messages from 2017-05-22 18:58:35 to 2017-05-31 15:32:43 UTC [more...]
[kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v6 0/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN
2017-05-31 15:32 UTC (17+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] LSM: Convert security_hook_heads into explicit array of struct list_head
2017-05-31 15:14 UTC (21+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 0/3] Implement fast refcount overflow protection
2017-05-31 14:03 UTC (11+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 1/3] refcount: Create unchecked atomic_t implementation
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 2/3] x86/asm: Add suffix macro for GEN_*_RMWcc()
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 3/3] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount overflow protection
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v5 0/3] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC v3]mm: ro protection for data allocated dynamically
2017-05-31 13:55 UTC (19+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/1] Sealable memory support
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] LSM: Make security_hook_heads a local variable
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/1] Sealable memory support
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 0/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN
2017-05-31 4:10 UTC (27+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 1/2] security: tty: Add owner user namespace to tty_struct
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 next 0/3] modules: automatic module loading restrictions
2017-05-30 17:59 UTC (21+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 next 1/3] modules:capabilities: allow __request_module() to take a capability argument
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 next 2/3] modules:capabilities: automatic module loading restriction
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 00/20] Introduce struct layout randomization plugin
2017-05-30 10:34 UTC (44+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 01/20] NFS: Avoid cross-structure casting
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 02/20] gcc-plugins: Detail c-common.h location for GCC 4.6
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 03/20] compiler: Add __designated_init annotation
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 04/20] gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 05/20] randstruct: Whitelist struct security_hook_heads cast
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 06/20] randstruct: Whitelist UNIXCB cast
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 07/20] randstruct: Whitelist big_key path struct overloading
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 08/20] randstruct: Whitelist NIU struct page overloading
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 09/20] randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 10/20] randstruct: opt-out externally exposed function pointer structs
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 11/20] randstruct: Disable randomization of ACPICA structs
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 12/20] sgi-xp: Use designated initializers
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 13/20] drm/amdgpu: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 14/20] drm/amd/powerplay: "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 15/20] mtk-vcodec: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 16/20] ntfs: Use ERR_CAST() to avoid cross-structure cast
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 17/20] ocfs2: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 18/20] randstruct: Enable function pointer struct detection
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 19/20] [RFC] task_struct: Allow randomized layout
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 20/20] ACPICA: Use designated initializers
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 0/3] ipc subsystem refcounter conversions
2017-05-29 15:43 UTC (10+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] Patch for random mac address
2017-05-26 14:41 UTC (14+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4] add the option of fortified string.h functions
2017-05-26 9:54 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3] add the option of fortified string.h functions
2017-05-26 8:35 UTC (8+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 00/31] Standardize doc formats - part 1
2017-05-24 20:18 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 23/31] gcc-plugins.txt: standardize document format
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 0/5] stackprotector: ascii armor the stack canary
2017-05-24 16:35 UTC (12+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/5] random,stackprotect: introduce get_random_canary function
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/5] fork,random: use get_random_canary to set tsk->stack_canary
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/5] x86: ascii armor the x86_64 boot init stack canary
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/5] arm64: ascii armor the arm64 "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 5/5] sh64: ascii armor the sh64 "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3.18 52/59] stackprotector: Increase the per-task stack canarys random range from 32 bits to 64 bits on 64-bit platforms
2017-05-23 20:10 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4.4 094/103] stackprotector: Increase the per-task stack canarys random range from 32 bits to 64 bits on 64-bit platforms
2017-05-23 20:10 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4.9 140/164] stackprotector: Increase the per-task stack canarys random range from 32 bits to 64 bits on 64-bit platforms
2017-05-23 20:09 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4.11 161/197] stackprotector: Increase the per-task stack canarys random range from 32 bits to 64 bits on 64-bit platforms
2017-05-23 20:08 UTC
[kernel-hardening] Re: arch: arm: bpf: Converting cBPF to eBPF for arm 32 bit
2017-05-23 19:32 UTC (18+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 next 3/3] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules auto-load mode
2017-05-23 14:18 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
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