From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.7 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 976FEC43331 for ; Thu, 26 Mar 2020 11:16:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with SMTP id ED49620714 for ; Thu, 26 Mar 2020 11:15:59 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org ED49620714 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=arm.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=kernel-hardening-return-18232-kernel-hardening=archiver.kernel.org@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 18055 invoked by uid 550); 26 Mar 2020 11:15:52 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Received: (qmail 18020 invoked from network); 26 Mar 2020 11:15:51 -0000 Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2020 11:15:21 +0000 From: Mark Rutland To: Kees Cook Cc: Thomas Gleixner , Elena Reshetova , x86@kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski , Peter Zijlstra , Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Alexander Potapenko , Ard Biesheuvel , Jann Horn , "Perla, Enrico" , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support Message-ID: <20200326111521.GA72909@C02TD0UTHF1T.local> References: <20200324203231.64324-1-keescook@chromium.org> <20200324203231.64324-6-keescook@chromium.org> <20200325132127.GB12236@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com> <202003251319.AECA788D63@keescook> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <202003251319.AECA788D63@keescook> On Wed, Mar 25, 2020 at 01:22:07PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > On Wed, Mar 25, 2020 at 01:21:27PM +0000, Mark Rutland wrote: > > On Tue, Mar 24, 2020 at 01:32:31PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > > > Allow for a randomized stack offset on a per-syscall basis, with roughly > > > 5 bits of entropy. > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook > > > > Just to check, do you have an idea of the impact on arm64? Patch 3 had > > figures for x86 where it reads the TSC, and it's unclear to me how > > get_random_int() compares to that. > > I didn't do a measurement on arm64 since I don't have a good bare-metal > test environment. I know Andy Lutomirki has plans for making > get_random_get() as fast as possible, so that's why I used it here. Ok. I suspect I also won't get the chance to test that in the next few days, but if I do I'll try to share the results. My concern here was that, get_random_int() has to grab a spinlock and mess with IRQ masking, so has the potential to block for much longer, but that might not be an issue in practice, and I don't think that should block these patches. > I couldn't figure out if there was a comparable instruction like rdtsc > in aarch64 (it seems there's a cycle counter, but I found nothing in > the kernel that seemed to actually use it)? AArch64 doesn't have a direct equivalent. The generic counter (CNTxCT_EL0) is the closest thing, but its nominal frequency is typically much lower than the nominal CPU clock frequency (unlike TSC where they're the same). The cycle counter (PMCCNTR_EL0) is part of the PMU, and can't be relied on in the same way (e.g. as perf reprograms it to generate overflow events, and it can stop for things like WFI/WFE). Thanks, Mark.