kernel-hardening.lists.openwall.com archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	juergh@gmail.com, tycho@tycho.ws, jsteckli@amazon.de,
	ak@linux.intel.com, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
	liran.alon@oracle.com, keescook@google.com,
	konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Cc: deepa.srinivasan@oracle.com, chris.hyser@oracle.com,
	tyhicks@canonical.com, dwmw@amazon.co.uk,
	andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, jcm@redhat.com,
	boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
	joao.m.martins@oracle.com, jmattson@google.com,
	pradeep.vincent@oracle.com, john.haxby@oracle.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com, hch@lst.de,
	steven.sistare@oracle.com, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v7 00/16] Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership
Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 16:23:02 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <783eefa3-9725-34c1-9729-2453274b1736@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8ffc77a9-6eae-7287-0ea3-56bfb61758cd@intel.com>

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2062 bytes --]

On 1/11/19 1:42 PM, Dave Hansen wrote:
>>> The second process could easily have the page's old TLB entry.  It could
>>> abuse that entry as long as that CPU doesn't context switch
>>> (switch_mm_irqs_off()) or otherwise flush the TLB entry.
>>
>> That is an interesting scenario. Working through this scenario, physmap
>> TLB entry for a page is flushed on the local processor when the page is
>> allocated to userspace, in xpfo_alloc_pages(). When the userspace passes
>> page back into kernel, that page is mapped into kernel space using a va
>> from kmap pool in xpfo_kmap() which can be different for each new
>> mapping of the same page. The physical page is unmapped from kernel on
>> the way back from kernel to userspace by xpfo_kunmap(). So two processes
>> on different CPUs sharing same physical page might not be seeing the
>> same virtual address for that page while they are in the kernel, as long
>> as it is an address from kmap pool. ret2dir attack relies upon being
>> able to craft a predictable virtual address in the kernel physmap for a
>> physical page and redirect execution to that address. Does that sound right?
> 
> All processes share one set of kernel page tables.  Or, did your patches
> change that somehow that I missed?
> 
> Since they share the page tables, they implicitly share kmap*()
> mappings.  kmap_atomic() is not *used* by more than one CPU, but the
> mapping is accessible and at least exists for all processors.
> 
> I'm basically assuming that any entry mapped in a shared page table is
> exploitable on any CPU regardless of where we logically *want* it to be
> used.
> 
> 

Ah, I see what you are saying. Virtual address on one processor is
visible on the other processor as well and one process could communicate
that va to the other process in some way so it could be exploited by the
other process. This va is exploitable only between the kmap and matching
kunmap but the window exists. I am trying to understand your scenario,
so I can address it right.

--
Khalid



[-- Attachment #2: pEpkey.asc --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-keys, Size: 2501 bytes --]

  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-01-11 23:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-01-10 21:09 [RFC PATCH v7 00/16] Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership Khalid Aziz
2019-01-10 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v7 01/16] mm: add MAP_HUGETLB support to vm_mmap Khalid Aziz
2019-01-10 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v7 02/16] x86: always set IF before oopsing from page fault Khalid Aziz
2019-01-10 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v7 03/16] mm, x86: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO) Khalid Aziz
2019-01-10 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v7 04/16] swiotlb: Map the buffer if it was unmapped by XPFO Khalid Aziz
2019-01-23 14:16   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-01-10 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v7 05/16] arm64/mm: Add support for XPFO Khalid Aziz
2019-01-23 14:20   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-02-12 15:45     ` Khalid Aziz
2019-01-23 14:24   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-02-12 15:52     ` Khalid Aziz
2019-02-12 20:01       ` Laura Abbott
2019-02-12 20:34         ` Khalid Aziz
2019-01-10 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v7 06/16] xpfo: add primitives for mapping underlying memory Khalid Aziz
2019-01-10 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v7 07/16] arm64/mm, xpfo: temporarily map dcache regions Khalid Aziz
2019-01-11 14:54   ` Tycho Andersen
2019-01-11 18:28     ` Khalid Aziz
2019-01-11 19:50       ` Tycho Andersen
2019-01-23 14:56   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-01-10 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v7 08/16] arm64/mm: disable section/contiguous mappings if XPFO is enabled Khalid Aziz
2019-01-10 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v7 09/16] mm: add a user_virt_to_phys symbol Khalid Aziz
2019-01-23 15:03   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2019-01-10 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v7 10/16] lkdtm: Add test for XPFO Khalid Aziz
2019-01-10 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v7 11/16] mm, x86: omit TLB flushing by default for XPFO page table modifications Khalid Aziz
2019-01-10 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v7 12/16] xpfo, mm: remove dependency on CONFIG_PAGE_EXTENSION Khalid Aziz
2019-01-10 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v7 13/16] xpfo, mm: optimize spinlock usage in xpfo_kunmap Khalid Aziz
2019-01-10 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v7 14/16] EXPERIMENTAL: xpfo, mm: optimize spin lock usage in xpfo_kmap Khalid Aziz
2019-01-17  0:18   ` Laura Abbott
2019-01-17 15:14     ` Khalid Aziz
2019-01-10 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v7 15/16] xpfo, mm: Fix hang when booting with "xpfotlbflush" Khalid Aziz
2019-01-10 21:09 ` [RFC PATCH v7 16/16] xpfo, mm: Defer TLB flushes for non-current CPUs (x86 only) Khalid Aziz
2019-01-10 23:07 ` [RFC PATCH v7 00/16] Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership Kees Cook
2019-01-11  0:20   ` Khalid Aziz
2019-01-11  0:44   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-01-11 21:45     ` Khalid Aziz
2019-01-10 23:40 ` Dave Hansen
2019-01-11  9:59   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-01-11 18:21   ` Khalid Aziz
2019-01-11 20:42     ` Dave Hansen
2019-01-11 21:06       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-01-11 23:25         ` Khalid Aziz
2019-01-11 23:23       ` Khalid Aziz [this message]
2019-01-16  1:28 ` Laura Abbott
     [not found] ` <ciirm8o98gzm4z.fsf@u54ee758033e858cfa736.ant.amazon.com>
2019-01-16 15:16   ` Khalid Aziz
2019-01-17 23:38 ` Laura Abbott

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=783eefa3-9725-34c1-9729-2453274b1736@oracle.com \
    --to=khalid.aziz@oracle.com \
    --cc=ak@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
    --cc=boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com \
    --cc=chris.hyser@oracle.com \
    --cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
    --cc=deepa.srinivasan@oracle.com \
    --cc=dwmw@amazon.co.uk \
    --cc=hch@lst.de \
    --cc=jcm@redhat.com \
    --cc=jmattson@google.com \
    --cc=joao.m.martins@oracle.com \
    --cc=john.haxby@oracle.com \
    --cc=jsteckli@amazon.de \
    --cc=juergh@gmail.com \
    --cc=kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com \
    --cc=keescook@google.com \
    --cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
    --cc=kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=konrad.wilk@oracle.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=liran.alon@oracle.com \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=pradeep.vincent@oracle.com \
    --cc=steven.sistare@oracle.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=tycho@tycho.ws \
    --cc=tyhicks@canonical.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).