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From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Al Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Matthew Garrett" <mjg59@google.com>,
	"Michael Kerrisk" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	"Mickaël Salaün" <mickael.salaun@ssi.gouv.fr>,
	"Mimi Zohar" <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Philippe Trébuchet" <philippe.trebuchet@ssi.gouv.fr>,
	"Shuah Khan" <shuah@kernel.org>,
	"Thibaut Sautereau" <thibaut.sautereau@ssi.gouv.fr>,
	"Vincent Strubel" <vincent.strubel@ssi.gouv.fr>,
	"Yves-Alexis Perez" <yves-alexis.perez@ssi.gouv.fr>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/5] Add support for O_MAYEXEC
Date: Wed, 12 Dec 2018 21:13:16 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87lg4upkpv.fsf@oldenburg2.str.redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1812130642250.29507@namei.org> (James Morris's message of "Thu, 13 Dec 2018 06:51:53 +1100 (AEDT)")

* James Morris:

> If you're depending on the script interpreter to flag that the user may 
> execute code, this seems to be equivalent in security terms to depending 
> on the user.  e.g. what if the user uses ptrace and clears O_MAYEXEC?

The argument I've heard is this: Using ptrace (and adding the +x
attribute) are auditable events.

Florian

  reply	other threads:[~2018-12-12 20:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-12-12  8:17 [RFC PATCH v1 0/5] Add support for O_MAYEXEC Mickaël Salaün
2018-12-12  8:17 ` [RFC PATCH v1 1/5] fs: Add support for an O_MAYEXEC flag on sys_open() Mickaël Salaün
2018-12-12 14:43   ` Jan Kara
2018-12-12 17:09     ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-12-12 20:42     ` Mimi Zohar
2018-12-13  9:47     ` Matthew Bobrowski
2018-12-13 14:23       ` Mickaël Salaün
2019-04-15 18:47     ` Steve Grubb
2019-04-16 11:49       ` Florian Weimer
2019-04-16 15:34         ` Steve Grubb
2019-04-17 10:01           ` Florian Weimer
2019-04-17 15:04             ` Mickaël Salaün
2019-04-17 14:55       ` Mickaël Salaün
2019-08-04 23:55     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-06 16:40       ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-12-12  8:17 ` [RFC PATCH v1 2/5] fs: Add a MAY_EXECMOUNT flag to infer the noexec mount propertie Mickaël Salaün
2018-12-12  8:17 ` [RFC PATCH v1 3/5] Yama: Enforces noexec mounts or file executability through O_MAYEXEC Mickaël Salaün
2018-12-12 14:28   ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-12-12 17:09   ` Jann Horn
2018-12-13 14:49     ` Mickaël Salaün
2019-01-03 11:17       ` Jann Horn
2019-01-08 13:29         ` Mickaël Salaün
2019-01-08 23:30           ` Kees Cook
2019-01-09 13:41             ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-12-12  8:17 ` [RFC PATCH v1 4/5] selftest/yama: Add tests for O_MAYEXEC enforcing Mickaël Salaün
2018-12-12  8:17 ` [RFC PATCH v1 5/5] doc: Add documentation for Yama's open_mayexec_enforce Mickaël Salaün
2018-12-12 16:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 0/5] Add support for O_MAYEXEC Jordan Glover
2018-12-12 17:01   ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-12-12 19:51 ` James Morris
2018-12-12 20:13   ` Florian Weimer [this message]
2018-12-12 23:40     ` James Morris
2018-12-13  5:13       ` Florian Weimer
2018-12-13 14:57         ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-12-13  3:02 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-12-13  5:22   ` Florian Weimer
2018-12-13 11:04   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-12-13 11:26     ` Florian Weimer
2018-12-13 12:16       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-12-13 12:16     ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-12-13 15:17   ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-12-13 17:13     ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-12-13 17:36       ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-12-13 17:44         ` Matthew Wilcox

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