kernel-hardening.lists.openwall.com archive mirror

 messages from 2013-04-26 19:03:19 to 2013-10-09 22:42:32 UTC [more...]

[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK
 2013-10-09 22:42 UTC  (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "

[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 0/7] Kernel base address randomization
 2013-10-09 18:06 UTC  (31+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/7] x86, kaslr: move CPU flags out of cpucheck
  ` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/7] x86, kaslr: return location from decompress_kernel
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/7] x86, kaslr: find minimum safe relocation position
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/7] x86, kaslr: select random base offset
  ` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 5/7] x86, kaslr: select memory region from e820 maps
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 6/7] x86, kaslr: report kernel offset on panic
  ` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 7/7] x86, kaslr: raise max positions to 1GiB on x86_64
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v6 0/7] Kernel base address randomization

[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred
 2013-10-09 17:27 UTC  (67+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 1/9] procfs: add proc_same_open_cred() to check if the cred have changed
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task
  ` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 3/9] procfs: Document the proposed solution to protect procfs entries
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 4/9] procfs: make /proc/*/{stack,syscall} 0400
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 5/9] procfs: make /proc entries that use seq files able to access file->f_cred
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 6/9] procfs: add permission checks on the file's opener of /proc/*/stat
  ` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 7/9] procfs: add permission checks on the file's opener of /proc/*/personality
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 8/9] procfs: improve permission checks on /proc/*/stack
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 9/9] procfs: improve permission checks on /proc/*/syscall
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred

[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK
 2013-10-09 14:57 UTC  (9+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "

[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] procfs: restore 0400 permissions on /proc/*/{syscall,stack,personality}
 2013-10-04  0:53 UTC  (23+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] procfs: restore 0400 permissions on /proc/*/pagemap
  ` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] procfs: restore 0400 permissions on /proc/*/{syscall,stack,personality}

[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 0/7] Kernel base address randomization on x86
 2013-10-03 22:46 UTC  (11+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/7] x86, boot: move CPU flags out of cpucheck
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/7] x86, kaslr: return location from decompress_kernel
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/7] x86, kaslr: find minimum safe relocation position
  ` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/7] x86, kaslr: select random base offset
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 5/7] x86, kaslr: select memory region from e820 maps
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 6/7] x86, kaslr: report kernel offset on panic
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 7/7] x86, kaslr: raise max positions to 1GiB on x86_64

[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/12] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred
 2013-10-02 19:52 UTC  (24+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 01/12] procfs: add proc_same_open_cred() to check if the cred have changed
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 02/12] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 03/12] procfs: Document the proposed solution to protect procfs entries
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 04/12] seq_file: Make seq_file able to access the file's opener cred
  ` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 05/12] seq_file: set the seq_file->f_cred during seq_open()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 06/12] procfs: make /proc/*/stack 0400
  ` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 07/12] procfs: add permission checks on the file's opener of /proc/*/stack
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 08/12] procfs: add permission checks on the file's opener of /proc/*/personality
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 09/12] procfs: add permission checks on the file's opener of /proc/*/stat
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 10/12] procfs: move PROC_BLOCK_SIZE declaration up to make it visible
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 11/12] procfs: improve permission checks on /proc/*/syscall
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 12/12] user_ns: seq_file: use the user_ns that is embedded in the f_cred struct

[kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC] KPortReserve : kernel version of portreserve utility
 2013-08-11  2:50 UTC  (4+ messages)

[kernel-hardening] [ANNOUNCE] Linux Security Summit 2013 - CFP
 2013-06-12 16:45 UTC  (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "

[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 0/6] kernel ASLR
 2013-04-29 19:15 UTC  (22+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/6] x86: kaslr: move ELF relocation handling to C
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/6] x86: kaslr: move CPU flags out of cpucheck
  ` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/6] x86: kaslr: return location from decompress_kernel
  ` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] x86: kaslr: select random base offset
  ` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 5/6] x86: kaslr: select memory region from e820 maps
  ` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 6/6] x86: kaslr: report kernel offset on panic
  ` [kernel-hardening] "