removes the mention of non-existing boot param "ubsan_handle".

Suggested-by: Elena Petrova <lenaptr@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
---
 lib/Kconfig.ubsan      | 22 ++++++++++++++++++----
 lib/Makefile           |  2 ++
 scripts/Makefile.ubsan |  9 +++++++--
 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.ubsan b/lib/Kconfig.ubsan
index 0e04fcb3ab3d..9deb655838b0 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.ubsan
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.ubsan
@@ -5,11 +5,25 @@ config ARCH_HAS_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL
 config UBSAN
 	bool "Undefined behaviour sanity checker"
 	help
-	  This option enables undefined behaviour sanity checker
+	  This option enables the Undefined Behaviour sanity checker.
 	  Compile-time instrumentation is used to detect various undefined
-	  behaviours in runtime. Various types of checks may be enabled
-	  via boot parameter ubsan_handle
-	  (see: Documentation/dev-tools/ubsan.rst).
+	  behaviours at runtime. For more details, see:
+	  Documentation/dev-tools/ubsan.rst
+
+config UBSAN_TRAP
+	bool "On Sanitizer warnings, abort the running kernel code"
+	depends on UBSAN
+	depends on $(cc-option, -fsanitize-undefined-trap-on-error)
+	help
+	  Building kernels with Sanitizer features enabled tends to grow
+	  the kernel size by around 5%, due to adding all the debugging
+	  text on failure paths. To avoid this, Sanitizer instrumentation
+	  can just issue a trap. This reduces the kernel size overhead but
+	  turns all warnings (including potentially harmless conditions)
+	  into full exceptions that abort the running kernel code
+	  (regardless of context, locks held, etc), which may destabilize
+	  the system. For some system builders this is an acceptable
+	  trade-off.
 
 config UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL
 	bool "Enable instrumentation for the entire kernel"
diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
index 611872c06926..55cc8d73cd43 100644
--- a/lib/Makefile
+++ b/lib/Makefile
@@ -279,7 +279,9 @@ quiet_cmd_build_OID_registry = GEN     $@
 clean-files	+= oid_registry_data.c
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_UCS2_STRING) += ucs2_string.o
+ifneq ($(CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP),y)
 obj-$(CONFIG_UBSAN) += ubsan.o
+endif
 
 UBSAN_SANITIZE_ubsan.o := n
 KASAN_SANITIZE_ubsan.o := n
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.ubsan b/scripts/Makefile.ubsan
index 019771b845c5..668a91510bfe 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.ubsan
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.ubsan
@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 ifdef CONFIG_UBSAN
+
+ifdef CONFIG_UBSAN_ALIGNMENT
+      CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=alignment)
+endif
+
       CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=shift)
       CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=integer-divide-by-zero)
       CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=unreachable)
@@ -9,8 +14,8 @@ ifdef CONFIG_UBSAN
       CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=bool)
       CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=enum)
 
-ifdef CONFIG_UBSAN_ALIGNMENT
-      CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=alignment)
+ifdef CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP
+      CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize-undefined-trap-on-error)
 endif
 
       # -fsanitize=* options makes GCC less smart than usual and
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 2/6] ubsan: Split "bounds" checker from other options
  2020-02-27 19:35 [PATCH v5 0/6] ubsan: Split out bounds checker Kees Cook
  2020-02-27 19:35 ` [PATCH v5 1/6] ubsan: Add trap instrumentation option Kees Cook
@ 2020-02-27 19:35 ` Kees Cook
  2020-02-27 19:35 ` [PATCH v5 3/6] lkdtm/bugs: Add arithmetic overflow and array bounds checks Kees Cook
                   ` (3 subsequent siblings)
  5 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-02-27 19:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andrew Morton
  Cc: Kees Cook, Elena Petrova, Andrey Ryabinin, Dmitry Vyukov,
	Andrey Konovalov, Alexander Potapenko, Dan Carpenter,
	Gustavo A. R. Silva, Arnd Bergmann, Ard Biesheuvel, kasan-dev,
	linux-mm, linux-kernel, kernel-hardening, syzkaller

In order to do kernel builds with the bounds checker individually
available, introduce CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS, with the remaining options
under CONFIG_UBSAN_MISC.

