From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 54C3EC43331 for ; Thu, 2 Apr 2020 07:19:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with SMTP id A575720678 for ; Thu, 2 Apr 2020 07:19:56 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=chromium.org header.i=@chromium.org header.b="Mkdjc5J1" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org A575720678 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=chromium.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=kernel-hardening-return-18368-kernel-hardening=archiver.kernel.org@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 1094 invoked by uid 550); 2 Apr 2020 07:19:49 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Received: (qmail 1074 invoked from network); 2 Apr 2020 07:19:48 -0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=chromium.org; s=google; h=date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references:mime-version :content-disposition:in-reply-to; bh=MNcbIL1+RcHP9n1/a7uW2cYhRUPkvEWLMMecHAgQsXw=; b=Mkdjc5J1SEZfYsVao6D+3svMUTOlPWR0GUglETGCp1BLe0DlCeO6EhQvWvFeICMv36 FhEx79mg9w4G5l0oE52LrM6gGTrotrudHbeodjWMutpEZgdksa6OfQMqYRb+P06vpBHA 5ziM8BNeNC/piG1MVXXvFtq9O6gGtn/zz65nI= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references :mime-version:content-disposition:in-reply-to; bh=MNcbIL1+RcHP9n1/a7uW2cYhRUPkvEWLMMecHAgQsXw=; b=joPwF4DitNpW81keTz4bSZV0otYRgdOu+/4/Zj5pT25HkxPgcrR8RYWZ6olpy1JLrv SW9aoH7JKsmgvNtXyG2LKdcEH6joZ79lYEZxwwsYBe35m1PXnRCCdKZocQEMZcIqI5Jb GpL0rOvIr5LFDsFo339Mal0xj4ZQvEI6TFq9Mab9GPgZEPQN3UTcq8vMLiTSCbQXnSlF WBWLcO5M00xQ+25kHf+W1hGjcdRtmYE2y+lWGmSfEBYAQFJgblCMoxLC09LLs1qc6MFO wr8eIl3uKcjZKXBGpQXd8OAHfQO/8NOxu0zPwY4Y5qgF9C9jnfrODbu8311dQy6EtUun ectA== X-Gm-Message-State: AGi0PubLECPczFV57p08mY7st5CX3V2opah3Nl/Qx8Cuv5/NWWvWYRmH CuzZLMahhRGcuLPzM+4AzwBCdw== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APiQypIgY9efFSF0nGqyq4XrnljhNDsb8eVxK3UTxH/mnTcO3+iTBEtSUKooI7eOyQJMhEFKWznCZA== X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:b617:: with SMTP id b23mr1717580pls.285.1585811976162; Thu, 02 Apr 2020 00:19:36 -0700 (PDT) Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2020 00:19:34 -0700 From: Kees Cook To: "Eric W. Biederman" Cc: Linus Torvalds , Adam Zabrocki , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Jann Horn , Oleg Nesterov , Andy Lutomirski , Bernd Edlinger , Andrew Morton , stable@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] signal: Extend exec_id to 64bits Message-ID: <202004020019.1F1EEC3669@keescook> References: <20200324215049.GA3710@pi3.com.pl> <202003291528.730A329@keescook> <87zhbvlyq7.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <87zhbvlyq7.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> On Wed, Apr 01, 2020 at 03:47:44PM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > > Replace the 32bit exec_id with a 64bit exec_id to make it impossible > to wrap the exec_id counter. With care an attacker can cause exec_id > wrap and send arbitrary signals to a newly exec'd parent. This > bypasses the signal sending checks if the parent changes their > credentials during exec. > > The severity of this problem can been seen that in my limited testing > of a 32bit exec_id it can take as little as 19s to exec 65536 times. > Which means that it can take as little as 14 days to wrap a 32bit > exec_id. Adam Zabrocki has succeeded wrapping the self_exe_id in 7 > days. Even my slower timing is in the uptime of a typical server. > Which means self_exec_id is simply a speed bump today, and if exec > gets noticably faster self_exec_id won't even be a speed bump. > > Extending self_exec_id to 64bits introduces a problem on 32bit > architectures where reading self_exec_id is no longer atomic and can > take two read instructions. Which means that is is possible to hit > a window where the read value of exec_id does not match the written > value. So with very lucky timing after this change this still > remains expoiltable. > > I have updated the update of exec_id on exec to use WRITE_ONCE > and the read of exec_id in do_notify_parent to use READ_ONCE > to make it clear that there is no locking between these two > locations. > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/20200324215049.GA3710@pi3.com.pl > Fixes: 2.3.23pre2 > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" Thanks for chasing this down. :) Reviewed-by: Kees Cook -Kees > --- > > Linus would you prefer to take this patch directly or I could put it in > a brach and send you a pull request. > > fs/exec.c | 2 +- > include/linux/sched.h | 4 ++-- > kernel/signal.c | 2 +- > 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c > index 0e46ec57fe0a..d55710a36056 100644 > --- a/fs/exec.c > +++ b/fs/exec.c > @@ -1413,7 +1413,7 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) > > /* An exec changes our domain. We are no longer part of the thread > group */ > - current->self_exec_id++; > + WRITE_ONCE(current->self_exec_id, current->self_exec_id + 1); > flush_signal_handlers(current, 0); > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_new_exec); > diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h > index 04278493bf15..0323e4f0982a 100644 > --- a/include/linux/sched.h > +++ b/include/linux/sched.h > @@ -939,8 +939,8 @@ struct task_struct { > struct seccomp seccomp; > > /* Thread group tracking: */ > - u32 parent_exec_id; > - u32 self_exec_id; > + u64 parent_exec_id; > + u64 self_exec_id; > > /* Protection against (de-)allocation: mm, files, fs, tty, keyrings, mems_allowed, mempolicy: */ > spinlock_t alloc_lock; > diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c > index 9ad8dea93dbb..5383b562df85 100644 > --- a/kernel/signal.c > +++ b/kernel/signal.c > @@ -1926,7 +1926,7 @@ bool do_notify_parent(struct task_struct *tsk, int sig) > * This is only possible if parent == real_parent. > * Check if it has changed security domain. > */ > - if (tsk->parent_exec_id != tsk->parent->self_exec_id) > + if (tsk->parent_exec_id != READ_ONCE(tsk->parent->self_exec_id)) > sig = SIGCHLD; > } > > -- > 2.20.1 > -- Kees Cook