messages from 2017-07-18 22:33:27 to 2017-08-02 18:06:09 UTC [more...]
[kernel-hardening] [RESEND][PATCH v4] mm: Add SLUB free list pointer obfuscation
2017-08-02 18:06 UTC
[kernel-hardening] x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization
2017-08-02 18:05 UTC (41+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC 06/22] kvm: Adapt assembly for PIE support
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC 07/22] x86: relocate_kernel - "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC 13/22] x86/power/64: "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC 16/22] x86/percpu: Adapt percpu "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC 17/22] compiler: Option to default to hidden symbols
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC 18/22] x86/relocs: Handle DYN relocations for PIE support
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC 19/22] x86/pie: Add option to build the kernel as PIE for x86_64
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC 20/22] x86/relocs: Add option to generate 64-bit relocations
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC 21/22] x86/module: Add support for mcmodel large and PLTs
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC 22/22] x86/kaslr: Add option to extend KASLR range from 1GB to 3GB
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization
[kernel-hardening] [RFC] Tagging of vmalloc pages for supporting the pmalloc allocator
2017-08-02 17:08 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 1/3] Revert "arm/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return"
2017-08-02 14:10 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 2/3] arm/syscalls: Optimize address limit check
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 3/3] arm64/syscalls: Move address limit check in loop
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 00/11] ARMv8.3 pointer authentication userspace support
2017-08-01 17:02 UTC (30+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 01/11] arm64: docs: describe ELF hwcaps
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 02/11] asm-generic: mm_hooks: allow hooks to be overridden individually
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 03/11] arm64: add pointer authentication register bits
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 04/11] arm64/cpufeature: add ARMv8.3 id_aa64isar1 bits
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 05/11] arm64/cpufeature: detect pointer authentication
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 06/11] arm64: Don't trap host pointer auth use to EL2
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 07/11] arm64: add basic pointer authentication support
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 08/11] arm64: expose user PAC bit positions via ptrace
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 09/11] arm64/kvm: preserve host HCR_EL2 value
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 10/11] arm64/kvm: context-switch ptrauth registers
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 11/11] arm64: docs: document pointer authentication
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 00/11] ARMv8.3 pointer authentication userspace support
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3] arm64: kernel: implement fast refcount checking
2017-08-01 1:41 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4] arm64: kernel: implement fast refcount checking
2017-07-31 21:36 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3] mm: Add SLUB free list pointer obfuscation
2017-07-31 20:17 UTC (12+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [v3] "
[kernel-hardening] It looks like there will be no more public versions of PaX and Grsec
2017-07-31 13:38 UTC (3+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] Yes you have standing to sue GRSecurity
2017-07-30 19:54 UTC (3+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4] mm: Add SLUB free list pointer obfuscation
2017-07-27 15:14 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2] arm64: kernel: implement fast refcount checking
2017-07-27 4:16 UTC (8+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/3] arm/syscalls: Move address limit check in loop
2017-07-26 18:29 UTC (11+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/3] arm/syscalls: Optimize work flags assembly check
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/3] arm64/syscalls: Move address limit check in loop
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/3] arm/syscalls: "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 0/5] MPXK: Intel MPX for in-kernel use
2017-07-26 9:15 UTC (18+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 1/5] x86: add CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MPX_KERNEL to Kconfig
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 2/5] gcc-plugins: adds MPXK gcc plugin
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 3/5] x86: add mpxk-wrappers
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 4/5] x86: MPXK base
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 5/5] lkdtm: Add kernel MPX testing
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH untested] arm64: kernel: implement fast refcount checking
2017-07-26 1:47 UTC (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v9] x86/asm: Implement fast refcount overflow protection
2017-07-25 20:55 UTC
[kernel-hardening] Issue with CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT=y and out of tree modules
2017-07-25 20:16 UTC (2+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v8 0/3] x86: Implement fast refcount overflow protection
2017-07-25 19:11 UTC (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v8 1/3] x86/asm: Add suffix macro for GEN_*_RMWcc()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v8 2/3] x86/asm: add ASM_UNREACHABLE
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v8 3/3] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount overflow protection
[kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 0/2] draft of stack clearing for arm64
2017-07-25 3:34 UTC (8+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 0/3] x86: Implement fast refcount overflow protection
2017-07-24 18:25 UTC (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 1/3] x86/asm: Add suffix macro for GEN_*_RMWcc()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 2/3] x86/asm: add ASM_UNREACHABLE
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v7 3/3] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount overflow protection
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 0/2] x86: Implement fast refcount overflow protection
2017-07-24 12:23 UTC (20+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 1/2] x86/asm: Add suffix macro for GEN_*_RMWcc()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 2/2] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount overflow protection
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v6 0/2] x86: "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v3 1/1] gcc-plugins: Add stackleak feature erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls
2017-07-24 12:15 UTC (3+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 00/11] S.A.R.A. a new stacked LSM
2017-07-24 0:58 UTC (11+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC PATCH 6/6] arm64: add VMAP_STACK and detect out-of-bounds SP
2017-07-20 19:10 UTC (20+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v10 1/3] x86/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return
2017-07-19 18:50 UTC (12+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v10 2/3] arm/syscalls: "
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/1] mm/slub.c: add a naive detection of double free or corruption
2017-07-19 14:02 UTC (9+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] Compilation error and probable exploit
2017-07-19 8:30 UTC (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re : "
` [kernel-hardening] Re : "
` [kernel-hardening] "
page: next (older) | prev (newer) | latest
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).