From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: "James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Al Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>,
"Anton Ivanov" <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"Jeff Dike" <jdike@addtoit.com>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Michael Kerrisk" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
"Richard Weinberger" <richard@nod.at>,
"Shuah Khan" <shuah@kernel.org>,
"Vincent Dagonneau" <vincent.dagonneau@ssi.gouv.fr>,
"Kernel Hardening" <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
"Linux API" <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
"kernel list" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"open list:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK"
<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v24 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
Date: Sat, 21 Nov 2020 10:45:01 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <28499c4b-d388-7bd1-046e-a775c326e156@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAG48ez2RE6S7jKQY3iyoNRM5vV67W4S7OwJ0gmNGy+MB8F56vg@mail.gmail.com>
On 21/11/2020 08:00, Jann Horn wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 12, 2020 at 9:51 PM Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
>> A Landlock ruleset is mainly a red-black tree with Landlock rules as
>> nodes. This enables quick update and lookup to match a requested
>> access, e.g. to a file. A ruleset is usable through a dedicated file
>> descriptor (cf. following commit implementing syscalls) which enables a
>> process to create and populate a ruleset with new rules.
>>
>> A domain is a ruleset tied to a set of processes. This group of rules
>> defines the security policy enforced on these processes and their future
>> children. A domain can transition to a new domain which is the
>> intersection of all its constraints and those of a ruleset provided by
>> the current process. This modification only impact the current process.
>> This means that a process can only gain more constraints (i.e. lose
>> accesses) over time.
>>
>> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
>> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
>> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
>> ---
>>
>> Changes since v23:
>> * Always intersect access rights. Following the filesystem change
>> logic, make ruleset updates more consistent by always intersecting
>> access rights (boolean AND) instead of combining them (boolean OR) for
>> the same layer.
>
> This seems wrong to me. If some software e.g. builds a policy that
> allows it to execute specific libraries and to open input files
> specified on the command line, and the user then specifies a library
> as an input file, this change will make that fail unless the software
> explicitly deduplicates the rules.
> Userspace will be forced to add extra complexity to work around this.
That's a valid use case I didn't think about. Reverting this change is
not an issue.
>
>> This defensive approach could also help avoid user
>> space to inadvertently allow multiple access rights for the same
>> object (e.g. write and execute access on a path hierarchy) instead of
>> dealing with such inconsistency. This can happen when there is no
>> deduplication of objects (e.g. paths and underlying inodes) whereas
>> they get different access rights with landlock_add_rule(2).
>
> I don't see why that's an issue. If userspace wants to be able to
> access the same object in different ways for different purposes, it
> should be able to do that, no?
>
> I liked the semantics from the previous version.
>
I agree, but the real issue is with the ruleset layers applied to the
filesystem, cf. patch 7.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-11-21 9:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-11-12 20:51 [PATCH v24 00/12] Landlock LSM Mickaël Salaün
2020-11-12 20:51 ` [PATCH v24 01/12] landlock: Add object management Mickaël Salaün
2020-11-21 7:00 ` Jann Horn
2020-11-21 10:11 ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-11-12 20:51 ` [PATCH v24 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management Mickaël Salaün
2020-11-20 1:52 ` James Morris
2020-11-21 7:00 ` Jann Horn
2020-11-21 9:45 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2020-11-12 20:51 ` [PATCH v24 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials Mickaël Salaün
2020-11-12 20:51 ` [PATCH v24 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions Mickaël Salaün
2020-11-12 20:51 ` [PATCH v24 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Mickaël Salaün
2020-11-12 20:51 ` [PATCH v24 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook Mickaël Salaün
2020-11-12 20:51 ` [PATCH v24 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control Mickaël Salaün
2020-11-21 7:00 ` Jann Horn
2020-11-21 10:06 ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-11-23 19:44 ` Jann Horn
2020-11-23 21:16 ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-11-23 21:19 ` Jann Horn
2020-11-12 20:51 ` [PATCH v24 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations Mickaël Salaün
2020-11-21 7:00 ` Jann Horn
2020-11-12 20:51 ` [PATCH v24 09/12] arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls Mickaël Salaün
2020-11-12 20:51 ` [PATCH v24 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests Mickaël Salaün
2020-11-12 20:51 ` [PATCH v24 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example Mickaël Salaün
2020-11-12 20:51 ` [PATCH v24 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation Mickaël Salaün
2020-11-21 7:00 ` Jann Horn
2020-11-24 2:38 ` James Morris
2020-11-17 5:37 ` [PATCH v24 00/12] Landlock LSM James Morris
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