messages from 2017-08-10 17:26:10 to 2017-08-21 00:09:27 UTC [more...]
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v7 00/10] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing
2017-08-21 0:09 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v7 01/10] selftest: Enhance kselftest_harness.h with a step mechanism
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v7 02/10] bpf: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v7 03/10] bpf,landlock: Define an eBPF program type for a Landlock rule
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH net-next v7 04/10] bpf: Define handle_fs and add a new helper bpf_handle_fs_get_mode()
[kernel-hardening] hardening mmc driver
2017-08-20 16:59 UTC (5+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [RFC] memory allocations in genalloc
2017-08-18 14:47 UTC (3+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 00/30] implement KASLR for ARM
2017-08-18 11:48 UTC (58+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 01/30] asm-generic: add .data.rel.ro sections to __ro_after_init
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 02/30] ARM: assembler: introduce adr_l, ldr_l and str_l macros
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 03/30] ARM: head-common.S: use PC-relative insn sequence for __proc_info
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 04/30] ARM: head-common.S: use PC-relative insn sequence for idmap creation
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 05/30] ARM: head.S: use PC-relative insn sequence for secondary_data
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 06/30] ARM: kernel: use relative references for UP/SMP alternatives
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 07/30] ARM: head: use PC-relative insn sequence for __smp_alt
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 08/30] ARM: sleep.S: use PC-relative insn sequence for sleep_save_sp/mpidr_hash
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 09/30] ARM: head.S: use PC-relative insn sequences for __fixup_pv_table
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 10/30] ARM: head.S: use PC relative insn sequence to calculate PHYS_OFFSET
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 11/30] ARM: kvm: replace open coded VA->PA calculations with adr_l call
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 12/30] arm-soc: exynos: replace open coded VA->PA conversions
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 13/30] arm-soc: mvebu: replace open coded VA->PA conversion
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 14/30] arm-soc: various: replace open coded VA->PA calculation of pen_release
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 15/30] ARM: kernel: switch to relative exception tables
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 16/30] ARM: kernel: use relative phys-to-virt patch tables
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 17/30] arm-soc: tegra: make sleep asm code runtime relocatable
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 18/30] ARM: kernel: make vmlinux buildable as a PIE executable
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 19/30] ARM: kernel: use PC-relative symbol references in MMU switch code
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 20/30] ARM: kernel: use PC relative symbol references in suspend/resume code
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 21/30] ARM: mm: export default vmalloc base address
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 22/30] ARM: kernel: refer to swapper_pg_dir via its symbol
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 23/30] ARM: kernel: implement randomization of the kernel load address
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 24/30] ARM: decompressor: explicitly map decompressor binary cacheable
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 25/30] ARM: compressed: factor out zImage header and make it extensible
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 26/30] ARM: decompressor: add KASLR support
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 27/30] efi/libstub: add 'max' parameter to efi_random_alloc()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 28/30] efi/libstub: check for vmalloc= command line argument
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 29/30] efi/libstub: arm: reserve bootloader supplied initrd in memory map
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 30/30] efi/libstub: arm: implement KASLR
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 00/30] implement KASLR for ARM
[kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 0/2] draft of stack clearing for arm64
2017-08-18 8:07 UTC (9+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH] ARM: decompressor: implement autonomous KASLR offset calculation
2017-08-17 22:05 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCHv3 0/2] Command line randomness
2017-08-17 21:44 UTC (8+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv3 1/2] init: Move stack canary initialization after setup_arch
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv3 2/2] extract early boot entropy from the passed cmdline
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v3 1/1] gcc-plugins: Add stackleak feature erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls
2017-08-17 17:58 UTC (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] refactoring timers to avoid init_timer*()
2017-08-17 15:08 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization
2017-08-17 14:12 UTC (26+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 13/23] x86/power/64: Adapt assembly for PIE support
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 18/23] x86/relocs: Handle DYN relocations "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 19/23] x86: Support global stack cookie
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 20/23] x86/pie: Add option to build the kernel as PIE for x86_64
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 21/23] x86/relocs: Add option to generate 64-bit relocations
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 22/23] x86/module: Add support for mcmodel large and PLTs
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2 23/23] x86/kaslr: Add option to extend KASLR range from 1GB to 3GB
` [kernel-hardening] Re: x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization
[kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 0/2] Command line randomness
2017-08-17 5:10 UTC (9+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 1/2] init: Move stack canary initialization after setup_arch
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 2/2] extract early boot entropy from the passed cmdline
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 00/14] arm64: VMAP_STACK support
2017-08-15 18:15 UTC (25+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 01/14] arm64: remove __die()'s stack dump
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 02/14] fork: allow arch-override of VMAP stack alignment
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 03/14] arm64: kernel: remove {THREAD,IRQ_STACK}_START_SP
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 04/14] arm64: factor out PAGE_* and CONT_* definitions
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 05/14] arm64: clean up THREAD_* definitions
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 06/14] arm64: clean up irq stack definitions
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 07/14] arm64: move SEGMENT_ALIGN to <asm/memory.h>
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 08/14] efi/arm64: add EFI_KIMG_ALIGN
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 09/14] arm64: factor out entry stack manipulation
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 10/14] arm64: assembler: allow adr_this_cpu to use the stack pointer
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 11/14] arm64: use an irq "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 12/14] arm64: add basic VMAP_STACK support
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 13/14] arm64: add on_accessible_stack()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCHv2 14/14] arm64: add VMAP_STACK overflow detection
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCHv2 00/14] arm64: VMAP_STACK support
[kernel-hardening] [RESEND][PATCH v9] x86/asm: Implement fast refcount overflow protection
2017-08-15 16:19 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 00/14] arm64: VMAP_STACK support
2017-08-15 11:19 UTC (12+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 05/14] arm64: clean up THREAD_* definitions
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 10/14] arm64: assembler: allow adr_this_cpu to use the stack pointer
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 14/14] arm64: add VMAP_STACK overflow detection
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 00/10] Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership
2017-08-15 9:39 UTC (34+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 02/10] mm, x86: Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 04/10] arm64: Add __flush_tlb_one()
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 05/10] arm64/mm: Add support for XPFO
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 06/10] arm64/mm: Disable section mappings if XPFO is enabled
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 07/10] arm64/mm: Don't flush the data cache if the page is unmapped by XPFO
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 10/10] lkdtm: Add test for XPFO
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 1/4] syscalls: Use CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION for addr_limit_user_check
2017-08-14 21:37 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 2/4] Revert "arm/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return"
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 3/4] arm/syscalls: Optimize address limit check
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 4/4] arm64/syscalls: Move address limit check in loop
[kernel-hardening][RFD] Is there any plan to port the RAP feature from PAX/Grsecurity to main line ?
2017-08-14 17:44 UTC (6+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [linux-next][PATCH v2] mm/slub.c: add a naive detection of double free or corruption
2017-08-11 17:26 UTC (2+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 00/11] ARMv8.3 pointer authentication userspace support
2017-08-11 11:29 UTC (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 07/11] arm64: add basic pointer authentication support
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 00/11] ARMv8.3 pointer authentication userspace support
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] MIPS: usercopy: Implement stack frame object validation
2017-08-10 17:32 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
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