messages from 2016-10-12 08:27:26 to 2016-10-26 20:16:00 UTC [more...]
[kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 00/18] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing
2016-10-26 20:16 UTC (27+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 01/18] landlock: Add Kconfig
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 02/18] bpf: Move u64_to_ptr() to BPF headers and inline it
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 03/18] bpf,landlock: Add a new arraymap type to deal with (Landlock) handles
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 04/18] bpf,landlock: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 05/18] bpf,landlock: Define an eBPF program type for Landlock
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 06/18] fs: Constify path_is_under()'s arguments
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 07/18] landlock: Add LSM hooks
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 08/18] landlock: Handle file comparisons
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 09/18] landlock: Add manager functions
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 10/18] seccomp: Split put_seccomp_filter() with put_seccomp()
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 11/18] seccomp,landlock: Handle Landlock hooks per process hierarchy
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 12/18] bpf: Cosmetic change for bpf_prog_attach()
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 13/18] bpf/cgroup: Replace struct bpf_prog with struct bpf_object
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 14/18] bpf/cgroup: Make cgroup_bpf_update() return an error code
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 15/18] bpf/cgroup: Move capability check
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 16/18] bpf/cgroup,landlock: Handle Landlock hooks per cgroup
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 17/18] landlock: Add update and debug access flags
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 18/18] samples/landlock: Add sandbox example
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v4 00/18] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing
[kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 00/13] HARDENED_ATOMIC
2016-10-26 20:07 UTC (46+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 01/13] Add architecture independent hardened atomic base
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 02/13] percpu-refcount: leave atomic counter unprotected
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 03/13] kernel: identify wrapping atomic usage
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 04/13] mm: "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 05/13] fs: "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 06/13] net: "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 07/13] net: atm: "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 08/13] security: "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 09/13] drivers: identify wrapping atomic usage (part 1/2)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 10/13] drivers: identify wrapping atomic usage (part 2/2)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 11/13] x86: identify wrapping atomic usage
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 12/13] x86: implementation for HARDENED_ATOMIC
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 13/13] lkdtm: add tests for atomic over-/underflow
[kernel-hardening] Breaking Kernel ASLR by using Intel TSX
2016-10-26 14:47 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [RFC 0/2] arm: implementation of HARDENED_ATOMIC
2016-10-26 8:20 UTC (19+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC 1/2] Reordering / guard definition on atomic_*_wrap function in order to avoid implicitly defined / redefined error on them, when CONFIG_HARDENED_ATOMIC is unset
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC 2/2] arm: implementation for HARDENED_ATOMIC
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC 0/2] arm: implementation of HARDENED_ATOMIC
[kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 13.1/13] lkdtm: add tests for atomic over-/underflow
2016-10-26 7:29 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] fix typo __atomic_op_fence
2016-10-26 7:01 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] module: extend 'rodata=off' boot cmdline parameter to module mappings
2016-10-26 4:43 UTC (5+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] Re: [kees:kspp/hardened-atomic 3/14] kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:299:2: error: unknown type name 'local_wrap_t'
2016-10-25 22:21 UTC (2+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] Use-after-free and management of reference counts
2016-10-24 22:16 UTC (12+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] HARDENED_ATOMIC benchmarks
2016-10-24 21:12 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] Add the randstruct gcc plugin
2016-10-21 17:37 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2] module: extend 'rodata=off' boot cmdline parameter to module mappings
2016-10-21 1:13 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCHv3 0/4] WX checking for arm64
2016-10-20 13:01 UTC (8+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv3 1/4] arm64: dump: Make ptdump debugfs a separate option
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv3 2/4] arm64: dump: Make the page table dumping seq_file optional
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv3 3/4] arm64: dump: Remove max_addr
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv3 4/4] arm64: dump: Add checking for writable and exectuable pages
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 00/22] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing
2016-10-19 22:42 UTC (9+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 04/22] bpf: Set register type according to is_valid_access()
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 05/22] bpf,landlock: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v3 06/22] landlock: Add LSM hooks
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further restriction of perf_event_open
2016-10-19 15:39 UTC (12+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] self introduction
2016-10-18 21:21 UTC (24+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] lib: harden strncpy_from_user
2016-10-18 20:49 UTC (5+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [RFC] module: add 'module_ronx=off' boot cmdline parameter to disable ro/nx module mappings
2016-10-18 18:06 UTC (3+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] atomic64_wrap_t generic implementation
2016-10-18 8:35 UTC (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] include/asm-generic/atomic-long.h: Reordering atomic_*_wrap macros
2016-10-18 8:24 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 0/4] WX checking for arm64
2016-10-17 22:16 UTC (13+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 1/4] arm64: dump: Make ptdump debugfs a separate option
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 2/4] arm64: dump: Make the page table dumping seq_file optional
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 3/4] arm64: dump: Remove max_addr
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 4/4] arm64: dump: Add checking for writable and exectuable pages
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching
2016-10-16 2:04 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 00/13] HARDENING_ATOMIC feature
2016-10-13 14:31 UTC (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 01/13] Add architecture independent hardened atomic base
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] initcall randomization
2016-10-12 20:19 UTC (10+ messages)
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