From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B801CC433DB for ; Thu, 11 Mar 2021 20:08:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with SMTP id C693764F80 for ; Thu, 11 Mar 2021 20:08:36 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org C693764F80 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.intel.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=kernel-hardening-return-20929-kernel-hardening=archiver.kernel.org@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 30657 invoked by uid 550); 11 Mar 2021 20:08:30 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Received: (qmail 30622 invoked from network); 11 Mar 2021 20:08:29 -0000 IronPort-SDR: Uea+HUMU+/qeQu7uQfnXUlrJAvJrDNOcjC6WjxXm5QYsXHLxtV/zdKjiaI3fOJDZmIFty7BwBc E1+GdhUltqAA== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9920"; a="186357264" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,241,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="186357264" IronPort-SDR: KjMxJMyU8wBcqzcezN9xDQb+xk6wNl0Cwu+bdMoU7Efbs+0g5YtEQEXOORxIL7v1gEYy3MflXo XC0C20dAjegA== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,241,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="448398607" Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2021 12:08:11 -0800 From: Andi Kleen To: John Wood Cc: Kees Cook , Jann Horn , Randy Dunlap , Jonathan Corbet , James Morris , Shuah Khan , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Greg Kroah-Hartman , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM Message-ID: <20210311200811.GH203350@tassilo.jf.intel.com> References: <20210227153013.6747-8-john.wood@gmx.com> <878s78dnrm.fsf@linux.intel.com> <20210302183032.GA3049@ubuntu> <20210307151920.GR472138@tassilo.jf.intel.com> <20210307164520.GA16296@ubuntu> <20210307172540.GS472138@tassilo.jf.intel.com> <20210307180541.GA17108@ubuntu> <20210307224927.GT472138@tassilo.jf.intel.com> <20210309184054.GA3058@ubuntu> <20210311182252.GA3349@ubuntu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20210311182252.GA3349@ubuntu> > When a brute force attack is detected through the fork or execve system call, > all the tasks involved in the attack will be killed with the exception of the > init task (task with pid equal to zero). Now, and only if the init task is > involved in the attack, block the fork system call from the init process during > a user defined time (using a sysctl attribute). This way the brute force attack > is mitigated and the system does not panic. That means nobody can log in and fix the system during that time. Would be better to have that policy in init. Perhaps add some way that someone doing wait*() can know the exit was due this mitigation (and not something way) Then they could disable respawning of that daemon. -Andi