From: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
x86@kernel.org, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 00/12] mm: Hardened usercopy
Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2016 17:36:33 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <93009d46-0171-7398-4add-98e09ade608b@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1469046427-12696-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
On 07/20/2016 01:26 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> Hi,
>
> [This is now in my kspp -next tree, though I'd really love to add some
> additional explicit Tested-bys, Reviewed-bys, or Acked-bys. If you've
> looked through any part of this or have done any testing, please consider
> sending an email with your "*-by:" line. :)]
>
> This is a start of the mainline port of PAX_USERCOPY[1]. After writing
> tests (now in lkdtm in -next) for Casey's earlier port[2], I kept tweaking
> things further and further until I ended up with a whole new patch series.
> To that end, I took Rik, Laura, and other people's feedback along with
> additional changes and clean-ups.
>
> Based on my understanding, PAX_USERCOPY was designed to catch a
> few classes of flaws (mainly bad bounds checking) around the use of
> copy_to_user()/copy_from_user(). These changes don't touch get_user() and
> put_user(), since these operate on constant sized lengths, and tend to be
> much less vulnerable. There are effectively three distinct protections in
> the whole series, each of which I've given a separate CONFIG, though this
> patch set is only the first of the three intended protections. (Generally
> speaking, PAX_USERCOPY covers what I'm calling CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY
> (this) and CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_WHITELIST (future), and
> PAX_USERCOPY_SLABS covers CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_SPLIT_KMALLOC
> (future).)
>
> This series, which adds CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY, checks that objects
> being copied to/from userspace meet certain criteria:
> - if address is a heap object, the size must not exceed the object's
> allocated size. (This will catch all kinds of heap overflow flaws.)
> - if address range is in the current process stack, it must be within the
> a valid stack frame (if such checking is possible) or at least entirely
> within the current process's stack. (This could catch large lengths that
> would have extended beyond the current process stack, or overflows if
> their length extends back into the original stack.)
> - if the address range is part of kernel data, rodata, or bss, allow it.
> - if address range is page-allocated, that it doesn't span multiple
> allocations (excepting Reserved and CMA pages).
> - if address is within the kernel text, reject it.
> - everything else is accepted
>
> The patches in the series are:
> - Support for examination of CMA page types:
> 1- mm: Add is_migrate_cma_page
> - Support for arch-specific stack frame checking (which will likely be
> replaced in the future by Josh's more comprehensive unwinder):
> 2- mm: Implement stack frame object validation
> - The core copy_to/from_user() checks, without the slab object checks:
> 3- mm: Hardened usercopy
> - Per-arch enablement of the protection:
> 4- x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
> 5- ARM: uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
> 6- arm64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
> 7- ia64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
> 8- powerpc/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
> 9- sparc/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
> 10- s390/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
> - The heap allocator implementation of object size checking:
> 11- mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support
> 12- mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support
>
> Some notes:
>
> - This is expected to apply on top of -next which contains fixes for the
> position of _etext on both arm and arm64, though it has some conflicts
> with KASAN that should be trivial to fix up. Also in -next are the
> tests for this protection (in lkdtm), prefixed with USERCOPY_.
>
> - I couldn't detect a measurable performance change with these features
> enabled. Kernel build times were unchanged, hackbench was unchanged,
> etc. I think we could flip this to "on by default" at some point, but
> for now, I'm leaving it off until I can get some more definitive
> measurements. I would love if someone with greater familiarity with
> perf could give this a spin and report results.
>
> - The SLOB support extracted from grsecurity seems entirely broken. I
> have no idea what's going on there, I spent my time testing SLAB and
> SLUB. Having someone else look at SLOB would be nice, but this series
> doesn't depend on it.
>
> Additional features that would be nice, but aren't blocking this series:
>
> - Needs more architecture support for stack frame checking (only x86 now,
> but it seems Josh will have a good solution for this soon).
>
>
> Thanks!
>
> -Kees
>
> [1] https://grsecurity.net/download.php "grsecurity - test kernel patch"
> [2] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/05/19/5
>
> v4:
> - handle CMA pages, labbott
> - update stack checker comments, labbott
> - check for vmalloc addresses, labbott
> - deal with KASAN in -next changing arm64 copy*user calls
> - check for linear mappings at runtime instead of via CONFIG
>
> v3:
> - switch to using BUG for better Oops integration
> - when checking page allocations, check each for Reserved
> - use enums for the stack check return for readability
>
> v2:
> - added s390 support
> - handle slub red zone
> - disallow writes to rodata area
> - stack frame walker now CONFIG-controlled arch-specific helper
>
Do you have/plan to have LKDTM or the like tests for this? I started reviewing
the slub code and was about to write some test cases for myself. I did that
for CMA as well which is a decent indicator these should all go somewhere.
Thanks,
Laura
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-07-23 0:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-07-20 20:26 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 00/12] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-20 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 01/12] mm: Add is_migrate_cma_page Kees Cook
2016-07-20 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 02/12] mm: Implement stack frame object validation Kees Cook
2016-07-20 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 03/12] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-20 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 04/12] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-20 20:27 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 05/12] ARM: uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-20 20:27 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 06/12] arm64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-20 20:27 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 07/12] ia64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-20 20:27 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 08/12] powerpc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-20 20:27 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 09/12] sparc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-20 20:27 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 10/12] s390/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-20 20:27 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 11/12] mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support Kees Cook
2016-07-20 20:27 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 12/12] mm: SLUB " Kees Cook
2016-07-25 19:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2016-07-25 20:45 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-26 0:54 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-25 21:42 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-25 23:29 ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-26 0:22 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-23 0:36 ` Laura Abbott [this message]
2016-07-25 17:50 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 00/12] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=93009d46-0171-7398-4add-98e09ade608b@redhat.com \
--to=labbott@redhat.com \
--cc=aarcange@redhat.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org \
--cc=benh@kernel.crashing.org \
--cc=bp@suse.de \
--cc=bsingharora@gmail.com \
--cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
--cc=cl@linux.com \
--cc=danielmicay@gmail.com \
--cc=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=dvyukov@google.com \
--cc=fenghua.yu@intel.com \
--cc=iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com \
--cc=jack@suse.cz \
--cc=jpoimboe@redhat.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
--cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=linux@armlinux.org.uk \
--cc=linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=minipli@googlemail.com \
--cc=mpe@ellerman.id.au \
--cc=pageexec@freemail.hu \
--cc=penberg@kernel.org \
--cc=riel@redhat.com \
--cc=rientjes@google.com \
--cc=sparclinux@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=spender@grsecurity.net \
--cc=tony.luck@intel.com \
--cc=vitalywool@gmail.com \
--cc=will.deacon@arm.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).