From: hpa@zytor.com
To: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
linux_dti@icloud.com,
linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@linux.intel.com>,
"Dock, Deneen T" <deneen.t.dock@intel.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 06/17] x86/alternative: use temporary mm for text poking
Date: Thu, 17 Jan 2019 14:31:53 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <7E4A4400-0A2E-4393-B22C-DBD708610BB5@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <B8C39C5A-A669-4F80-9BAE-7C11A4379ECF@gmail.com>
On January 17, 2019 1:43:54 PM PST, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On Jan 17, 2019, at 12:47 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
>wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Jan 17, 2019 at 12:27 PM Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
>wrote:
>>> On Wed, Jan 16, 2019 at 4:33 PM Rick Edgecombe
>>> <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> wrote:
>>>> From: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
>>>>
>>>> text_poke() can potentially compromise the security as it sets
>temporary
>>>> PTEs in the fixmap. These PTEs might be used to rewrite the kernel
>code
>>>> from other cores accidentally or maliciously, if an attacker gains
>the
>>>> ability to write onto kernel memory.
>>>
>>> i think this may be sufficient, but barely.
>>>
>>>> + pte_clear(poking_mm, poking_addr, ptep);
>>>> +
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * __flush_tlb_one_user() performs a redundant TLB flush
>when PTI is on,
>>>> + * as it also flushes the corresponding "user" address
>spaces, which
>>>> + * does not exist.
>>>> + *
>>>> + * Poking, however, is already very inefficient since it
>does not try to
>>>> + * batch updates, so we ignore this problem for the time
>being.
>>>> + *
>>>> + * Since the PTEs do not exist in other kernel
>address-spaces, we do
>>>> + * not use __flush_tlb_one_kernel(), which when PTI is on
>would cause
>>>> + * more unwarranted TLB flushes.
>>>> + *
>>>> + * There is a slight anomaly here: the PTE is a
>supervisor-only and
>>>> + * (potentially) global and we use __flush_tlb_one_user()
>but this
>>>> + * should be fine.
>>>> + */
>>>> + __flush_tlb_one_user(poking_addr);
>>>> + if (cross_page_boundary) {
>>>> + pte_clear(poking_mm, poking_addr + PAGE_SIZE, ptep
>+ 1);
>>>> + __flush_tlb_one_user(poking_addr + PAGE_SIZE);
>>>> + }
>>>
>>> In principle, another CPU could still have the old translation.
>Your
>>> mutex probably makes this impossible, but it makes me nervous.
>>> Ideally you'd use flush_tlb_mm_range(), but I guess you can't do
>that
>>> with IRQs off. Hmm. I think you should add an inc_mm_tlb_gen()
>here.
>>> Arguably, if you did that, you could omit the flushes, but maybe
>>> that's silly.
>>>
>>> If we start getting new users of use_temporary_mm(), we should give
>>> some serious thought to the SMP semantics.
>>>
>>> Also, you're using PAGE_KERNEL. Please tell me that the global bit
>>> isn't set in there.
>>
>> Much better solution: do unuse_temporary_mm() and *then*
>> flush_tlb_mm_range(). This is entirely non-sketchy and should be
>just
>> about optimal, too.
>
>This solution sounds nice and clean. The fact the global-bit was set
>didn’t
>matter before (since __flush_tlb_one_user would get rid of it no matter
>what), but would matter now, so I’ll change it too.
>
>Thanks!
>
>Nadav
You can just disable the global bit at the top level, obviously.
This approach also should make it far easier to do batching if desired.
--
Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-01-17 22:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-01-17 0:32 [PATCH 00/17] Merge text_poke fixes and executable lockdowns Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17 0:32 ` [PATCH 01/17] Fix "x86/alternatives: Lockdep-enforce text_mutex in text_poke*()" Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17 6:47 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-01-17 21:15 ` hpa
2019-01-17 22:39 ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-17 22:59 ` hpa
2019-01-17 23:14 ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-25 9:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-01-25 18:28 ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-17 0:32 ` [PATCH 02/17] x86/jump_label: Use text_poke_early() during early init Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17 0:32 ` [PATCH 03/17] x86/mm: temporary mm struct Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17 0:32 ` [PATCH 04/17] fork: provide a function for copying init_mm Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17 0:32 ` [PATCH 05/17] x86/alternative: initializing temporary mm for patching Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17 0:32 ` [PATCH 06/17] x86/alternative: use temporary mm for text poking Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17 20:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-01-17 20:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-01-17 21:43 ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-17 22:29 ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-17 22:31 ` hpa [this message]
2019-01-17 0:32 ` [PATCH 07/17] x86/kgdb: avoid redundant comparison of patched code Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17 0:32 ` [PATCH 08/17] x86/ftrace: set trampoline pages as executable Rick Edgecombe
2019-02-06 16:22 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-02-06 17:33 ` Nadav Amit
2019-02-06 17:41 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-01-17 0:32 ` [PATCH 09/17] x86/kprobes: Instruction pages initialization enhancements Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17 6:51 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-01-17 0:32 ` [PATCH 10/17] x86: avoid W^X being broken during modules loading Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17 0:32 ` [PATCH 11/17] x86/jump-label: remove support for custom poker Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17 0:32 ` [PATCH 12/17] x86/alternative: Remove the return value of text_poke_*() Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17 0:32 ` [PATCH 13/17] Add set_alias_ function and x86 implementation Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17 0:32 ` [PATCH 14/17] mm: Make hibernate handle unmapped pages Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17 9:39 ` Pavel Machek
2019-01-17 22:16 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2019-01-17 23:41 ` Pavel Machek
2019-01-17 23:48 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2019-01-18 8:16 ` Pavel Machek
2019-01-17 0:32 ` [PATCH 15/17] vmalloc: New flags for safe vfree on special perms Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17 0:32 ` [PATCH 16/17] Plug in new special vfree flag Rick Edgecombe
2019-02-06 16:23 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-02-07 17:33 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2019-02-07 17:49 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-02-07 18:20 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2019-01-17 0:32 ` [PATCH 17/17] module: Prevent module removal racing with text_poke() Rick Edgecombe
2019-01-17 7:54 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-01-17 18:07 ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-17 23:44 ` H. Peter Anvin
2019-01-18 8:23 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-01-17 23:58 ` H. Peter Anvin
2019-01-18 1:15 ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-18 13:32 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2019-01-17 13:21 ` [PATCH 00/17] Merge text_poke fixes and executable lockdowns Peter Zijlstra
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