kernel-hardening.lists.openwall.com archive mirror

 messages from 2013-10-09 22:33:50 to 2015-11-25 23:31:22 UTC [more...]

[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 0/4] introduce post-init read-only memory
 2015-11-25 23:31 UTC 

[kernel-hardening] On techniques for preventing commit_creds() user-space abuse
 2015-11-25 23:14 UTC 

[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/2] introduce post-init read-only memory
 2015-11-25 23:05 UTC  (16+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] x86: "
  ` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] x86, vdso: mark vDSO read-only after init

[kernel-hardening] System call interface changes
 2015-11-24 22:33 UTC  (8+ messages)

[kernel-hardening] status: PAX_REFCOUNT
 2015-11-24 21:47 UTC  (6+ messages)

[kernel-hardening] status: GRKERNSEC_BRUTE
 2015-11-24 19:19 UTC 

[kernel-hardening] status: PAX_USERCOPY
 2015-11-24 19:11 UTC 

[kernel-hardening] status: GRKERNSEC_KSTACKOVERFLOW
 2015-11-24 19:10 UTC 

[kernel-hardening] Re: GCC upstream contacts for Linux kernel bugs
 2015-11-20 17:18 UTC  (3+ messages)

[kernel-hardening] Fwd: [Bug lto/61313] configure incorrectly strips $target_alias from PLUGIN_LD_SUFFIX
 2015-11-19 18:08 UTC  (2+ messages)

[kernel-hardening]
 2015-11-17 17:30 UTC  (16+ messages)

[kernel-hardening] What ever happened to the kernel UBSan work?
 2015-11-17  7:48 UTC 

[kernel-hardening] Kernel Self Protection Project
 2015-11-13  8:55 UTC  (31+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
              ` [kernel-hardening] Binary blobs

[kernel-hardening] Proposal for kernel self protection features
 2015-11-13  2:08 UTC  (42+ messages)
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[kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] video: constify geode ops structures
 2015-11-10 15:44 UTC  (16+ messages)

[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/3] fix LIST_POISON{1,2} offset
 2015-07-26 18:42 UTC  (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/3] use POISON_POINTER_DELTA for poison pointers
  ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/3] remove not-used poison pointer macros
  ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 2/3] use POISON_POINTER_DELTA for poison pointers

[kernel-hardening] [RFC] pointer poisoning macro
 2015-06-06 12:46 UTC  (2+ messages)
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[kernel-hardening] Linux kernel pointer poisoning (was: CVE request for a fixed bug existed in all versions of linux kernel from KeenTeam)
 2015-05-07  9:37 UTC  (2+ messages)
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[kernel-hardening] [patch] lib: check for strcpy() overflows to fixed length buffers
 2014-05-06 12:41 UTC  (10+ messages)
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[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 0/7] Kernel base address randomization on x86
 2014-01-29 16:57 UTC  (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/7] x86, boot: move CPU flags out of cpucheck
  ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] x86, boot: fix word-size assumptions in has_eflag() inline asm
    ` [kernel-hardening] "

[kernel-hardening] [Resend] [PATCH 0/2] procfs: make /proc/*/{stack,syscall,pagemap} 0400
 2013-12-17  1:52 UTC  (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] procfs: make /proc/*/{stack,syscall,personality} 0400
  ` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] procfs: make /proc/*/pagemap 0400
  ` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [Resend] [PATCH 0/2] procfs: make /proc/*/{stack,syscall,pagemap} 0400

[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK
 2013-10-15 20:51 UTC  (3+ messages)
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[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK
 2013-10-14 20:41 UTC  (22+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
            ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3a] "
              ` [kernel-hardening] "

[kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task
 2013-10-13 10:18 UTC  (11+ messages)

[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v8 0/6] Kernel base address randomization
 2013-10-11  0:18 UTC  (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v8 1/6] x86, boot: move CPU flags out of cpucheck
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v8 2/6] x86, kaslr: return location from decompress_kernel
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v8 3/6] x86, kaslr: provide randomness functions
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v8 4/6] x86, kaslr: select random position from e820 maps
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v8 5/6] x86, kaslr: report kernel offset on panic
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v8 6/6] x86, kaslr: raise max positions to 1GiB on x86_64