From: "Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@intel.com> To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>, "luto@kernel.org" <luto@kernel.org>, "tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>, "mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>, "bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>, "keescook@chromium.org" <keescook@chromium.org>, "tytso@mit.edu" <tytso@mit.edu> Subject: RE: [RFC PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon system call Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2019 13:20:09 +0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <2236FBA76BA1254E88B949DDB74E612BA4BB7580@IRSMSX102.ger.corp.intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20190208130544.GI32511@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> > On Fri, Feb 08, 2019 at 02:15:49PM +0200, Elena Reshetova wrote: > > 1) hackbench -s 4096 -l 2000 -g 15 -f 25 -P > > base: Time: 12.243 > > random_offset: Time: 13.411 > > > base: > > 8.46% time [kernel.kallsyms] [k] crc32c_pcl_intel_update > > 4.77% time [kernel.kallsyms] [k] ext4_mark_iloc_dirty > > 4.14% time [kernel.kallsyms] [k] fsnotify > > > > random_offset: > > 8.35% time [kernel.kallsyms] [k] crc32c_pcl_intel_update > > 5.61% time [kernel.kallsyms] [k] get_random_u64 > > 4.88% time [kernel.kallsyms] [k] ext4_mark_iloc_dirty > > *ouch* > > > Notable differences from RANDKSTACK: > > > - random bits are taken from get_random_long() instead of > > rdtsc() for a better randomness. This however has a big > > performance impact (see above the numbers) and additionally > > if we happen to hit a point when a generator needs to be > > reseeded, we might have an issue. Alternatives can be to > > make this feature dependent on CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU, > > which can solve some issues, but I doubt that all of them. > > Of course rdtsc() can be a fallback if there is no way to > > make calls for a proper randomness from the trampoline stack. > > http://www.chronox.de/jent/doc/CPU-Jitter-NPTRNG.html Oh, this seems to be a great write up, I will read this carefully, thank you for the pointer! Yes, I believe RANDKSTACK was using rdtsc() exactly because of many issues get_random_* brings in addition to horrid performance. This patch works with rdtsc() as well just fine, just wanted to show the *full* randomness option first with the impact it brings. > > That would seem to suggest that the low bits of rdtsc would in fact be a > fairly good source of random. > > Still, doing this on sysexit seems painful at best, syscall performance > matters (and hopefully we'll get rid of meltdown 'soon'). I can measure the impact with rdtsc(), I think it is *very* small. Btw, what should be the good measurement test? I am not that happy with just looping on fopen-fclose, too much noise. > > Why can't we change the stack offset periodically from an interrupt or > so, and then have every later entry use that. Hm... This sounds more complex conceptually - we cannot touch stack when it is in use, so we have to periodically probe for a good time (when process is in userspace I guess) to change it from an interrupt? IMO trampoline stack provides such a good clean place for doing it and we have stackleak there doing stack cleanup, so would make sense to keep these features operating together. Best Regards, Elena.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-02-08 13:20 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-02-08 12:15 [RFC PATCH] Early version of thread stack randomization Elena Reshetova 2019-02-08 12:15 ` [RFC PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon system call Elena Reshetova 2019-02-08 13:05 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-02-08 13:20 ` Reshetova, Elena [this message] 2019-02-08 14:26 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-02-09 11:13 ` Reshetova, Elena 2019-02-09 18:25 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-02-11 6:39 ` Reshetova, Elena 2019-02-11 15:54 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-02-12 10:16 ` Perla, Enrico 2019-02-14 7:52 ` Reshetova, Elena 2019-02-19 14:47 ` Jann Horn 2019-02-20 22:20 ` Kees Cook 2019-02-21 6:37 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-02-21 13:20 ` Jann Horn 2019-02-21 15:49 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-02-20 22:15 ` Kees Cook 2019-02-20 22:53 ` Kees Cook 2019-02-21 23:29 ` Kees Cook 2019-02-27 11:03 ` Reshetova, Elena 2019-02-21 9:35 ` Perla, Enrico 2019-02-21 17:23 ` Kees Cook 2019-02-21 17:48 ` Perla, Enrico 2019-02-21 19:18 ` Kees Cook 2019-02-20 21:51 ` Kees Cook 2019-02-08 15:15 ` Peter Zijlstra 2019-02-09 11:38 ` Reshetova, Elena 2019-02-09 12:09 ` Greg KH 2019-02-11 6:05 ` Reshetova, Elena 2019-02-08 16:34 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-02-20 22:03 ` Kees Cook 2019-02-08 21:28 ` Kees Cook 2019-02-11 12:47 ` Reshetova, Elena 2019-02-20 22:04 ` Kees Cook
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