messages from 2017-02-13 22:05:39 to 2017-02-22 01:26:28 UTC [more...]
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 00/10] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing
2017-02-22 1:26 UTC (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 01/10] bpf: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 02/10] bpf,landlock: Define an eBPF program type for Landlock
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 03/10] bpf: Define handle_fs and add a new helper bpf_handle_fs_get_mode()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 04/10] landlock: Add LSM hooks related to filesystem
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 05/10] seccomp: Split put_seccomp_filter() with put_seccomp()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 06/10] seccomp,landlock: Handle Landlock events per process hierarchy
[kernel-hardening] Merge in PAX_MEMORY_SANITIZE work from grsec to linux-next
2017-02-21 23:26 UTC (15+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 0/3] provide check for ro_after_init memory sections
2017-02-21 20:51 UTC (11+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 1/3] module: verify address is read-only
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 2/3] extable: "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 3/3] Make vmbus register arguments read-only
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC 1/7] arch: add __ro_mostly_after_init section marker
2017-02-21 20:38 UTC (20+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC 2/7] init: add set_ro_mostly_after_init_rw/ro function
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC 3/7] module: modify memory attrs for __ro_mostly_after_init during module_init/exit
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC 4/7] selinux: mark __ro_mostly_after_init for selinux_hooks/selinux_nf_ops
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC 5/7] cpu: mark ro_mostly_after_init for cpuhp_ap/bp_states
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC 6/7] arm64: add __map_kernel_segment to accept additional vm flags
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC 7/7] arm64: map seperately rodata sections for __ro_mostly_after_init section
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] gcc-plugins: fix spelling mistake: "unkown" -> "unknown"
2017-02-21 19:15 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] usercopy: Don't test 64-bit get/put_user() on 32-bit powerpc
2017-02-21 19:13 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] usercopy: Add tests for all get_user() sizes
2017-02-21 19:09 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/7] introduce __ro_mostly_after_init section marker
2017-02-21 10:54 UTC (6+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 1/4] x86/mm: Adapt MODULES_END based on Fixmap section size
2017-02-21 10:28 UTC (21+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 2/4] x86: Remap GDT tables in the Fixmap section
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 3/4] x86: Make the GDT remapping read-only on 64-bit
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 4/4] KVM: VMX: Simplify segment_base
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 1/4] x86/mm: Adapt MODULES_END based on Fixmap section size
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 0/4] Introduce the initify gcc plugin
2017-02-20 21:42 UTC (12+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCHv3 0/2] Hardening configs refactor/rename
2017-02-20 7:21 UTC (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv3 2/2] arch: Rename CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and CONFIG_DEBUG_MODULE_RONX
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] Make vmbus register arguments read-only (fwd)
2017-02-18 23:45 UTC (2+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 1/4] x86/mm: Adapt MODULES_END based on Fixmap section size
2017-02-17 20:52 UTC (8+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 2/4] x86: Remap GDT tables in the Fixmap section
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 3/4] x86: Make the GDT remapping read-only on 64-bit
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 4/4] KVM: VMX: Simplify segment_base
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 1/4] x86/mm: Adapt MODULES_END based on Fixmap section size
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 0/3] arm64: usercopy: Implement stack frame object validation
2017-02-17 18:09 UTC (8+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 1/3] usercopy: create enum stack_type
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 2/3] arm64: Add arch_within_stack_frames() for hardened usercopy
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 3/3] arm64/uaccess: Add hardened usercopy check for bad stack accesses
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 0/3] arm64: usercopy: Implement stack frame object validation
[kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 1/2] security: introduce CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
2017-02-17 17:29 UTC (11+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 2/2] security: mark LSM hooks as __ro_after_init
2017-02-17 16:29 UTC (3+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] Introduction + new project: "rootkit detection using virtualization"
2017-02-17 1:16 UTC (9+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 1/3] usercopy: create enum stack_type
2017-02-16 17:38 UTC (8+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 2/3] arm64: usercopy: Implement stack frame object validation
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 1/5] irq: set {msi_domain,syscore}_ops as __ro_after_init
2017-02-16 14:38 UTC (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 3/5] pci: set msi_domain_ops "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] ARM: uaccess: consistently check object sizes
2017-02-16 12:32 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/2] RFC: Adjust powerpc ASLR elf randomness
2017-02-16 4:49 UTC (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] powerpc: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] ARM: uaccess: fix zeroing of 64-bit get_user()
2017-02-16 0:36 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] checkpatch: add warning on %pk instead of %pK usage
2017-02-16 0:19 UTC (11+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2] usercopy: Add tests for all get_user() sizes
2017-02-16 0:07 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] usercopy: add testcases to check zeroing on failure of usercopy
2017-02-15 19:18 UTC (8+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] Format string gcc-plugin?
2017-02-15 17:31 UTC (3+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH] nfsd: add +1 to reference counting scheme for struct nfsd4_session
2017-02-15 16:45 UTC (11+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 0/3] arm64: eliminate early RWX mappings
2017-02-15 15:38 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 1/3] arm64: mmu: restrict permissions of early kernel mappings
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 2/3] arm64: boot: align __inittext with swapper block on relocatable kernels
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 3/3] arm64: efi: use effective text offset when allocating Image
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 0/2] procfs/tasks: introduce per-task procfs hidepid= field
2017-02-15 8:56 UTC (12+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 1/2] procfs: use an enum for possible hidepid values
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 2/2] procfs/tasks: add a simple per-task procfs hidepid= field
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 3/4] integrity: mark default IMA rules as __ro_after_init
2017-02-15 5:58 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC] [PATCH 0/2] provide check for ro_after_init memory sections
2017-02-15 5:56 UTC (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC] [PATCH 1/2] module: verify address is read-only
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC] [PATCH 2/2] extable: "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 0/5] arm64: mmu: avoid writeable-executable mappings
2017-02-14 20:52 UTC (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 1/5] arm: kvm: move kvm_vgic_global_state out of .text section
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 2/5] arm64: mmu: move TLB maintenance from callers to create_mapping_late()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 3/5] arm64: alternatives: apply boot time fixups via the linear mapping
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 4/5] arm64: mmu: map .text as read-only from the outset
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 5/5] arm64: mmu: apply strict permissions to .init.text and .init.data
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 0/5] arm64: mmu: avoid writeable-executable mappings
2017-02-14 17:54 UTC (13+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 2/5] arm64: mmu: move TLB maintenance from callers to create_mapping_late()
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 3/5] arm64: alternatives: apply boot time fixups via the linear mapping
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 4/5] arm64: mmu: map .text as read-only from the outset
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 5/5] arm64: mmu: apply strict permissions to .init.text and .init.data
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 0/2] security: mark LSM hooks with __ro_after_init
2017-02-14 17:21 UTC (2+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] cdrom: Make device operations read-only
2017-02-14 15:30 UTC (3+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 PATCH 2/2] security: mark LSM hooks as __ro_after_init
2017-02-14 13:24 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 1/4] security: mark LSM hooks as __ro_after_init
2017-02-14 12:59 UTC (9+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7] fork: free vmapped stacks in cache when cpus are offline
2017-02-14 12:40 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [RFC/PATCH 0/3] introduce Timgad LSM
2017-02-14 12:19 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC/PATCH 2/3] security: Add the Timgad module
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 2/4] security: mark nf ops in SELinux and Smack as __ro_after_init
2017-02-14 2:46 UTC (12+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC PATCH 2/4] security: mark nf ops inSELinux "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 4/4] selinux: constify nlmsg permission tables
2017-02-14 0:19 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
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