For example, using this, we can start to expand the coverage syzkaller is
providing. Right now, all of UBSan is disabled for syzbot builds because
taken as a whole, it is too noisy. This will let us focus on one feature
at a time.

For the bounds checker specifically, this provides a mechanism to
eliminate an entire class of array overflows with close to zero
performance overhead (I cannot measure a difference). In my (mostly)
defconfig, enabling bounds checking adds ~4200 checks to the kernel.
Performance changes are in the noise, likely due to the branch predictors
optimizing for the non-fail path.

Some notes on the bounds checker:

- it does not instrument {mem,str}*()-family functions, it only
  instruments direct indexed accesses (e.g. "foo[i]"). Dealing with
  the {mem,str}*()-family functions is a work-in-progress around
  CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE[1].

- it ignores flexible array members, including the very old single
  byte (e.g. "int foo[1];") declarations. (Note that GCC's
  implementation appears to ignore _all_ trailing arrays, but Clang only
  ignores empty, 0, and 1 byte arrays[2].)

[1] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/6
[2] https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=92589

Suggested-by: Elena Petrova <lenaptr@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
---
 lib/Kconfig.ubsan      | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 scripts/Makefile.ubsan |  7 ++++++-
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.ubsan b/lib/Kconfig.ubsan
index 9deb655838b0..48469c95d78e 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.ubsan
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.ubsan
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 config ARCH_HAS_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL
 	bool
 
-config UBSAN
+menuconfig UBSAN
 	bool "Undefined behaviour sanity checker"
 	help
 	  This option enables the Undefined Behaviour sanity checker.
@@ -10,9 +10,10 @@ config UBSAN
 	  behaviours at runtime. For more details, see:
 	  Documentation/dev-tools/ubsan.rst
 
+if UBSAN
+
 config UBSAN_TRAP
 	bool "On Sanitizer warnings, abort the running kernel code"
-	depends on UBSAN
 	depends on $(cc-option, -fsanitize-undefined-trap-on-error)
 	help
 	  Building kernels with Sanitizer features enabled tends to grow
@@ -25,9 +26,26 @@ config UBSAN_TRAP
 	  the system. For some system builders this is an acceptable
 	  trade-off.
 
+config UBSAN_BOUNDS
+	bool "Perform array index bounds checking"
+	default UBSAN
+	help
+	  This option enables detection of directly indexed out of bounds
+	  array accesses, where the array size is known at compile time.
+	  Note that this does not protect array overflows via bad calls
+	  to the {str,mem}*cpy() family of functions (that is addressed
+	  by CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE).
+
+config UBSAN_MISC
+	bool "Enable all other Undefined Behavior sanity checks"
+	default UBSAN
+	help
+	  This option enables all sanity checks that don't have their
+	  own Kconfig options. Disable this if you only want to have
+	  individually selected checks.
+
 config UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL
 	bool "Enable instrumentation for the entire kernel"
-	depends on UBSAN
 	depends on ARCH_HAS_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL
 
 	# We build with -Wno-maybe-uninitilzed, but we still want to
@@ -44,7 +62,6 @@ config UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL
 
 config UBSAN_NO_ALIGNMENT
 	bool "Disable checking of pointers alignment"
-	depends on UBSAN
 	default y if HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
 	help
 	  This option disables the check of unaligned memory accesses.
@@ -57,7 +74,9 @@ config UBSAN_ALIGNMENT
 
 config TEST_UBSAN
 	tristate "Module for testing for undefined behavior detection"
-	depends on m && UBSAN
+	depends on m
 	help
 	  This is a test module for UBSAN.
 	  It triggers various undefined behavior, and detect it.
+
+endif	# if UBSAN
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.ubsan b/scripts/Makefile.ubsan
index 668a91510bfe..5b15bc425ec9 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.ubsan
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.ubsan
@@ -5,14 +5,19 @@ ifdef CONFIG_UBSAN_ALIGNMENT
       CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=alignment)
 endif
 
