messages from 2016-05-19 20:20:07 to 2016-06-16 18:37:07 UTC [more...]
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core)
2016-06-16 18:37 UTC (34+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 01/13] x86/mm/hotplug: Don't remove PGD entries in remove_pagetable()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 02/13] x86/cpa: In populate_pgd, don't set the pgd entry until it's populated
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 03/13] x86/cpa: Warn if kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd is used inappropriately
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 04/13] mm: Track NR_KERNEL_STACK in pages instead of number of stacks
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 05/13] mm: Move memcg stack accounting to account_kernel_stack
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 06/13] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 07/13] x86/die: Don't try to recover from an OOPS on a non-default stack
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 08/13] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 09/13] x86/dumpstack: When dumping stack bytes due to OOPS, start with regs->sp
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 10/13] x86/dumpstack: Try harder to get a call trace on stack overflow
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 11/13] x86/dumpstack/64: Handle faults when printing the "Stack:" part of an OOPS
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 12/13] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 13/13] x86/mm: Improve stack-overflow #PF handling
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core)
[kernel-hardening] Initialising random(4)
2016-06-16 17:46 UTC (4+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH v2 0/4] mm: Hardened usercopy
2016-06-16 1:38 UTC (19+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 1/4] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 2/4] usercopy: avoid direct copying to userspace
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 3/4] usercopy: whitelist user-copyable caches
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 4/4] usercopy: provide split of user-controlled slabs
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH v2 5/4] arm: fixes for usercopy
` [kernel-hardening] RE: [RFC][PATCH v2 0/4] mm: Hardened usercopy
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 6/4] mm: disallow user copy to/from separately allocated pages
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH v2 "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 0/4] Introduce the latent_entropy gcc plugin
2016-06-15 23:10 UTC (12+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 1/4] Add support for passing gcc plugin arguments
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 2/4] Add the latent_entropy gcc plugin
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 3/4] Mark functions with the latent_entropy attribute
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 4/4] Add the extra_latent_entropy kernel parameter
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 0/4] Introduce the latent_entropy gcc plugin
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v9 0/4] Introduce GCC plugin infrastructure
2016-06-15 22:41 UTC (17+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v9 1/4] Shared library support
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v9 2/4] GCC plugin infrastructure
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v9 3/4] Add Cyclomatic complexity GCC plugin
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v9 4/4] Add sancov plugin
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 0/4] Introduce GCC plugin infrastructure
[kernel-hardening] Playing with virtually mapped stacks (with guard pages!)
2016-06-15 17:49 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 0/3] Introduce the latent_entropy gcc plugin
2016-06-14 22:31 UTC (21+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 1/3] Add "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 2/3] Mark functions with the latent_entropy attribute
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 3/3] Add the extra_latent_entropy kernel parameter
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2 0/3] Introduce the latent_entropy gcc plugin
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] gcc-plugins: disable under COMPILE_TEST
2016-06-14 2:01 UTC (11+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
` "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC 0/3] Add struct randomization plugin
2016-06-13 20:34 UTC (10+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC 3/3] Change initialization C99 style; tag no_ramdomize_layout structs
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] Re: linux-next: Tree for Jun 9
2016-06-11 1:05 UTC (3+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/5] lkdtm: add usercopy and rodata, fix atomic
2016-06-10 1:14 UTC (13+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/5] lkdtm: split build into multiple source files
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/5] lkdtm: clean up after rename
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/5] lkdtm: add function for testing .rodata section
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/5] lkdtm: add usercopy tests
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 5/5] lkdtm: split atomic test into over and underflow
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/2] Document and extend kernel.perf_event_paranoid
2016-06-04 20:56 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] security,perf: Allow further restriction of perf_event_open
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/2] expand use of __ro_after_init
2016-06-03 22:01 UTC (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] x86: apply more __ro_after_init and const
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] arm: apply more __ro_after_init
[kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v1 1/3] Add the latent_entropy gcc plugin
2016-05-31 17:25 UTC (6+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v1 0/3] Introduce the latent_entropy gcc plugin
2016-05-30 22:39 UTC (14+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v1 1/3] Add "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v1 2/3] Mark functions with the latent_entropy attribute
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v1 3/3] Add the extra_latent_entropy kernel parameter
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v1 0/2] mm: SLUB Freelist randomization
2016-05-26 20:37 UTC (3+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v1 1/2] mm: Reorganize SLAB freelist randomization
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v1 2/2] mm: SLUB Freelist randomization
[kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 0/2] mm: SLUB Freelist randomization
2016-05-26 18:50 UTC (9+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 1/2] mm: Reorganize SLAB freelist randomization
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 2/2] mm: SLUB Freelist randomization
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] BPF JIT spray attack - proof of concept code for modern kernel
2016-05-24 7:21 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 0/2] mm: SLUB Freelist randomization
2016-05-24 5:17 UTC (11+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 2/2] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] doc: self-protection: provide initial details
2016-05-23 9:29 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC v1 00/17] seccomp-object: From attack surface reduction to sandboxing
2016-05-22 21:30 UTC (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] Choosing CCs for discussions
2016-05-20 22:49 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] Subject: [RFC PATCH] mm: Hardened usercopy
2016-05-20 18:22 UTC (2+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v8 0/4] Introduce GCC plugin infrastructure
2016-05-20 10:10 UTC (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v8 2/4] "
page: next (older) | prev (newer) | latest
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).