From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Network Development <netdev@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH net-next v6 04/11] landlock: Add LSM hooks related to filesystem
Date: Wed, 19 Apr 2017 00:44:07 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <9a69055a-b4cf-00b0-da5e-2e45ff88059c@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jJKNp8R5kZ1U=K7KwgnV=NvH5aoAbftA-05a_Sa4pOg1Q@mail.gmail.com>
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On 19/04/2017 00:17, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 4:46 PM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
>> Handle 33 filesystem-related LSM hooks for the Landlock filesystem
>> event: LANDLOCK_SUBTYPE_EVENT_FS.
>>
>> A Landlock event wrap LSM hooks for similar kernel object types (e.g.
>> struct file, struct path...). Multiple LSM hooks can trigger the same
>> Landlock event.
>>
>> Landlock handle nine coarse-grained actions: read, write, execute, new,
>> get, remove, ioctl, lock and fcntl. Each of them abstract LSM hook
>> access control in a way that can be extended in the future.
>>
>> The Landlock LSM hook registration is done after other LSM to only run
>> actions from user-space, via eBPF programs, if the access was granted by
>> major (privileged) LSMs.
>>
>> Changes since v5:
>> * split hooks.[ch] into hooks.[ch] and hooks_fs.[ch]
>> * add more documentation
>> * cosmetic fixes
>>
>> Changes since v4:
>> * add LSM hook abstraction called Landlock event
>> * use the compiler type checking to verify hooks use by an event
>> * handle all filesystem related LSM hooks (e.g. file_permission,
>> mmap_file, sb_mount...)
>> * register BPF programs for Landlock just after LSM hooks registration
>> * move hooks registration after other LSMs
>> * add failsafes to check if a hook is not used by the kernel
>> * allow partial raw value access form the context (needed for programs
>> generated by LLVM)
>>
>> Changes since v3:
>> * split commit
>> * add hooks dealing with struct inode and struct path pointers:
>> inode_permission and inode_getattr
>> * add abstraction over eBPF helper arguments thanks to wrapping structs
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
>> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
>> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
>> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
>> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
>> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
>> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
>> ---
>> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 +
>> security/landlock/Makefile | 4 +-
>> security/landlock/hooks.c | 115 +++++++++
>> security/landlock/hooks.h | 177 ++++++++++++++
>> security/landlock/hooks_fs.c | 563 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> security/landlock/hooks_fs.h | 19 ++
>> security/landlock/init.c | 13 +
>> security/security.c | 7 +-
>> 8 files changed, 901 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/hooks.c
>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/hooks.h
>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/hooks_fs.c
>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/hooks_fs.h
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>> index e29d4c62a3c8..884289166a0e 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>> @@ -1920,5 +1920,10 @@ void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void);
>> #else
>> static inline void loadpin_add_hooks(void) { };
>> #endif
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK
>> +extern void __init landlock_add_hooks(void);
>> +#else
>> +static inline void __init landlock_add_hooks(void) { }
>> +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK */
>>
>> #endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
>> diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile
>> index 7205f9a7a2ee..c0db504a6335 100644
>> --- a/security/landlock/Makefile
>> +++ b/security/landlock/Makefile
>> @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
>> +ccflags-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) += -Werror=unused-function
>
> Why is this needed? If it can't be avoided, a comment should exist
> here explaining why.
This is useful to catch defined but unused hooks: error out if a
HOOK_NEW_FS(foo) is not used with a HOOK_INIT_FS(foo) in the struct
security_hook_list landlock_hooks.
>
>> [...]
>> @@ -127,3 +132,11 @@ static struct bpf_prog_type_list bpf_landlock_type __ro_after_init = {
>> .ops = &bpf_landlock_ops,
>> .type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LANDLOCK,
>> };
>> +
>> +void __init landlock_add_hooks(void)
>> +{
>> + pr_info("landlock: Version %u", LANDLOCK_VERSION);
>> + landlock_add_hooks_fs();
>> + security_add_hooks(NULL, 0, "landlock");
>> + bpf_register_prog_type(&bpf_landlock_type);
>
> I'm confused by the separation of hook registration here. The call to
> security_add_hooks is with count=0 is especially weird. Why isn't this
> just a single call with security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks,
> ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks), "landlock")?