+ifdef CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS
+      CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=bounds)
+endif
+
+ifdef CONFIG_UBSAN_MISC
       CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=shift)
       CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=integer-divide-by-zero)
       CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=unreachable)
       CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=signed-integer-overflow)
-      CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=bounds)
       CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=object-size)
       CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=bool)
       CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=enum)
+endif
 
 ifdef CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP
       CFLAGS_UBSAN += $(call cc-option, -fsanitize-undefined-trap-on-error)
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 3/6] lkdtm/bugs: Add arithmetic overflow and array bounds checks
  2020-02-27 19:35 [PATCH v5 0/6] ubsan: Split out bounds checker Kees Cook
  2020-02-27 19:35 ` [PATCH v5 1/6] ubsan: Add trap instrumentation option Kees Cook
  2020-02-27 19:35 ` [PATCH v5 2/6] ubsan: Split "bounds" checker from other options Kees Cook
@ 2020-02-27 19:35 ` Kees Cook
  2020-02-27 19:35 ` [PATCH v5 4/6] ubsan: Check panic_on_warn Kees Cook
                   ` (2 subsequent siblings)
  5 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-02-27 19:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andrew Morton
  Cc: Kees Cook, Dmitry Vyukov, Andrey Ryabinin, Elena Petrova,
	Andrey Konovalov, Alexander Potapenko, Dan Carpenter,
	Gustavo A. R. Silva, Arnd Bergmann, Ard Biesheuvel, kasan-dev,
	linux-mm, linux-kernel, kernel-hardening, syzkaller

Adds LKDTM tests for arithmetic overflow (both signed and unsigned),
as well as array bounds checking.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
---
 drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c  | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c  |  3 ++
 drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h |  3 ++
 3 files changed, 81 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c
index de87693cf557..e4c61ffea35c 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
 #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
 #include <asm/desc.h>
@@ -175,6 +176,80 @@ void lkdtm_HUNG_TASK(void)
 	schedule();
 }
 
