messages from 2016-06-24 15:36:18 to 2016-07-07 22:24:36 UTC [more...]
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 0/9] x86/mm: memory area address KASLR
2016-07-07 22:24 UTC (16+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] devicetree random-seed properties, was: "Re: [PATCH v7 0/9] x86/mm: memory area address KASLR"
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v7 0/9] x86/mm: memory area address KASLR
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/9] mm: Hardened usercopy
2016-07-07 19:34 UTC (27+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/9] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/9] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/9] ARM: uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/9] arm64/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 5/9] ia64/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 6/9] powerpc/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 7/9] sparc/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 8/9] mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 9/9] mm: SLUB "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 0/9] mm: Hardened usercopy
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] powerpc/kernel: Disable the latent entropy plugin unconditionally
2016-07-06 18:57 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] Add support for complex gcc plugins that don't fit in a single file
2016-07-06 18:56 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] Automate make rule generation for gcc plugin objects
2016-07-06 18:55 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] Looking for something to WORK ON
2016-07-06 17:35 UTC (3+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 0/3] Introduce the initify gcc plugin
2016-07-06 16:45 UTC (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 1/3] Add "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 2/3] Mark functions with the __nocapture attribute
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 3/3] Constify some function parameters
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 00/29] virtually mapped stacks and thread_info cleanup
2016-07-06 13:20 UTC (79+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 01/29] bluetooth: Switch SMP to crypto_cipher_encrypt_one()
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 02/29] rxrpc: Avoid using stack memory in SG lists in rxkad
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 03/29] x86/mm/hotplug: Don't remove PGD entries in remove_pagetable()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 04/29] x86/cpa: In populate_pgd, don't set the pgd entry until it's populated
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 05/29] x86/mm: Remove kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd() and efi_cleanup_page_tables()
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 06/29] mm: Track NR_KERNEL_STACK in KiB instead of number of stacks
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 07/29] mm: Fix memcg stack accounting for sub-page stacks
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 08/29] dma-api: Teach the "DMA-from-stack" check about vmapped stacks
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 09/29] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 10/29] x86/die: Don't try to recover from an OOPS on a non-default stack
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 11/29] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 12/29] x86/dumpstack: When dumping stack bytes due to OOPS, start with regs->sp
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 13/29] x86/dumpstack: Try harder to get a call trace on stack overflow
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 14/29] x86/dumpstack/64: Handle faults when printing the "Stack:" part of an OOPS
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 15/29] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 16/29] x86/mm: Improve stack-overflow #PF handling
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 17/29] x86: Move uaccess_err and sig_on_uaccess_err to thread_struct
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 18/29] x86: Move addr_limit "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 19/29] signal: Consolidate {TS,TLF}_RESTORE_SIGMASK code
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 20/29] x86/smp: Remove stack_smp_processor_id()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 21/29] x86/smp: Remove unnecessary initialization of thread_info::cpu
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 22/29] x86/asm: Move 'status' from struct thread_info to struct thread_struct
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 23/29] kdb: Use task_cpu() instead of task_thread_info()->cpu
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 24/29] x86/entry: Get rid of pt_regs_to_thread_info()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 25/29] um: Stop conflating task_struct::stack with thread_info
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 26/29] sched: Allow putting thread_info into task_struct
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 27/29] x86: Move "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 28/29] sched: Free the stack early if CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 29/29] fork: Cache two thread stacks per cpu if CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is set
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 02/29] rxrpc: Avoid using stack memory in SG lists in rxkad
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 00/29] virtually mapped stacks and thread_info cleanup
[kernel-hardening] usercopy - goood news and bad news
2016-07-01 19:54 UTC (2+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v1 0/2] Introduce the initify gcc plugin
2016-07-01 14:03 UTC (32+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v1 1/2] Add "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v1 2/2] Mark functions with the __nocapture attribute
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] Introduce the initify gcc plugin
[kernel-hardening] Usercopy caught another one - ping IPv6
2016-06-28 16:31 UTC (3+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core)
2016-06-27 10:36 UTC (36+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 00/16] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core)
2016-06-26 16:59 UTC (10+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 11/16] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 13/16] x86/dumpstack: Try harder to get a call trace on stack overflow
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 14/16] x86/dumpstack/64: Handle faults when printing the "Stack:" part of an OOPS
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC] reference count hardening via kref: another attempt
2016-06-26 4:07 UTC (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC] kref: pin objects with dangerously high reference count
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC] reference count hardening via kref: another attempt
[kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH v2 0/4] mm: Hardened usercopy
2016-06-24 20:59 UTC (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 6/4] mm: disallow user copy to/from separately allocated pages
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH v2 "
` [kernel-hardening] "
page: next (older) | prev (newer) | latest
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).