Yes, this is ugly with the new security_add_hooks() with three arguments
but I wanted to split the hooks definition in multiple files.
The current security_add_hooks() use lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) which
is not exported. Unfortunately, calling multiple security_add_hooks()
with the same LSM name would register multiple names for the same LSM…
Is it OK if I modify this function to not add duplicated entries?
>
>> +}
>> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
>> index d0e07f269b2d..a3e9f4625991 100644
>> --- a/security/security.c
>> +++ b/security/security.c
>> @@ -64,10 +64,15 @@ int __init security_init(void)
>> loadpin_add_hooks();
>>
>> /*
>> - * Load all the remaining security modules.
>> + * Load all remaining privileged security modules.
>> */
>> do_security_initcalls();
>>
>> + /*
>> + * Load potentially-unprivileged security modules at the end.
>> + */
>> + landlock_add_hooks();
>
> Oh, is this to make it last in the list? Is there a reason it has to be last?
Right, this is the intend. I'm not sure it is the only way to register
hooks, though.
For an unprivileged access-control, we don't want to give the ability to
any process to do some checks, through an eBPF program, on kernel
objects (e.g. files) if they should not be accessible (because of a
following LSM hook check).
Mickaël
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-04-18 22:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-03-28 23:46 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 00/11] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing Mickaël Salaün
2017-03-28 23:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 01/11] bpf: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier Mickaël Salaün
2017-03-29 13:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " kbuild test robot
2017-04-18 21:48 ` Kees Cook
2017-03-28 23:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 02/11] bpf,landlock: Define an eBPF program type for Landlock Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-16 21:57 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-18 21:58 ` Kees Cook
2017-03-28 23:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 03/11] bpf: Define handle_fs and add a new helper bpf_handle_fs_get_mode() Mickaël Salaün
2017-03-28 23:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 04/11] landlock: Add LSM hooks related to filesystem Mickaël Salaün
2017-03-29 15:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " kbuild test robot
2017-04-18 22:17 ` Kees Cook
2017-04-18 22:44 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2017-04-18 23:16 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-04-18 23:40 ` Kees Cook
2017-04-19 22:03 ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-19 23:58 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-04-20 1:48 ` Kees Cook
2017-04-18 23:39 ` Kees Cook
2017-03-28 23:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 05/11] seccomp: Split put_seccomp_filter() with put_seccomp() Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-18 22:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-04-18 22:47 ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-19 22:18 ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-20 1:54 ` Kees Cook
2017-03-28 23:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 06/11] seccomp,landlock: Handle Landlock events per process hierarchy Mickaël Salaün
2017-03-29 10:35 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-03-31 21:15 ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-18 22:54 ` Kees Cook
2017-04-18 22:53 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-04-18 23:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-18 23:48 ` Kees Cook
2017-03-28 23:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 07/11] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-10 6:48 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-04-11 7:19 ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-03-28 23:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 08/11] bpf: Add a Landlock sandbox example Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-18 23:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-04-18 23:35 ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-03-28 23:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 09/11] seccomp: Enhance test_harness with an assert step mechanism Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-19 0:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-04-19 21:51 ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-19 22:02 ` Kees Cook
2017-04-19 22:05 ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-20 1:50 ` Kees Cook
2017-03-28 23:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 10/11] bpf,landlock: Add tests for Landlock Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-18 23:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-04-18 23:53 ` Mickaël Salaün
2017-04-18 23:59 ` Kees Cook
2017-03-28 23:46 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v6 11/11] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation " Mickaël Salaün
2017-03-29 15:58 ` [kernel-hardening] " kbuild test robot
2017-04-18 23:26 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH net-next v6 00/11] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing Kees Cook
2017-04-19 0:12 ` Mickaël Salaün
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