+volatile unsigned int huge = INT_MAX - 2;
+volatile unsigned int ignored;
+
+void lkdtm_OVERFLOW_SIGNED(void)
+{
+	int value;
+
+	value = huge;
+	pr_info("Normal signed addition ...\n");
+	value += 1;
+	ignored = value;
+
+	pr_info("Overflowing signed addition ...\n");
+	value += 4;
+	ignored = value;
+}
+
+
+void lkdtm_OVERFLOW_UNSIGNED(void)
+{
+	unsigned int value;
+
+	value = huge;
+	pr_info("Normal unsigned addition ...\n");
+	value += 1;
+	ignored = value;
+
+	pr_info("Overflowing unsigned addition ...\n");
+	value += 4;
+	ignored = value;
+}
+
+/* Intentially using old-style flex array definition of 1 byte. */
+struct array_bounds_flex_array {
+	int one;
+	int two;
+	char data[1];
+};
+
+struct array_bounds {
+	int one;
+	int two;
+	char data[8];
+	int three;
+};
+
+void lkdtm_ARRAY_BOUNDS(void)
+{
+	struct array_bounds_flex_array *not_checked;
+	struct array_bounds *checked;
+	volatile int i;
+
+	not_checked = kmalloc(sizeof(*not_checked) * 2, GFP_KERNEL);
+	checked = kmalloc(sizeof(*checked) * 2, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	pr_info("Array access within bounds ...\n");
+	/* For both, touch all bytes in the actual member size. */
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(checked->data); i++)
+		checked->data[i] = 'A';
+	/*
+	 * For the uninstrumented flex array member, also touch 1 byte
+	 * beyond to verify it is correctly uninstrumented.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(not_checked->data) + 1; i++)
+		not_checked->data[i] = 'A';
+
+	pr_info("Array access beyond bounds ...\n");
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(checked->data) + 1; i++)
+		checked->data[i] = 'B';
+
+	kfree(not_checked);
+	kfree(checked);
+}
+
 void lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_ADD(void)
 {
 	/*
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c
index ee0d6e721441..2e04719b503c 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c
@@ -129,6 +129,9 @@ static const struct crashtype crashtypes[] = {
 	CRASHTYPE(HARDLOCKUP),
 	CRASHTYPE(SPINLOCKUP),
 	CRASHTYPE(HUNG_TASK),
+	CRASHTYPE(OVERFLOW_SIGNED),
+	CRASHTYPE(OVERFLOW_UNSIGNED),
+	CRASHTYPE(ARRAY_BOUNDS),
 	CRASHTYPE(EXEC_DATA),
 	CRASHTYPE(EXEC_STACK),
 	CRASHTYPE(EXEC_KMALLOC),
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h
index c56d23e37643..8391081c6f13 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ void lkdtm_SOFTLOCKUP(void);
 void lkdtm_HARDLOCKUP(void);
 void lkdtm_SPINLOCKUP(void);
 void lkdtm_HUNG_TASK(void);
+void lkdtm_OVERFLOW_SIGNED(void);
+void lkdtm_OVERFLOW_UNSIGNED(void);
+void lkdtm_ARRAY_BOUNDS(void);
 void lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_ADD(void);
 void lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_DEL(void);
 void lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS(void);
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 4/6] ubsan: Check panic_on_warn
  2020-02-27 19:35 [PATCH v5 0/6] ubsan: Split out bounds checker Kees Cook
                   ` (2 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-27 19:35 ` [PATCH v5 3/6] lkdtm/bugs: Add arithmetic overflow and array bounds checks Kees Cook
@ 2020-02-27 19:35 ` Kees Cook
  2020-02-27 19:35 ` [PATCH v5 5/6] kasan: Unset panic_on_warn before calling panic() Kees Cook
  2020-02-27 19:35 ` [PATCH v5 6/6] ubsan: Include bug type in report header Kees Cook
  5 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-02-27 19:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andrew Morton
  Cc: Kees Cook, Andrey Ryabinin, Elena Petrova, Andrey Konovalov,
	Alexander Potapenko, Dan Carpenter, Gustavo A. R. Silva,
	Arnd Bergmann, Ard Biesheuvel, kasan-dev, linux-mm, linux-kernel,
	kernel-hardening, syzkaller

Syzkaller expects kernel warnings to panic when the panic_on_warn
sysctl is set. More work is needed here to have UBSan reuse the WARN
infrastructure, but for now, just check the flag manually.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CACT4Y+bsLJ-wFx_TaXqax3JByUOWB3uk787LsyMVcfW6JzzGvg@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 lib/ubsan.c | 11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

diff --git a/lib/ubsan.c b/lib/ubsan.c
index 7b9b58aee72c..429663eef6a7 100644
--- a/lib/ubsan.c
+++ b/lib/ubsan.c
@@ -156,6 +156,17 @@ static void ubsan_epilogue(void)
 		"========================================\n");
 
 	current->in_ubsan--;
+
+	if (panic_on_warn) {
+		/*
+		 * This thread may hit another WARN() in the panic path.
+		 * Resetting this prevents additional WARN() from panicking the
+		 * system on this thread.  Other threads are blocked by the
+		 * panic_mutex in panic().
+		 */
+		panic_on_warn = 0;
+		panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
+	}
 }
 
 static void handle_overflow(struct overflow_data *data, void *lhs,
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 5/6] kasan: Unset panic_on_warn before calling panic()
  2020-02-27 19:35 [PATCH v5 0/6] ubsan: Split out bounds checker Kees Cook
                   ` (3 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-27 19:35 ` [PATCH v5 4/6] ubsan: Check panic_on_warn Kees Cook
@ 2020-02-27 19:35 ` Kees Cook
  2020-02-27 19:35 ` [PATCH v5 6/6] ubsan: Include bug type in report header Kees Cook
  5 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-02-27 19:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andrew Morton
  Cc: Kees Cook, Dmitry Vyukov, Andrey Ryabinin, Elena Petrova,
	Andrey Konovalov, Alexander Potapenko, Dan Carpenter,
	Gustavo A. R. Silva, Arnd Bergmann, Ard Biesheuvel, kasan-dev,
	linux-mm, linux-kernel, kernel-hardening, syzkaller

