messages from 2017-06-13 07:55:30 to 2017-06-23 14:18:37 UTC [more...]
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] exec: Account for argv/envp pointers
2017-06-23 14:18 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/4] Reduce ELF_ET_DYN_BASE
2017-06-23 14:02 UTC (9+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/4] arm: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/4] arm64: "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/4] powerpc: "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/4] s390: "
[kernel-hardening] Re: [kernel hardening]Could we do something for KSPP?
2017-06-23 4:31 UTC (2+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] symlink/hardlink/FIFO restrictions
2017-06-23 4:27 UTC (4+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2] mm: Add SLUB free list pointer obfuscation
2017-06-23 1:50 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 0/4] randstruct: Enable function pointer struct detection
2017-06-23 0:20 UTC (13+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/4] task_struct: Allow randomized layout
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/4] randstruct: opt-out externally exposed function pointer structs
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/4] randstruct: Disable randomization of ACPICA structs
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/4] randstruct: Enable function pointer struct detection
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] binfmt_elf: Safely increment argv pointers
2017-06-22 17:38 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes
2017-06-22 0:04 UTC (34+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 01/13] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] [RFC] binfmt_elf: Use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE
2017-06-21 18:47 UTC (8+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2] binfmt_elf: Use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE
2017-06-21 18:24 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v2 1/1] gcc-plugins: Add stackleak feature erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls
2017-06-21 15:54 UTC (14+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v10 1/3] x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return
2017-06-21 13:57 UTC (9+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v10 2/3] arm/syscalls: "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v10 3/3] arm64/syscalls: "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v10 1/3] x86/syscalls: "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 00/23] Hardened usercopy whitelisting
2017-06-20 23:09 UTC (36+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 01/23] usercopy: Prepare for "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 02/23] usercopy: Enforce slab cache usercopy region boundaries
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 03/23] vfs: define usercopy region in names_cache slab caches
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 04/23] vfs: copy struct mount.mnt_id to userspace using put_user()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 05/23] befs: define usercopy region in befs_inode_cache slab cache
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 06/23] cifs: define usercopy region in cifs_request "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 07/23] exofs: define usercopy region in exofs_inode_cache "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 08/23] ext2: define usercopy region in ext2_inode_cache "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 09/23] ext4: define usercopy region in ext4_inode_cache "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 10/23] vxfs: define usercopy region in vxfs_inode "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 11/23] jfs: define usercopy region in jfs_ip "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 12/23] orangefs: define usercopy region in orangefs_inode_cache "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 13/23] ufs: define usercopy region in ufs_inode_cache "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 14/23] fork: define usercopy region in thread_stack, task_struct, mm_struct slab caches
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 15/23] net: define usercopy region in struct proto slab cache
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 16/23] net: copy struct sctp_sock.autoclose to userspace using put_user()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 17/23] dcache: define usercopy region in dentry_cache slab cache
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 18/23] scsi: define usercopy region in scsi_sense_cache "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 19/23] xfs: define usercopy region in xfs_inode "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 20/23] usercopy: convert kmalloc caches to usercopy caches
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 21/23] usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 22/23] usercopy: split user-controlled slabs to separate caches
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 23/23] mm: Allow slab_nomerge to be set at build time
[kernel-hardening] hard link restrictions
2017-06-20 21:02 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] mm: Add SLUB free list pointer obfuscation
2017-06-20 18:08 UTC (3+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 00/11] S.A.R.A. a new stacked LSM
2017-06-20 7:53 UTC (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 04/11] S.A.R.A. USB Filtering
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 05/11] Creation of "check_vmflags" LSM hook
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/6] Constant Time Memory Comparisons Are Important
2017-06-20 3:38 UTC (8+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] security/keys: use constant time memory comparison for macs
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 6/6] mac80211/wpa: use constant time memory comparison for MACs
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] rsa-pkcs1pad: "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5] add the option of fortified string.h functions
2017-06-19 21:02 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 00/20] Introduce struct layout randomization plugin
2017-06-19 19:24 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 07/20] randstruct: Whitelist big_key path struct overloading
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 22/31] gcc-plugins.txt: standardize document format
2017-06-19 18:58 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 0/4] ro protection for dynamic data
2017-06-19 7:12 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/4] Protectable Memory Allocator
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes
2017-06-18 19:12 UTC (18+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 06/13] iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 13/13] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 0/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM
2017-06-16 2:25 UTC (14+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 1/1] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH] print_tpe_error() can be static
[kernel-hardening] Why does no one care that Brad Spengler of GRSecurity is blatantly violating the intention of the rightsholders to the Linux Kernel?
2017-06-15 17:26 UTC (15+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 0/9] S.A.R.A. a new stacked LSM
2017-06-15 16:47 UTC (11+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 1/9] S.A.R.A. Documentation
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 2/9] S.A.R.A. framework creation
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 3/9] Creation of "check_vmflags" LSM hook
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 4/9] S.A.R.A. cred blob management
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 5/9] S.A.R.A. WX Protection
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 6/9] Creation of "pagefault_handler_x86" LSM hook
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 7/9] Trampoline emulation
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 8/9] Allowing for stacking procattr support in S.A.R.A
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 9/9] S.A.R.A. WX Protection procattr interface
[kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v1] shebang: restrict python interactive prompt/interpreter
2017-06-14 20:37 UTC (8+ messages)
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