messages from 2016-07-06 18:57:08 to 2016-07-19 22:40:46 UTC [more...]
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 00/11] mm: Hardened usercopy
2016-07-19 22:40 UTC (24+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 01/11] mm: Implement stack frame object validation
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] mm: Add is_migrate_cma_page
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 03/11] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 04/11] ARM: uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 05/11] arm64/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 06/11] ia64/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 07/11] powerpc/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 08/11] sparc/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 09/11] s390/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 10/11] mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 11/11] mm: SLUB "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 00/11] mm: Hardened usercopy
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 0/11] mm: Hardened usercopy
2016-07-15 19:23 UTC (32+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 01/11] mm: Implement stack frame object validation
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 03/11] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 04/11] ARM: uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 05/11] arm64/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 06/11] ia64/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 07/11] powerpc/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 08/11] sparc/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 09/11] s390/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 10/11] mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 11/11] mm: SLUB "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 00/32] virtually mapped stacks and thread_info cleanup
2016-07-14 20:41 UTC (49+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 01/32] bluetooth: Switch SMP to crypto_cipher_encrypt_one()
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 02/32] x86/mm/hotplug: Don't remove PGD entries in remove_pagetable()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 03/32] x86/cpa: In populate_pgd, don't set the pgd entry until it's populated
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 04/32] x86/mm: Remove kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd() and efi_cleanup_page_tables()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 05/32] mm: Track NR_KERNEL_STACK in KiB instead of number of stacks
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 06/32] mm: Fix memcg stack accounting for sub-page stacks
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 07/32] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 08/32] dma-api: Teach the "DMA-from-stack" check about vmapped stacks
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 09/32] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 10/32] x86/dumpstack: Honor supplied @regs arg
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 11/32] x86/dumpstack: Try harder to get a call trace on stack overflow
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 12/32] x86/dumpstack/64: Handle faults when printing the "Stack:" part of an OOPS
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 13/32] x86/mm/64: In vmalloc_fault(), use CR3 instead of current->active_mm
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 14/32] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 15/32] x86/mm: Improve stack-overflow #PF handling
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 16/32] x86: Move uaccess_err and sig_on_uaccess_err to thread_struct
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 17/32] x86: Move addr_limit "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 18/32] signal: Consolidate {TS,TLF}_RESTORE_SIGMASK code
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 19/32] x86/smp: Remove stack_smp_processor_id()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 20/32] x86/smp: Remove unnecessary initialization of thread_info::cpu
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 21/32] x86/asm: Move 'status' from struct thread_info to struct thread_struct
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 22/32] kdb: Use task_cpu() instead of task_thread_info()->cpu
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 23/32] printk: When dumping regs, show the stack, not thread_info
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 24/32] x86/entry: Get rid of pt_regs_to_thread_info()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 25/32] um: Stop conflating task_struct::stack with thread_info
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 26/32] sched: Allow putting thread_info into task_struct
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 27/32] x86: Move "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 28/32] sched: Add try_get_task_stack() and put_task_stack()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 29/32] kthread: to_live_kthread() needs try_get_task_stack()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 30/32] x86/dumpstack: Pin the target stack in save_stack_trace_tsk()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 31/32] sched: Free the stack early if CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 32/32] fork: Cache two thread stacks per cpu if CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is set
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v5 00/32] virtually mapped stacks and thread_info cleanup
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 0/3] Introduce the initify gcc plugin
2016-07-13 21:26 UTC (15+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 1/3] Add "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 2/3] Mark functions with the __nocapture attribute
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] Looking for something to WORK ON
2016-07-13 9:02 UTC (15+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] Availability of gcc plugin headers on Debian and Ubuntu
2016-07-12 23:38 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH v2 0/4] mm: Hardened usercopy
2016-07-12 23:04 UTC (3+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 1/4] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/9] mm: Hardened usercopy
2016-07-12 18:44 UTC (49+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/9] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/9] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/9] ARM: uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/9] arm64/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 5/9] ia64/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 6/9] powerpc/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 7/9] sparc/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 8/9] mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 9/9] mm: SLUB "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 0/9] mm: Hardened usercopy
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core)
2016-07-11 17:00 UTC (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 06/13] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 00/29] virtually mapped stacks and thread_info cleanup
2016-07-11 16:42 UTC (8+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 26/29] sched: Allow putting thread_info into task_struct
[kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 9/9] mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support
2016-07-11 6:08 UTC (10+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 0/9] x86/mm: memory area address KASLR
2016-07-07 22:24 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] powerpc/kernel: Disable the latent entropy plugin unconditionally
2016-07-06 18:57 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
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