As done in the full WARN() handler, panic_on_warn needs to be cleared
before calling panic() to avoid recursive panics.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
---
 mm/kasan/report.c | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c
index 5ef9f24f566b..54bd98a1fc7b 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/report.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/report.c
@@ -92,8 +92,16 @@ static void end_report(unsigned long *flags)
 	pr_err("==================================================================\n");
 	add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&report_lock, *flags);
-	if (panic_on_warn)
+	if (panic_on_warn) {
+		/*
+		 * This thread may hit another WARN() in the panic path.
+		 * Resetting this prevents additional WARN() from panicking the
+		 * system on this thread.  Other threads are blocked by the
+		 * panic_mutex in panic().
+		 */
+		panic_on_warn = 0;
 		panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
+	}
 	kasan_enable_current();
 }
 
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5 6/6] ubsan: Include bug type in report header
  2020-02-27 19:35 [PATCH v5 0/6] ubsan: Split out bounds checker Kees Cook
                   ` (4 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-27 19:35 ` [PATCH v5 5/6] kasan: Unset panic_on_warn before calling panic() Kees Cook
@ 2020-02-27 19:35 ` Kees Cook
  2020-02-28 12:45   ` Andrey Konovalov
  5 siblings, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-02-27 19:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andrew Morton
  Cc: Kees Cook, Dmitry Vyukov, Andrey Ryabinin, Elena Petrova,
	Andrey Konovalov, Alexander Potapenko, Dan Carpenter,
	Gustavo A. R. Silva, Arnd Bergmann, Ard Biesheuvel, kasan-dev,
	linux-mm, linux-kernel, kernel-hardening, syzkaller

When syzbot tries to figure out how to deduplicate bug reports, it
prefers seeing a hint about a specific bug type (we can do better than
just "UBSAN"). This lifts the handler reason into the UBSAN report line
that includes the file path that tripped a check. Unfortunately, UBSAN
does not provide function names.

Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CACT4Y+bsLJ-wFx_TaXqax3JByUOWB3uk787LsyMVcfW6JzzGvg@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 lib/ubsan.c | 36 +++++++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/ubsan.c b/lib/ubsan.c
index 429663eef6a7..f8c0ccf35f29 100644
--- a/lib/ubsan.c
+++ b/lib/ubsan.c
@@ -45,13 +45,6 @@ static bool was_reported(struct source_location *location)
 	return test_and_set_bit(REPORTED_BIT, &location->reported);
 }
 
-static void print_source_location(const char *prefix,
-				struct source_location *loc)
-{
-	pr_err("%s %s:%d:%d\n", prefix, loc->file_name,
-		loc->line & LINE_MASK, loc->column & COLUMN_MASK);
-}
-
 static bool suppress_report(struct source_location *loc)
 {
 	return current->in_ubsan || was_reported(loc);
@@ -140,13 +133,14 @@ static void val_to_string(char *str, size_t size, struct type_descriptor *type,
 	}
 }
 
-static void ubsan_prologue(struct source_location *location)
+static void ubsan_prologue(struct source_location *loc, const char *reason)
 {
 	current->in_ubsan++;
 
 	pr_err("========================================"
 		"========================================\n");
-	print_source_location("UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in", location);
+	pr_err("UBSAN: %s in %s:%d:%d\n", reason, loc->file_name,
+		loc->line & LINE_MASK, loc->column & COLUMN_MASK);
 }
 
 static void ubsan_epilogue(void)
@@ -180,12 +174,12 @@ static void handle_overflow(struct overflow_data *data, void *lhs,
 	if (suppress_report(&data->location))
 		return;
 
