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charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20200324203231.64324-5-keescook@chromium.org> On Tue, Mar 24, 2020 at 01:32:30PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > Allow for a randomized stack offset on a per-syscall basis, with roughly > 5 bits of entropy. > > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook > --- > arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + > arch/x86/entry/common.c | 12 +++++++++++- > 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig > index beea77046f9b..b9d449581eb6 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig > +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig > @@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ config X86 > select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE > select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD if X86_64 > select HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK if X86_64 > + select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET > select HAVE_ARCH_WITHIN_STACK_FRAMES > select HAVE_ASM_MODVERSIONS > select HAVE_CMPXCHG_DOUBLE > diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c > index 9747876980b5..086d7af570af 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c > +++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c > @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > > #include > #include > @@ -189,6 +190,13 @@ __visible inline void prepare_exit_to_usermode(struct pt_regs *regs) > lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled(); > lockdep_sys_exit(); > > + /* > + * x86_64 stack alignment means 3 bits are ignored, so keep > + * the top 5 bits. x86_32 needs only 2 bits of alignment, so > + * the top 6 bits will be used. > + */ > + choose_random_kstack_offset(rdtsc() & 0xFF); > + > cached_flags = READ_ONCE(ti->flags); > > if (unlikely(cached_flags & EXIT_TO_USERMODE_LOOP_FLAGS)) > @@ -283,6 +291,7 @@ __visible void do_syscall_64(unsigned long nr, struct pt_regs *regs) > { > struct thread_info *ti; > > + add_random_kstack_offset(); > enter_from_user_mode(); > local_irq_enable(); > ti = current_thread_info(); So, I got an email from 0day that this caused a performance regression[1] with things _turned off_. On closer examination: Before (objdump -dS vmlinux): __visible void do_syscall_64(unsigned long nr, struct pt_regs *regs) { ffffffff81003920: 41 54 push %r12 ffffffff81003922: 55 push %rbp ffffffff81003923: 48 89 f5 mov %rsi,%rbp ffffffff81003926: 53 push %rbx ffffffff81003927: 48 89 fb mov %rdi,%rbx struct thread_info *ti; enter_from_user_mode(); local_irq_enable(); ... After: __visible void do_syscall_64(unsigned long nr, struct pt_regs *regs) { ffffffff81003960: 55 push %rbp ffffffff81003961: 48 89 e5 mov %rsp,%rbp ffffffff81003964: 41 55 push %r13 ffffffff81003966: 41 54 push %r12 ffffffff81003968: 49 89 f4 mov %rsi,%r12 ffffffff8100396b: 53 push %rbx ffffffff8100396c: 48 89 fb mov %rdi,%rbx ffffffff8100396f: 48 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%rsp ffffffff81003973: 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 mov %gs:0x28,%rax ffffffff8100397a: 00 00 ffffffff8100397c: 48 89 45 e0 mov %rax,-0x20(%rbp) ffffffff81003980: 31 c0 xor %eax,%eax asm_volatile_goto("1:" ffffffff81003982: 0f 1f 44 00 00 nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) struct thread_info *ti; add_random_kstack_offset(); enter_from_user_mode(); local_irq_enable(); The "nopl" there is the static_branch code that I'd expect. However, the preample is quite different. *drum roll* Anyone else recognize %gs:0x28? That's the stack canary. :P It seems that GCC views this as an array: char *ptr = __builtin_alloca(offset & 0x3FF); asm volatile("" : "=m"(*ptr)); because it's locally allocated on the stack. *face palm* I'll go figure out a way to fix this... -Kees [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202003281505.0F481D3@keescook/ -- Kees Cook