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 messages from 2016-07-11 20:53:49 to 2016-07-27 14:45:46 UTC [more...]

[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further restriction of perf_event_open
 2016-07-27 14:45 UTC 

[kernel-hardening] [RFC patch 1/6] random: Simplify API for random address requests
 2016-07-27 13:51 UTC  (15+ messages)
  ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC patch 2/6] x86: Use simpler "
  ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC patch 3/6] ARM: "
  ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC patch 4/6] arm64: "
  ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC patch 5/6] tile: "
  ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC patch 6/6] unicore32: "
  ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC patch 1/6] random: Simplify "
    ` [kernel-hardening] "

[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 0/7] Introduce the initify gcc plugin
 2016-07-27  2:27 UTC  (13+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 1/7] Move type casts into is_kernel_rodata
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 2/7] Split up struct warn_args
  ` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 3/7] Constify some function parameters
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 4/7] Add the initify gcc plugin
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 5/7] Mark functions with the __nocapture attribute
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 6/7] Mark a few functions with the printf attribute
  ` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 7/7] Mark functions with the __unverified_nocapture attribute

[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] [RFC] Introduce mmap randomization
 2016-07-26 23:51 UTC  (14+ messages)
  ` [kernel-hardening] "
    ` [kernel-hardening] "

[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 00/11] mm: Hardened usercopy
 2016-07-26  4:46 UTC  (39+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 01/11] mm: Implement stack frame object validation
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy
  ` [kernel-hardening] "
      ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] mm: Add is_migrate_cma_page
        ` [kernel-hardening] "
        ` [kernel-hardening] RE: [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 03/11] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 04/11] ARM: uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 05/11] arm64/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 06/11] ia64/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 07/11] powerpc/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 08/11] sparc/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 09/11] s390/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 10/11] mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 11/11] mm: SLUB "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 00/11] mm: Hardened usercopy
` [kernel-hardening] "

[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 00/12] mm: Hardened usercopy
 2016-07-26  0:54 UTC  (21+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 01/12] mm: Add is_migrate_cma_page
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 02/12] mm: Implement stack frame object validation
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 03/12] mm: Hardened usercopy
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 04/12] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 05/12] ARM: uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 06/12] arm64/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 07/12] ia64/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 08/12] powerpc/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 09/12] sparc/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 10/12] s390/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 11/12] mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 12/12] mm: SLUB "
  ` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 00/12] mm: Hardened usercopy

[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 00/32] virtually mapped stacks and thread_info cleanup
 2016-07-23 14:58 UTC  (47+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 01/32] bluetooth: Switch SMP to crypto_cipher_encrypt_one()
  ` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 03/32] x86/cpa: In populate_pgd, don't set the pgd entry until it's populated
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 13/32] x86/mm/64: In vmalloc_fault(), use CR3 instead of current->active_mm
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 14/32] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks
  ` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 16/32] x86: Move uaccess_err and sig_on_uaccess_err to thread_struct
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 17/32] x86: Move addr_limit "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 18/32] signal: Consolidate {TS,TLF}_RESTORE_SIGMASK code
  ` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 19/32] x86/smp: Remove stack_smp_processor_id()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 20/32] x86/smp: Remove unnecessary initialization of thread_info::cpu
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 21/32] x86/asm: Move 'status' from struct thread_info to struct thread_struct
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 22/32] kdb: Use task_cpu() instead of task_thread_info()->cpu
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 23/32] printk: When dumping regs, show the stack, not thread_info
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 24/32] x86/entry: Get rid of pt_regs_to_thread_info()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 25/32] um: Stop conflating task_struct::stack with thread_info
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 26/32] sched: Allow putting thread_info into task_struct
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 27/32] x86: Move "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 28/32] sched: Add try_get_task_stack() and put_task_stack()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 29/32] kthread: to_live_kthread() needs try_get_task_stack()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 30/32] x86/dumpstack: Pin the target stack in save_stack_trace_tsk()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 31/32] sched: Free the stack early if CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 32/32] fork: Cache two thread stacks per cpu if CONFIG_VMAP_STACK is set
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v5 00/32] virtually mapped stacks and thread_info cleanup

[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 0/11] mm: Hardened usercopy
 2016-07-15 19:23 UTC  (32+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 01/11] mm: Implement stack frame object validation
  ` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy
  ` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 03/11] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 04/11] ARM: uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 05/11] arm64/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 06/11] ia64/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 07/11] powerpc/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 08/11] sparc/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 09/11] s390/uaccess: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 10/11] mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 11/11] mm: SLUB "
  ` [kernel-hardening] "

[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 0/3] Introduce the initify gcc plugin
 2016-07-13 21:26 UTC  (15+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 1/3] Add "
  ` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 2/3] Mark functions with the __nocapture attribute
  ` [kernel-hardening] "

[kernel-hardening] Looking for something to WORK ON
 2016-07-13  9:02 UTC  (10+ messages)

[kernel-hardening] Availability of gcc plugin headers on Debian and Ubuntu
 2016-07-12 23:38 UTC  (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "

[kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH v2 0/4] mm: Hardened usercopy
 2016-07-12 23:04 UTC  (3+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 1/4] "
  ` [kernel-hardening] "

[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/9] mm: Hardened usercopy
 2016-07-12 18:44 UTC  (3+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "


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