-	ubsan_prologue(&data->location);
+	ubsan_prologue(&data->location, type_is_signed(type) ?
+			"signed-integer-overflow" :
+			"unsigned-integer-overflow");
 
 	val_to_string(lhs_val_str, sizeof(lhs_val_str), type, lhs);
 	val_to_string(rhs_val_str, sizeof(rhs_val_str), type, rhs);
-	pr_err("%s integer overflow:\n",
-		type_is_signed(type) ? "signed" : "unsigned");
 	pr_err("%s %c %s cannot be represented in type %s\n",
 		lhs_val_str,
 		op,
@@ -225,7 +219,7 @@ void __ubsan_handle_negate_overflow(struct overflow_data *data,
 	if (suppress_report(&data->location))
 		return;
 
-	ubsan_prologue(&data->location);
+	ubsan_prologue(&data->location, "negation-overflow");
 
 	val_to_string(old_val_str, sizeof(old_val_str), data->type, old_val);
 
@@ -245,7 +239,7 @@ void __ubsan_handle_divrem_overflow(struct overflow_data *data,
 	if (suppress_report(&data->location))
 		return;
 
-	ubsan_prologue(&data->location);
+	ubsan_prologue(&data->location, "division-overflow");
 
 	val_to_string(rhs_val_str, sizeof(rhs_val_str), data->type, rhs);
 
@@ -264,7 +258,7 @@ static void handle_null_ptr_deref(struct type_mismatch_data_common *data)
 	if (suppress_report(data->location))
 		return;
 
-	ubsan_prologue(data->location);
+	ubsan_prologue(data->location, "null-ptr-deref");
 
 	pr_err("%s null pointer of type %s\n",
 		type_check_kinds[data->type_check_kind],
@@ -279,7 +273,7 @@ static void handle_misaligned_access(struct type_mismatch_data_common *data,
 	if (suppress_report(data->location))
 		return;
 
-	ubsan_prologue(data->location);
+	ubsan_prologue(data->location, "misaligned-access");
 
 	pr_err("%s misaligned address %p for type %s\n",
 		type_check_kinds[data->type_check_kind],
@@ -295,7 +289,7 @@ static void handle_object_size_mismatch(struct type_mismatch_data_common *data,
 	if (suppress_report(data->location))
 		return;
 
-	ubsan_prologue(data->location);
+	ubsan_prologue(data->location, "object-size-mismatch");
 	pr_err("%s address %p with insufficient space\n",
 		type_check_kinds[data->type_check_kind],
 		(void *) ptr);
@@ -354,7 +348,7 @@ void __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds(struct out_of_bounds_data *data, void *index)
 	if (suppress_report(&data->location))
 		return;
 
-	ubsan_prologue(&data->location);
+	ubsan_prologue(&data->location, "array-index-out-of-bounds");
 
 	val_to_string(index_str, sizeof(index_str), data->index_type, index);
 	pr_err("index %s is out of range for type %s\n", index_str,
@@ -375,7 +369,7 @@ void __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds(struct shift_out_of_bounds_data *data,
 	if (suppress_report(&data->location))
 		goto out;
 
-	ubsan_prologue(&data->location);
+	ubsan_prologue(&data->location, "shift-out-of-bounds");
 
 	val_to_string(rhs_str, sizeof(rhs_str), rhs_type, rhs);
 	val_to_string(lhs_str, sizeof(lhs_str), lhs_type, lhs);
@@ -407,7 +401,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds);
 
 void __ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable(struct unreachable_data *data)
 {
-	ubsan_prologue(&data->location);
+	ubsan_prologue(&data->location, "unreachable");
 	pr_err("calling __builtin_unreachable()\n");
 	ubsan_epilogue();
 	panic("can't return from __builtin_unreachable()");
@@ -422,7 +416,7 @@ void __ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value(struct invalid_value_data *data,
 	if (suppress_report(&data->location))
 		return;
 
-	ubsan_prologue(&data->location);
+	ubsan_prologue(&data->location, "invalid-load");
 
 	val_to_string(val_str, sizeof(val_str), data->type, val);
 
-- 
2.20.1


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v5 6/6] ubsan: Include bug type in report header
  2020-02-27 19:35 ` [PATCH v5 6/6] ubsan: Include bug type in report header Kees Cook
@ 2020-02-28 12:45   ` Andrey Konovalov
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Andrey Konovalov @ 2020-02-28 12:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Kees Cook
  Cc: Andrew Morton, Dmitry Vyukov, Andrey Ryabinin, Elena Petrova,
	Alexander Potapenko, Dan Carpenter, Gustavo A. R. Silva,
	Arnd Bergmann, Ard Biesheuvel, kasan-dev,
	Linux Memory Management List, LKML, kernel-hardening, syzkaller

On Thu, Feb 27, 2020 at 8:35 PM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> When syzbot tries to figure out how to deduplicate bug reports, it
> prefers seeing a hint about a specific bug type (we can do better than
> just "UBSAN"). This lifts the handler reason into the UBSAN report line
> that includes the file path that tripped a check. Unfortunately, UBSAN
> does not provide function names.
>
> Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CACT4Y+bsLJ-wFx_TaXqax3JByUOWB3uk787LsyMVcfW6JzzGvg@mail.gmail.com
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> ---
>  lib/ubsan.c | 36 +++++++++++++++---------------------
>  1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/lib/ubsan.c b/lib/ubsan.c
> index 429663eef6a7..f8c0ccf35f29 100644
> --- a/lib/ubsan.c
> +++ b/lib/ubsan.c
> @@ -45,13 +45,6 @@ static bool was_reported(struct source_location *location)
>         return test_and_set_bit(REPORTED_BIT, &location->reported);
>  }
>
> -static void print_source_location(const char *prefix,
> -                               struct source_location *loc)
> -{
> -       pr_err("%s %s:%d:%d\n", prefix, loc->file_name,
> -               loc->line & LINE_MASK, loc->column & COLUMN_MASK);
> -}
> -
>  static bool suppress_report(struct source_location *loc)
>  {
>         return current->in_ubsan || was_reported(loc);
> @@ -140,13 +133,14 @@ static void val_to_string(char *str, size_t size, struct type_descriptor *type,
>         }
>  }
>
> -static void ubsan_prologue(struct source_location *location)
> +static void ubsan_prologue(struct source_location *loc, const char *reason)
>  {
>         current->in_ubsan++;
>
>         pr_err("========================================"
>                 "========================================\n");
> -       print_source_location("UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in", location);
> +       pr_err("UBSAN: %s in %s:%d:%d\n", reason, loc->file_name,
> +               loc->line & LINE_MASK, loc->column & COLUMN_MASK);
>  }
>
>  static void ubsan_epilogue(void)
> @@ -180,12 +174,12 @@ static void handle_overflow(struct overflow_data *data, void *lhs,
>         if (suppress_report(&data->location))
>                 return;
>
> -       ubsan_prologue(&data->location);
> +       ubsan_prologue(&data->location, type_is_signed(type) ?
> +                       "signed-integer-overflow" :
> +                       "unsigned-integer-overflow");
>
>         val_to_string(lhs_val_str, sizeof(lhs_val_str), type, lhs);
>         val_to_string(rhs_val_str, sizeof(rhs_val_str), type, rhs);
> -       pr_err("%s integer overflow:\n",
> -               type_is_signed(type) ? "signed" : "unsigned");
>         pr_err("%s %c %s cannot be represented in type %s\n",
>                 lhs_val_str,
>                 op,
> @@ -225,7 +219,7 @@ void __ubsan_handle_negate_overflow(struct overflow_data *data,
>         if (suppress_report(&data->location))
>                 return;
>
> -       ubsan_prologue(&data->location);
> +       ubsan_prologue(&data->location, "negation-overflow");
>
>         val_to_string(old_val_str, sizeof(old_val_str), data->type, old_val);
>
> @@ -245,7 +239,7 @@ void __ubsan_handle_divrem_overflow(struct overflow_data *data,
>         if (suppress_report(&data->location))
>                 return;
>
> -       ubsan_prologue(&data->location);
> +       ubsan_prologue(&data->location, "division-overflow");
>
>         val_to_string(rhs_val_str, sizeof(rhs_val_str), data->type, rhs);
>
> @@ -264,7 +258,7 @@ static void handle_null_ptr_deref(struct type_mismatch_data_common *data)
>         if (suppress_report(data->location))
>                 return;
>
> -       ubsan_prologue(data->location);
> +       ubsan_prologue(data->location, "null-ptr-deref");
>
>         pr_err("%s null pointer of type %s\n",
>                 type_check_kinds[data->type_check_kind],
> @@ -279,7 +273,7 @@ static void handle_misaligned_access(struct type_mismatch_data_common *data,
>         if (suppress_report(data->location))
>                 return;
>
> -       ubsan_prologue(data->location);
> +       ubsan_prologue(data->location, "misaligned-access");
>
>         pr_err("%s misaligned address %p for type %s\n",
>                 type_check_kinds[data->type_check_kind],
> @@ -295,7 +289,7 @@ static void handle_object_size_mismatch(struct type_mismatch_data_common *data,
>         if (suppress_report(data->location))
>                 return;
>
> -       ubsan_prologue(data->location);
> +       ubsan_prologue(data->location, "object-size-mismatch");
>         pr_err("%s address %p with insufficient space\n",
>                 type_check_kinds[data->type_check_kind],
>                 (void *) ptr);
> @@ -354,7 +348,7 @@ void __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds(struct out_of_bounds_data *data, void *index)
>         if (suppress_report(&data->location))
>                 return;
>
> -       ubsan_prologue(&data->location);
> +       ubsan_prologue(&data->location, "array-index-out-of-bounds");
>
>         val_to_string(index_str, sizeof(index_str), data->index_type, index);
>         pr_err("index %s is out of range for type %s\n", index_str,
> @@ -375,7 +369,7 @@ void __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds(struct shift_out_of_bounds_data *data,
>         if (suppress_report(&data->location))
>                 goto out;
>
> -       ubsan_prologue(&data->location);
> +       ubsan_prologue(&data->location, "shift-out-of-bounds");
>
>         val_to_string(rhs_str, sizeof(rhs_str), rhs_type, rhs);
>         val_to_string(lhs_str, sizeof(lhs_str), lhs_type, lhs);
> @@ -407,7 +401,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds);
>
>  void __ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable(struct unreachable_data *data)
>  {
> -       ubsan_prologue(&data->location);
> +       ubsan_prologue(&data->location, "unreachable");
>         pr_err("calling __builtin_unreachable()\n");
>         ubsan_epilogue();
>         panic("can't return from __builtin_unreachable()");
> @@ -422,7 +416,7 @@ void __ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value(struct invalid_value_data *data,
>         if (suppress_report(&data->location))
>                 return;
>
> -       ubsan_prologue(&data->location);
> +       ubsan_prologue(&data->location, "invalid-load");
>
>         val_to_string(val_str, sizeof(val_str), data->type, val);
>
> --
> 2.20.1
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "kasan-dev" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to kasan-dev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/kasan-dev/20200227193516.32566-7-keescook%40chromium.org.

Acked-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>

Thanks!

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread

end of thread, back to index

Thread overview: 8+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2020-02-27 19:35 [PATCH v5 0/6] ubsan: Split out bounds checker Kees Cook
2020-02-27 19:35 ` [PATCH v5 1/6] ubsan: Add trap instrumentation option Kees Cook
2020-02-27 19:35 ` [PATCH v5 2/6] ubsan: Split "bounds" checker from other options Kees Cook
2020-02-27 19:35 ` [PATCH v5 3/6] lkdtm/bugs: Add arithmetic overflow and array bounds checks Kees Cook
2020-02-27 19:35 ` [PATCH v5 4/6] ubsan: Check panic_on_warn Kees Cook
2020-02-27 19:35 ` [PATCH v5 5/6] kasan: Unset panic_on_warn before calling panic() Kees Cook
2020-02-27 19:35 ` [PATCH v5 6/6] ubsan: Include bug type in report header Kees Cook
2020-02-28 12:45   ` Andrey Konovalov

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